ENDNOTES

1 See Christian Aid, Oxfam-GB, Save the Children, No End in Sight: The Human Tragedy of the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, August 2001.

2 IDP numbers are estimates. It is very difficult to obtain precise numbers due to the country’s vast size, inadequate infrastructure and lack of access to various conflict areas.

3 Gross Primary Enrollment Ration refers to the number of children enrolled, regardless of age, divided by the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the same level.

4 The phrase “children associated with armed forces and groups” is used in this report in reference to the more commonly used term “child soldiers,” which Watchlist has used in other contexts. In DRC, the term “children associated with armed forces and groups” refers to the widely recognized definition of “child soldiers” established in 1997 in the Cape Town Principles and Best Practices. “[A child soldier is] any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers, and those accompanying such groups, other than purely as family members. It includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms.”

5 The DRC governing authorities cooperate with the investigations of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to prosecute crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC in DRC. The transitional government signed a special agreement allowing the ICC to pursue activities in DRC until the enactment of the full implementation legislation. The new constitution does not refer to the ICC, however it provides immunities and privileges to some leaders who might be subject to prosecution by the ICC.

6 According to some analysts, Laurent Kabila’s four years in power did more harm to the Congolese economy than Mobutu’s entire tenure.

7 Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and the MLC signed the cease-fire agreement. The RCD and Burundian, Rwandan and Ugandan opposition armed groups that operated in DRC were not signatories to the Lusaka agreement.

8 The Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) and the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) split into two factions in 1999: the RCD-Goma (RCD-G); and the RCD-Kisangani (RCD-K), which later became RCD-K/ML. The armed forces of Uganda have traditionally supported the RCD-K/ML and the MLC, while the armed forces of Rwanda have traditionally supported RCD-Goma.

9 The LRA is estimated to have abducted 16,000 Ugandan and Sudanese refugee children. Both adult and children abductees are taken as war booty and forced to commit horrific acts of brutality against other children and adults. At least 85 percent of the LRA’s forces are thought to be abducted men, women and children (Watchlist Sudan Report, March 2003).

10 Commander Masunzu is the leader of a Banyamulenge-based uprising among RCD troops.

11 Critics of MONUC argued that the force was weak and unable to improve the human rights situation for three primary reasons: 1) the small size of the force operating in a vast area; 2) the limited civilian protection mandate; and 3) the general atmosphere of insecurity.

12 Primary tasks and priorities of the Child Protection Section include:

• ensuring a child-conscious approach within MONUC in all its activities;

• monitoring, reporting and advocacy related to minors on violations of international human rights and humanitarian law;

• focusing on the need to end impunity;

• facilitating and supporting, together with UNICEF and other partners, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of Congolese child soldiers;

• facilitating and supporting disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of foreign child soldiers;

• training and other capacity-building activities;

• ensuring that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and other MONUC sections are adequately informed about issues related to CAC;

• providing advice on strategies and advocacy for child protection;

• conducting sensitization activities to raise awareness of the rights of the child, especially related to CAC;

• providing funding for certain CAC projects (through Norwegian Trust Fund);

• promoting inclusion of child protection issues in the peace process and transitional period.

13 Uganda assumed military control of Ituri in 1998, however Uganda never assumed direct administrative or political control for the district. Rather, it acted as “kingmaker” to various armed groups vying for control of the area. The principal armed political groups that have operated in the district are the RCD-K/ML, MLC, RCD-N and UPC. Many other armed groups, including the Mai Mai and Interahamwe, have operated in Ituri. According to AI, all of the armed political groups fighting in Ituri are in some respect protégés of the Ugandan government.

14 This camp subsequently closed in August 2005.

15 This provision does not apply to national staff of MONUC involved in a bona fide relationship according to Congolese national law or customs.

16 For a complete list of businesses, see Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC (S/2002/1146), Annex III. For more information on the OECD guidelines, see www.oecd.org.

17 The Kimberly Process is a negotiating procedure to establish minimum, acceptable international standards for national certification schemes of import and export of rough diamonds, in an effort to stem the flow of rough diamonds from conflict areas, thereby contributing to the sustainability of peace and protecting the legitimate diamond industry. For more information on the Kimberly Process, see www.kimberlyprocess.com.

18The armed wing of the RCD-K/ML is the Congolese People’s Army (APC).