Indicators
INDICATORS |
Sri Lanka
|
Population |
Estimated 20.7 million people in 2005, including an estimated 6.1
million children (UNICEF, 2007) |
Gross National
Income (GNI) per Capita |
US $1,300 in 2006 (World Bank, 2007) |
Refugees and
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) |
Estimated 97,000 refugees in Tamil Nadu (
India
)
as of December 2007, including an estimated 20,000 refugees from the
post-January 2006 conflict
Estimated 456,000 IDPs as of November 2007,
including an estimated 189,000 from the post-April 2006 conflict
Children constitute approximately 39
percent of IDPs (UNHCR, January 2008) |
Infant Mortality |
12/1,000 in 2005 (UNICEF, 2007) |
HIV/AIDS |
Less than 0.1 percent estimated prevalence rate as of 2005 (UNAIDS,
WHO and UNICEF, 2006) |
Education |
Estimated 97 percent net enrollment rate
for primary education, not accounting for regional differences or actual
student attendance as of 2005; near gender parity in school enrollment
(UNESCO, 2007) |
Gender-Based
Violence (GBV) |
Conflict-related
GBV, including sexual violence in IDP camps, trafficking, sexual
exploitation, early marriages and sexual harassment at military checkpoints.
Specific data on prevalence of GBV is scant |
Trafficking |
As of 2004, an estimated 5,000 Sri Lankan children had been trafficked
for commercial sex, domestic work and child recruitment (ILO, 2004) |
Landmines and
Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) |
Estimated 99 sq km of land is contaminated by ERW and 730 villages are contaminated by landmines,
according to GoSL estimates (Landmine
Monitor Report 2007) |
Small Arms |
Estimated 1 to 2.4
million small arms in circulation in Sri Lanka, half of which are owned by
civilians (independent experts, cited in Small Arms Survey, 2004) Estimated 45,000
small arms in circulation according to GoSL officials (SAS, 2004) |
Child Soldiers |
6,248 cases of child recruitment by the LTTE, including 2,469 girls,
were reported to UNICEF between January 2002 and December 2007. 453 cases of
child recruitment, including one case of a girl, by the TMVP/Karuna faction
with alleged complicity of the GoSL were reported to UNICEF between April
2004 and December 2007. Actual numbers of recruitment are thought to be
significantly higher (UNICEF, 2008) |
Abductions and
Disappearances |
More than 1,100 new
abductions and “disappearances” of civilians, including children, reported
between January 2006 and June 2007, mainly Tamils (HRW, August 2007) |
Attacks on
Humanitarian and Human Rights Workers |
At least 28
humanitarian NGO workers were intentionally killed from January 2006 to
November 2007 (UNOCHA, 2007) |
International
Treaties Signed (S)/ Ratified (R)/ Acceded (A) (Year) |
International
Treaties Not Signed |
· Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (R)
(1991)
· Optional Protocol
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (R) (2000)
· Optional Protocol
on the
Sale
of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (R) (2006)
· The
Geneva
Conventions of 1949 (R) (1959)
· International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (A) (1980)
· International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (A) (1980)
· Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (A) (1982)
· Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (A) (2004)
· Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (A) (1950)
· International Labor Organization (ILO)
Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor (R) (1991) |
· Additional Protocols to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949
· 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol
· Convention
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (“Mine Ban Treaty”)
·
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
· Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment |
UN Security Council Resolutions on
Sri Lanka
|
UN Security Council
has not adopted any country specific resolutions on
Sri Lanka
|
UN Security Council
Resolutions on Children and Armed Conflict |
1612 (July 2005),
1539 (April 2004), 1460 (January 2003), 1379 (November 2001), 1314 (August
2000), 1261 (August 1999) |
Note: In September
2006, the Sri Lankan Supreme Court “declared that neither United Nations
conventions signed by Sri Lanka nor the directives of monitoring bodies are
binding on the country” according to a statement by the Asian Human Rights
Commission (AHRC), Sri Lanka: Supreme
Court Removes Country from Obligations under International Law, Raises
Unprecedented Questions for UN, September 18, 2006. [1]
Sri Lanka
’s children have been embroiled in a
brutal armed conflict which has killed more than 67,000 civilians in the last
two decades and caused untold suffering among the Sri Lankan population. Gross
human rights violations committed by Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) forces, the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and armed breakaway groups, like the
Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP)/Karuna faction, have created a climate
of constant fear and insecurity throughout the country.
Both the GoSL and the
LTTE have restricted or denied the delivery of vital humanitarian aid to the
Jaffna peninsula and the
Vanni area in the North, certain areas in the East and GoSL-declared high
security zones. Adding to considerable bureaucratic barriers, humanitarian and
human rights workers have been increasingly harassed, threatened and even
killed while carrying out their lifesaving work. Additionally, restrictions on
the movement of civilians have exacerbated the humanitarian crisis by preventing
civilians from escaping into safety or seeking assistance. Perpetrators commit violations against
children and other civilians with impunity. Today, the establishment of an
independent human rights monitoring system is more critical than ever since the
recent dissolution of the cease-fire agreement and the subsequent withdrawal of
the Nordic-led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM).
Children throughout
Sri Lanka
face a broad spectrum of violations against their security and rights,
perpetrated by various armed forces and groups. In this report, Watchlist
illustrates this situation and provides practical recommendations for urgent
actions needed to protect Sri Lankan children.
Refugees and IDPs
Between April 2006 and
April 2007, the resumption of violent conflict displaced more than 300,000
people within
Sri Lanka
and
forced more than 20,000 to seek safety in
India
. Approximately half a million Sri Lankans had
been displaced prior to April 2006. Children comprise approximately 39 percent
of the displaced population.
Internally displaced
persons (IDPs) suffer as a result of poor sanitary conditions and strained
health facilities, as well as insufficient food supplies in host communities
and IDP camps. The lack of security in and around the camps has exposed
children to abduction, recruitment and sexual violence. Some IDP camps have
become direct targets of military attacks. Similarly, Sri Lankan refugees in
India
live in difficult conditions. Though given minimal assistance by the Indian
government, many live in refugee camps with outdated infrastructure from the
1980s and 1990s. In addition, approximately 23,000 Sri Lankan refugees living
outside the camps are not entitled to any assistance.
Some Sri Lankan
children have grown up in the confines of IDP or refugee settings. While
finding durable solutions for IDPs and refugees is a priority, humanitarian
organizations have considered the recent returns of many IDPs premature and
have criticized the GoSL for forcing thousands of IDPs to return to insecure
areas. The lack of clear policies and plans for IDPs has stirred tensions among
various groups, mainly along ethnic lines.
Health
Armed conflict,
displacement and restrictions in the delivery of humanitarian aid have
increased Sri Lankans’ vulnerability to malnutrition and disease. In addition,
many health facilities in the North and East have been damaged or destroyed.
The World Food Program warned of an emerging humanitarian emergency in
Jaffna and Batticaloa and
an acute food and livelihood crisis in five other districts in the North and
East in May 2007. Ongoing armed conflict and access restrictions have prevented
people in conflict-affected areas from accessing life-saving medical care.
Children in particular suffer under these conditions.
HIV/AIDS
At the end of 2005,
the estimated national HIV prevalence rate among people between the ages of 15
and 49 was less than 0.1 percent in Sri Lanka, according to UNAIDS.
Nonetheless, GoSL, international and national agencies warn that HIV may spread
further among the population, particularly among older children, due to lack of
awareness, stigmatization and unsafe sexual practices. Even health care
personnel and officials in the education sector are known to have discriminated
against individuals with HIV/AIDS. Armed conflict and
consequent displacement have created conditions that make the spread of HIV
more likely in the North and East.
Education
Sri Lanka
’s armed conflict has turned schools into
military targets, IDP camps and military shelters. More than 250,000 children
in
Sri Lanka
,
mostly in the North and East, have been forced to interrupt their education due
to the renewed outbreak of armed conflict in 2006. Military attacks had damaged
or destroyed 261 schools as of September 2007 and their reconstruction has been
delayed due to insecurity. The massive outflow of educational staff in recent
years from conflict-affected areas has resulted in a serious lack of teachers
in the North and East. Exceptionally high student dropout and absentee rates
are prevalent in conflict areas, particularly among displaced children. Many
students who remain in school require special attention as a result of distress
due to conflict-related experiences or because they missed years of education.
Gender-Based Violence
There is a dearth of
information about conflict-related cases of gender-based violence (GBV) in
Sri Lanka
,
which makes it difficult to assess the nature and scope of the problem.
However, anecdotal information suggests that this lack of information does not
necessarily reflect the reality of the situation. Rather, it is likely that
incidents of GBV have increased due to the armed conflict, yet incidents are
not reported or systematically documented due to survivors’ fear of
stigmatization or retribution and the lack of access to adequate and
appropriate legal, medical and social services for them.
Landmines and ERW
Before the 2002
cease-fire, the LTTE and the GoSL had used antipersonnel mines extensively
throughout the conflict. The mines’ proximity to civilian settlements has
endangered the lives of the war-affected populations in the North and East.
Children accounted for 30 percent of casualties from landmines and explosive
remnants of war (ERW) in 2006. Lack of access to these areas due to mine
contamination has hindered humanitarian assistance, economic reconstruction and
the return of displaced people to their homes. Since the upsurge of violence in
mid-2006, agencies have been forced to slow down or even halt demining efforts. In some cases, clearance efforts may have
been deliberately blocked by the military. Recent reports also point to renewed
use of landmines by the LTTE, including claymore mines which are notorious for
their indiscriminate and lethal effects on civilians.
Small Arms
The proliferation of
illicit small arms has become one of the main barriers to achieving sustainable
peace and human security for children and their communities in
Sri Lanka
.
Independent experts estimate that 1 to 2.4 million small arms are in
circulation in
Sri Lanka
,
mostly owned by civilians. Despite its active participation in international
efforts to stave off the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, the
GoSL has not been able or willing to monitor or control the circulation of
illicit arms in its territory. For its part, the LTTE has employed an effective
network for guaranteeing a steady flow of small arms into the country. The
European Union, as well as the
United
States
and other countries have declared the
LTTE a terrorist organization and introduced measures to prevent it from
raising money for arms or other purposes.
Child Soldiers
Sri Lankan children
currently face the ubiquitous threat of being abducted, recruited and used as
soldiers whether they are in areas controlled by the GoSL or the LTTE. UNICEF’s
child recruitment database, the authoritative source on child recruitment and
use, documents 6,248 cases of child recruitment by the LTTE between January
2002 and December 2007, including many girls, and 453 cases of child recruitment
by the TMVP/Karuna faction, with alleged complicity of the GoSL, between April
2004 and December 2007. However, UNICEF relies exclusively on voluntary
reporting by parents and communities, therefore it is likely that the actual
numbers are much higher.
Despite promises to do
so, the GoSL has not yet conducted a credible and thorough investigation into
the alleged complicity of certain elements of its security forces with the
TMVP/Karuna faction in the recruitment of children. Both the LTTE and the TMVP/Karuna
faction have been named by the UN Secretary-General as repeat offenders of this
crime. There is currently no formal disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration (DDR) process for children, nor policies or programs to protect
and reintegrate children who surrender to the GoSL or seek its protection after
they escape from armed groups.
Other Violations and
Vulnerabilities
Sri Lankan children
continue to face a spectrum of other violations of their security and rights,
including trafficking, child labor, prostitution, abuse in orphanages and
arbitrary and illegal arrests. While Sri Lankan children were vulnerable to
these violations even before the armed conflict, anecdotal information suggests
that incidents likely have increased due to the conflict.
Recommendations
In this report, the Watchlist on Children and
Armed Conflict makes urgent recommendations to the GoSL, the LTTE, the
TMVP/Karuna faction; the United Nations Security Council; the 1612 Taskforce in
Sri Lanka
; the humanitarian
community in
Sri Lanka
;
donors; and other governments. Of primary importance, is the call to all armed
forces and groups in
Sri
Lanka
to immediately halt violations against
children. Additionally, all actors must take immediate action to protect
children in
Sri Lanka
from further abuse and to find ways to assist and support those who have
suffered the consequences of decades of armed conflict.
For more than two decades, the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has been fighting with the Sinhalese-dominated Government
of Sri Lanka (GoSL) to establish an independent Tamil state or a degree of
autonomy for Tamils in the North and East of Sri Lanka. For decades, the LTTE
has accused the GoSL of discriminating against the Tamil minority in
Sri Lanka
’s
multi-ethnic state. [2]
After
Sri Lanka
’s
independence from
Britain
in 1948, the Sinhalese majority government passed a number of laws that barred
Tamils from certain educational and employment opportunities. Most notably,
Sinhala became the official language of
Sri Lanka
in 1956, [3] costing thousands of Tamils their civil service jobs. At the time, many Tamils
staged demonstrations against these policies, demanding equal rights and
adequate political representation. [4] The GoSL’s excessive use of force against the protesters incited counter force
by emerging militant Tamil groups. What began as a largely nonviolent movement
turned into a brutal civil war in the 1980s. Full-blown armed conflict broke out in 1983 after Tamil
militants killed 13 GoSL troops, triggering violent ethnic riots and a massive
displacement of Tamils.
The LTTE, under the leadership of Velupillai
Prabhakaran, emerged as the dominant Tamil armed group, violently eliminating
its rivals. To solidify its territorial claims, the LTTE established a “quasi” state
in parts of the Vanni area [5] ,
the northern mainland, controlling Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi and parts of
Vavuniya and Mannar. [6] Today, the LTTE administers government-like
services in these territories, including a police force, justice system and tax
regime. The Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) has effectively acted as
the LTTE’s humanitarian wing. Most recently, the TRO has been accused of
supporting the LTTE’s war efforts. [7] In
addition to these institutions, the Tamil diaspora in the United States,
Canada, the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia provides a secure financial base
for the LTTE’s military and other operations, according to a Human Rights Watch
(HRW) report, Funding the “Final War,” LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the
Tamil Diaspora, March 14, 2006.
Sri
Lanka
’s armed conflict has been characterized by
massive human rights violations committed by both the GoSL and the LTTE. The
LTTE has employed suicide bombers, landmines, claymore mines [8] and other explosive remnants of war (ERW), used children as soldiers and
civilians as shields, abducted civilians, engaged in politically motivated
killings and blocked water supplies from the civilian population.
Similarly, the GoSL has committed grave abuses of
human rights, including indiscriminate shelling and aerial bombardment of
LTTE-controlled areas, arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial killings, torture,
forced returns of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to unsafe areas and
forced evictions. More recently, Sri Lankan security forces have been accused
of complicity in the recruitment and use of child soldiers by the Tamil Makkal
Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP)/Karuna
faction, a paramilitary group operating in the East. [9]
In what many describe as a war on civilians, gross
human rights violations have created a climate of constant fear and insecurity. An
estimated 67,000 civilians have lost their lives in the conflict between the
LTTE and the GoSL since 1983, according to the United Nations, in United Nations Concerned by Civilian Deaths
in Sri Lanka, January 2, 2007. At
least 45 children were killed and 77 maimed due to armed conflict between
November 1, 2006 and September 14, 2007, according to the 2007
Secretary-General’s Report on Children and Armed Conflict (S/2007/758, para.
24). Fighting has been concentrated in the North and East, but has also
spilled into the South with the LTTE staging suicide bombings and other
violence in
Colombo
and other areas. Today’s disregard for the rule of law, increased hostilities
and rampant impunity have caused innumerable problems, including the
polarization of communities, the militarization of the civilian population and
the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. Extremely high levels of
violence in the country have also led to the development of new and multiple
armed breakaway factions.
The emergence of the TMVP/Karuna faction, an unregistered political party and
paramilitary group, added to the volatile environment in
Sri Lanka
. Vinayagamoorthy
Muralitharan, alias Colonel Karuna, the LTTE’s leading commander in the East,
founded the TMVP/Karuna faction in March 2004 after
splitting from the LTTE. The TMVP/Karuna faction allegedly cooperates with the
GoSL to fight against the LTTE, according to HRW, Return to War. Human Rights under Siege, August 2007. This
cooperation enabled the TMVP/Karuna
faction to establish itself in the districts of Ampara, Trincomalee and Batticaloa.
Although the GoSL officially regained control of these territories, its
security forces have failed to disarm the TMVP/Karuna faction and other smaller paramilitary groups or to stop their human rights
violations against the civilian population.
After leaving the TMVP/Karuna faction,
Colonel Karuna was arrested in the
UK
on November 2, 2007, on pending
immigration charges. Pillayan, the TMVP’s second in command, has declared
himself the new leader of the TMVP/Karuna faction. However, internal power
struggles within the faction have resulted in breakaway factions and increased
human rights violations with no clearly identified group to hold accountable
for violations.
In 2002, the GoSL and the LTTE signed a
cease-fire agreement (CFA) brokered by
Norway
, and agreed to move towards
a negotiated settlement. An independent monitoring mission, the Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM), initially comprised of staff from five Nordic
countries (
Norway
,
Sweden
,
Finland
,
Denmark
and
Iceland
) [10] was established to investigate violations of the CFA. Peace talks between the
GoSL and the LTTE started in September 2002 with
Norway
acting as the mediator. Four
co-chairs (
Norway
, the
United States
,
Japan
, and the European Union) were
also designated to support the peace process, particularly post-conflict
rehabilitation and development.
Despite this international support for the peace
process, the LTTE unilaterally abandoned the process in April 2003, citing its
exclusion from donor talks. The LTTE predicated future negotiations upon the
acceptance of its proposal to establish a self-governing authority for the
North and East. The GoSL opposed this demand viewing it as an effective
secession of these territories. There have been several attempts to re-engage
both parties in the peace process since then, most recently in October 2006. None of these have
yet succeeded.
Between 2002 and 2005, the CFA led to some
improvements in the human rights and humanitarian situation for civilians. Yet,
political assassinations, child recruitment and ethnic clashes between Muslims
and Tamils, often over unsettled land issues, continued.
Following the devastating Asian tsunami in
December 2004, the GoSL and the LTTE agreed to cooperate in relief efforts as
part of the Post-Tsunami
Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS). Many donors tied assistance to shared aid
structures, viewing this as an opportunity to overcome ethno-political
barriers. However, the P-TOMS eventually collapsed following the Sri Lankan
Supreme Court’s decision to render the shared aid system unconstitutional.
India
, the
United States
,
Canada
and the
UK
,
as well as other countries and the European Union (EU) have declared the LTTE a
terrorist organization. The
United States
and the
UK
have suspended some aid to the GoSL in response to alleged human rights
violations by military groups with which the GoSL cooperates. [11] Despite warnings and sanctions, violations of the CFA continued by both sides.
The SLMM reported 4,181 violations of the CFA between February 2002 and April
2007, of which the vast majority, 3,830 violations, were committed by the LTTE.
On January 3, 2008, the GoSL officially abrogated the CFA of 2002, and
the SLMM consequently terminated its operational activities in
Sri Lanka
on January 16, 2008. Top UN officials and many governments, including
Japan
,
Norway
,
and the
US
,
as well as the EU, raised concerns about the protection of civilians and
humanitarian access to affected areas following the GoSL’s declaration. UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has called for an end to bloodshed through a
political solution.
During the few years before the formal end of
the cease-fire in 2008, the political climate had increasingly turned towards a
resumption of hostilities. The assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman
Kadirgamar in 2005 prompted the GoSL to enact the Emergency Regulations of
August 2005, giving the security forces broad powers to arrest and detain
civilians. After presidential elections in November 2005, the United People’s
Freedom Alliance (UPFA) coalition government led by President Mahinda Rajapakse
of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, assumed a
more confrontational stance against the LTTE than the preceding government and
expanded the Emergency Regulations in December 2006. The LTTE, for its part,
reinforced belligerence with a series of suicide attacks and political
killings.
The GoSL, likely encouraged by territorial
gains in the East, appears determined to defeat the LTTE militantly before
entering into further peace negotiations. To achieve this “military solution,”
it is widely believed that the GoSL is collaborating with the TMVP/Karuna
faction, using the group’s insider knowledge of the LTTE, and its intelligence
and troops, including child soldiers, to fight the LTTE. The GoSL also raised
its military expenditure by almost 20 percent from 2007 to 2008, according to BBC News, “Sri Lanka Defense Budget to
Soar,” October 10, 2007. In the preceding year, the government had raised
military expenditure by 40 percent, according to The Economist, “A War Strange as Fiction,” June 7, 2007. The LTTE
has similarly engaged in a massive funding campaign, urging and, in some cases,
coercing members of the Tamil diaspora to contribute to a “final war” according
to HRW, Funding the “Final War,” LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil
Diaspora, March 14, 2006. In preparation, it has re-engaged in a campaign
of “compulsory training and mobilization of civilians” in Vanni since 2006,
according to OCHA, Common Humanitarian
Action Plan (CHAP) for Sri Lanka 2007, July 17, 2007.
Already, efforts to achieve a military solution have resulted in massive
human rights violations and a humanitarian crisis in the conflict-affected
areas. More than 3,000 civilians have been killed in the conflict since the
renewal of fighting in 2006, according to the UN, United Nations Concerned by Civilian Deaths in Sri Lanka, January
2, 2007. More than 50 civilians were killed in aerial bombardments, shelling
and claymore mine attacks in the last two weeks of November 2007, according to
Amnesty International (AI)/HRW, Human
Rights Council: Urgent Action Needed to End Abuses in Sri Lanka, December
7, 2007. In addition, reports indicate that fighting has intensified in the
northern areas of Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi, Mannar, Vavuniya, Weli Oya and
Jaffna, as well as at sea.
The absence of a functioning human rights
monitoring system in
Sri
Lanka
has put the lives of those speaking
out against human rights violations in jeopardy while allowing perpetrators to
commit crimes with impunity. National and international human rights
organizations have thus been demanding the establishment of an independent
monitoring mission under the auspices of the Office of the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR). [12] This office would receive complaints of human rights violations and conduct
appropriate investigations. [13] This need for monitoring became even more critical with the dissolution of the
CFA and withdrawal of the SLMM. Yet, the GoSL continues to oppose an
independent human rights monitoring mission, referring to existing mechanisms
and commissions established by the government such as the Human Rights
Commission (HRC), the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (CoI) [14] and a number of other commissions. [15]
The current armed conflict has triggered
humanitarian emergencies in two districts and acute food and livelihood crises
in five others in the North and East, according to the World Food Program
(WFP), Executive Brief: Sri Lanka
Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification (IPC), May
2007. The upsurge in violence since April 2006 has also caused the displacement
of more than 300,000 people. Approximately 189,000 of these people were still
displaced as of November 2007 according to UNHCR (see below: Refugees and
IDPs). Restrictions on the movement of civilians have also exacerbated the
humanitarian crisis. For example, people can only leave the Vanni area if
issued a local pass by the LTTE and on the condition that one family member is
left behind (S/2007/758, para. 40).
The GoSL and the LTTE do not provide the
people living in these crisis areas with adequate assistance. Instead, they
have at times obstructed the delivery of vital humanitarian assistance.
Humanitarian organizations are especially concerned about the lack of access to
the
Jaffna
peninsula in the North, the Vanni, certain areas in the East and parts of the
country declared by the GoSL as high security zones (HSZs). Beginning in August
2006, the government closed the A9 highway, the only land route linking
Jaffna to the rest of the
country. The LTTE, in turn, put up a sea blockade, cutting off 600,000 people
in
Jaffna from
aid supplies, according to AI Report 2007.
Humanitarian programs also continue to face restrictions on operational space.
For example, in June 2007, if permitted through a checkpoint at Madavachchiya,
a main highway intersection, humanitarian trucks were forced to offload goods
for inspection and then had to transfer them to other trucks, which delayed the
provision of assistance and jeopardized lives.
The conditions for humanitarian access
improved somewhat in some areas between August 2007 and November 2007,
according to IRIN, “
Sri Lanka
: Humanitarian access
improving in resettlement areas in East,” November 21, 2007. Although relief
and humanitarian agencies were still required to go through a cumbersome
bureaucratic process to access certain regions, particularly in the East, a new
government system allowed them access to most conflict-affected areas,
including resettlement sites. Nevertheless, many agencies, especially those dealing with protection
issues, are still rarely permitted to access these areas.
Humanitarian aid workers are increasingly
being harassed, threatened and even killed in the North and East. In many
instances, the LTTE has forced national aid workers to join its ranks or to
contribute money or labor to its war efforts, according to the UN
Secretary-General’s 2007 report on children and armed conflict in
Sri Lanka
(S/2007/758, para. 40). Since January 2006, at least 28 humanitarian aid
workers have been intentionally killed, according to IRIN, “
Sri Lanka
:
UN urges investigations of deaths and more security for aid workers,” November
14, 2007. This includes 17 Sri Lankan aid workers from the international NGO
Action Contre la Faim (Action Against Hunger, ACF) who were murdered, execution
style, allegedly by Sri Lankan security personnel, in the eastern town of
Muttur in the Trincomalee
district in August 2006. To date, no one has been held accountable for the
crime. UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Sir John Holmes,
described
Sri Lanka
as one of “the most dangerous places in
the world for aid workers” in an interview with Reuters, “Sri Lanka Rebukes UN Aid Chief Over Safety Fears,” August
10, 2007. This heightened aggression against aid workers has caused many NGOs
to increase their security measures, limit their movement and scale down their
operations or even suspend them in some cases.
Free media and information exchange has
become elusive in
Sri Lanka
’s
current climate of fear and intimidation against journalists, local and
international NGOs, humanitarian workers and human rights activists. [16] International human rights and humanitarian NGOs are frequently accused of
clandestine support for the LTTE in the local media or on official GoSL
websites. Those who publicly criticize the security forces or the government’s
human rights record risk harassment, abduction and death. [17] Accusations against international NGOs and UN agencies undermine the
credibility of humanitarian and human rights work to the detriment of people in
need. Moreover, they endanger the lives of humanitarian and human rights
workers.
Security forces are allowed to arrest members
of the media and civil society organizations for peaceful activities protected
under Sri Lankan and international law under the emergency Prevention and
Prohibition of Terrorism and Specified Terrorist Activities regulations of
December 6, 2006. [18] The
GoSL also established a Parliamentary Select Committee responsible for
investigating NGO activity in
Sri
Lanka
.
In those areas that have been blocked to the
UN, NGOs and the media, the government or the LTTE are the only information
sources, resulting in unbalanced information and propaganda. Both the GoSL and
the LTTE want to persuade their respective constituency of their military
successes to justify the costs and sacrifices, according to the National Peace
Council (NPC), a Sri Lankan think tank that supports the nonviolent settlement
of armed conflict.
Refugees and IDPs
The resumption of violent conflict caused the
new displacement of more than 300,000 people within
Sri
Lanka
from April 2006 to April 2007 and the movement of
an estimated 20,000 refugees to
India
,
according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), Civilians in the Way of Conflict: Displaced
People in Sri Lanka, September 26, 2007. The newly displaced persons originate mainly from the areas of
Batticaloa, Vanni, Trincomalee, Ampara and
Jaffna, according to UNHCR. Reflecting the ethnic make up of these
regions, the majority of them are Tamils and Muslims, according to IDMC. In addition, approximately half a million
people were displaced by conflict prior to April 2006 and by the 2004 tsunami,
according to IDMC. Thousands of IDPs who are not registered are not included in
these figures [19] and do
not benefit from any official assistance. [20]
Even after more than a decade, a number of IDPs have not received
adequate assistance to end their displacement. While tens of thousands of people have
returned home spontaneously or through government-run resettlement programs, a
total of 456,000 displaced persons remained in
Sri Lanka
as of November 2007. This
includes 189,000 IDPs from the post-April 2006 conflict. A total of 97,000 Sri Lankan refugees were still
living in
India
’s
Tamil Nadu state as of December 2007, according to UNHCR.
The causes of displacement are many, as
parties to the conflict have not spared the civilian population and in some
cases have specifically targeted them. Civilians have fled violent clashes,
landmine and ERW contamination and recruitment of children (see below: Child
Soldiers). Some families fled in a desperate attempt to spare their children
from recruitment by either the LTTE or the TMVP/Karuna faction, according to AI, Waiting to Go
Home - The Plight of the Internally Displaced, June 29, 2006.
Children have been acutely affected by
displacement in
Sri Lanka
.
According to UNHCR’s estimates, children constitute approximately 39 percent of
the displaced population. In the turmoil of the armed conflict, thousands have
been separated from their families and live in vulnerable circumstances without
proper guardianship.
Lives
of Internally Displaced
Persons
For many IDPs the
flight from their homes was the first phase of a strenuous and long
displacement which they initially envisioned as a temporary situation. The
majority of IDPs live in government-run IDP camps, so-called “welfare centers,”
which have been established in public buildings. Others stay with host families
or relatives.
The arrival of large
numbers of IDPs has strained sanitary and health facilities, as well as food
supplies in host communities and IDP camps (see below: Health). In some
clinics, one doctor must see on average 150 IDP patients per day compared to
the 50 patients per day recommended by the internationally accepted SPHERE
standards for humanitarian relief in emergencies, according to International
Medical Corps (IMC), Save
Sri Lanka
’s
Neglected Population, IMC’s Mobile Clinics Bring Health Care to Those Who Need
it Most, August 31, 2007. The lack of adequate sanitation facilities in
many camps heightens the risk of infections. On average, more than 16 individuals must share one toilet in the
government-run IDP camps in
Jaffna,
according to the Danish Refugee Council Sri Lanka and UNHCR, Sri Lanka: Jaffna Welfare Centre Assessment
– Final Report, July 31, 2007. Worse yet, many of the toilets were not
usable, according to the same assessment. Malnutrition has become another serious
concern in many IDP camps, particularly for infants and children under 5 years
old, according to OCHA, CHAP: Sri Lanka 2007. In many instances,
restricted humanitarian access to the displaced populations has added to the
difficult plight of these children.
The lack of security in and around camps also poses a severe risk for IDP
children in
Sri Lanka
.
They are exposed to threats from armed groups roaming around camps and are
vulnerable to recruitment into armed groups, including cases of abduction and
recruitment from the camps (see below: Child Soldiers). Over a period of 18 months
in 2006 and 2007, more than 200 protection incidents were reported in the
government-run IDP camps in
Jaffna,
according to Danish Refugee Council Sri Lanka and UNHCR, Sri Lanka: Jaffna Welfare Centre Assessment – Final Report, July
31, 2007. Afraid of abductions en route to or in school, some displaced parents
have forbidden their children to attend school according to AI. The lack of
security in the camps has also reportedly exposed women and girls to increased
levels of domestic and sexual violence (see below: GBV).
In many instances, military sites are in close proximity to IDP camps,
thereby endangering both IDPs and humanitarian workers. In fact, some IDP
camps, including schools used as temporary shelters, have become direct targets
of military attacks (see below: Education). In addtion to livelihoods and
humanitarian access, the UN Special Representative on Human Rights of IDPs,
Walter Kälin, has highlighted the need for physical security as a key concern
of IDPs, UN Press Release, “UN Expert
Emphasizes Sustainable and Durable Solutions for Sri Lanka’s Internally
Displaced Persons,” December 27, 2007.
An estimated 20,000
Tamil refugees arrived in camp sites in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu between
2006 and 2007, raising the number of refugees living in the camps to 74,000
people as of December 2007, according to UNHCR. After passing through a transit
facility, they usually move into one of the 117 refugee sites where the Indian
government gives them basic assistance. New arrivals in particular need this
assistance after having spent a large portion of their savings and sold their
belongings to pay for the passage, according to The Washington Times, “Tamils Flee Sri Lankan War for Jobs in
India; Families Sell Possessions to Make Journey,” November 18, 2006. In
addition, approximately 23,000 Tamil refugees are living outside the camps and
are not entitled to any assistance, according to UNHCR.
As the armed
conflict has continued for more than twenty years, some children have grown up
in the confines of camps and have been unable to lead normal lives. Refugees
generally must ask for official permission to leave the camps and have to
return to the camp at a certain time, according to BBC News, “War Weary Tamils Face India Hardship,” June 4, 2007.
Some refugees have also encountered difficulties when trying to find a job,
rent a house or set up bank accounts in
India
, according to BBC News. Once refugee children have
finished school, these challenges may hamper their prospects of finding
employment in the highly competitive Indian job market.
Despite the minimal
assistance they receive, refugees tend not to complain for fear of inciting
resentment among members of the Indian host communities who in some cases may
be living in equally destitute circumstances. Some of the refugee camp
infrastructure dates back to the 1980s and 1990s and requires urgent repair,
especially water facilities and toilets, according to the US Bureau of
Population, Refugees and Migration, FY
Guidelines for Proposal Submissions for IO and NGO Protection and Assistance
Programs for Sri Lankan Refugees in India, August 27, 2007.
Some recent reports state that refugees have
been prevented from escaping to
India
by sea by Sri Lankan authorities. The Sri Lankan Navy reportedly fired at the
ship of a refugee family that was fleeing from the Mannar mainland coast on
October 18, 2007, killing a man and two children, ages 11 and 16 years, and
injuring a woman and two other younger children, according to a report by the University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna)
(UTHR(J)), a leading independent human rights organization in Sri Lanka, Slow Strangulation of Jaffna: Trashing
General Larry Wijeratne’s Legacy and Enthroning Barbarism, Special Report No. 28, December 4, 2007.
The GoSL has sought to resolve the displacement crisis quickly to
demonstrate its ability to address the humanitarian situation and to downplay
other human rights concerns. In this vein, the government started major return campaigns
in September 2006 and March 2007, during
which more than 100,000 IDPs went back to their homes in the Trincomalee and
Batticaloa districts. Many of them were coerced to return. Security forces at
times have allegedly threatened to withhold water and food rations from IDPs
who refuse to cooperate with return programs. This prompted WFP to link the
government’s food aid requests to conditions of voluntary return, according to Reuters, “
Sri Lanka
’s War Displaced Seek New
Start - Yet Again,” June 19, 2007.
Security forces,
nevertheless, have continued to threaten IDPs stating that they will no longer
guarantee the security of those staying in the camps, according to HRW, Return to War: Human Rights under Siege,
August 2007. Some government officials exerted considerable pressure on IDPs in
the days leading up to the returns. At times, they forced IDPs in the camps
onto buses that would take them back to their home communities without allowing
the IDPs to wait for their children to come back from school or for others
relatives to return from work outside the camps. Some displaced persons have
told humanitarian workers that security forces threatened to beat or kill them
if they refused to return, or said that they would consider the IDPs to be part
of the LTTE if they didn’t go home.
Humanitarian
organizations have also raised concerns about whether these premature returns
allow returnees to live under the “safe, dignified and sustainable” conditions
that international standards require. With the security situation unchanged and
humanitarian access restricted in some of these areas, resettlement exposes
many IDPs to the same dangerous and insecure environment from which they had
hoped to escape.
The GoSL has in some cases not ensured that
returnees have shelter, the ability to earn a livelihood or access to basic
services. According to initial assessments by humanitarian organizations, the
conditions and areas of return are unsatisfactory and there appears to be an
urgent need to support the returnees with food and equipment to restart their
livelihoods. As many schools in the areas of return are not open, some parents
decide to leave children behind with host families so they can continue their
education in IDP camps, according to Save the Children in
Sri Lanka
, Emergency Response Monthly Update, May 2007. Due to the lack of
coordination in the resettlement process, some children in the North and East
missed their “O” level exams in December 2007, delaying the completion of their
education for another year, according to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee
(IASC) (see below: Education).
Humanitarian organizations wanting to provide
returnees with livelihood support in the initial stages of return have been
denied access to some areas of the Batticaloa district by the government,
citing security concerns, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The absence of humanitarian assistance and human
rights monitoring may inhibit the ability of returnees to thrive and creates an
environment where human rights violations take place. Access
constraints have also made it difficult to obtain reliable information on
living conditions and protection needs of resettled people and newly displaced
persons in these conflict areas.
In March 2007, UNHCR
officially stated that “heavy pressure has been applied on internally displaced
people” to return. It then received assurances from the GoSL that future IDP
returns would be safe and voluntary. Subsequently, UNHCR noted an improvement
in the situation and released a statement in May 2007 stating that the majority
of returns were meeting minimum international standards. Several human rights
organizations disapproved of UNHCR’s turnaround in light of ongoing violations
in the return process, according to South Asians for Human Rights (SAHR).
The lack of clear
policies and plans for IDPs has stirred tensions among various groups that
accuse the GoSL of favoritism and discrimination. The LTTE and the government
are well aware that the return of displaced populations can change the ethnic
make up of certain areas. Minorities in the East fear that the GoSL is pursuing
a policy of “Sinhalization” in some areas to change the ethnic demography of
the Eastern Province in its favor, according to SAHR, Report on the Fact Finding Mission to the North and East to Assess the
State of Displaced Persons, August 2007. They accuse the GoSL of changing
administrative borders, moving Sinhalese settlers to Tamil and Muslim areas and
constructing Buddhist temples on these lands to acquire territory for the
Sinhalese majority. Similarly, the LTTE has allegedly encouraged Tamils to move
to Muslim areas according to AI, Waiting to Go
Home - The Plight of the Internally Displaced, June 29, 2006.
Moreover, human
rights organizations have cast doubts on the nature of some government-declared
high security zones (HSZs), which are only accessible to the military, and
which are seen as discriminating against Tamils. Most IDPs in Jaffna and many
in Trincomalee are unable to return to their communities because their homes
are located in HSZs. Paradoxically, the government deemed one area in the
Trincomalee district as a HSZ in 2007, yet opened it for economic investment,
according to UTHR(J), Can the East be Won
by Human Culling? Special Economic Zones. An Ideological Journey Back to 1983,
August 2007. [21] More
than 4,250 families, mainly Tamils, are currently stranded in transit sites as
a result of their area of origin being deemed a HSZ in Trincomalee and have not
been offered viable alternatives by the GoSL, according to UTHR(J).
The GoSL rarely
offers alternatives for displaced people who cannot or do not wish to return
and generally does not approve of local integration or resettlement to other
areas of Sri Lanka except if the area of return is mined or has been designated as a HSZ. This strict policy
prevents a large percentage of Muslim IDPs in Puttalam in western
Sri Lanka
from formally starting their new lives. Having been displaced for 17 years,
some people who were displaced as children have lived in the district almost
all of their lives, started families and developed social ties there.
Nevertheless, current policies prevent them from acquiring resident status and
property rights and participating in resettlement programs. They cannot leave
the camps unless they return to their areas of origin.
The government’s
strict policy also does not account for the well-founded security concerns of
Muslim IDPs in Puttalam, Trincomalee and
Anuradhapura
about returning to areas formerly controlled by the LTTE. Muslim IDPs from
Puttalam and
Anuradhapura
had been expelled by the LTTE in the 1990s to make space for Tamils.
Finally, some donors
have earmarked funding for tsunami-displaced areas or IDPs, thereby creating
disparities between the tsunami-induced and conflict-induced displaced people.
While villages for tsunami-affected IDPs in the South were rebuilt for the
largely Sinhalese population, Tamil and Muslim IDPs in the North and East
hardly benefited from the funding as HSZs and insecurity impeded reconstruction
efforts, according to AI, Waiting to Go Home, June, 29, 2006. This “funding divide” between
tsunami-induced and conflict-induced IDPs prevents aid organizations from
addressing such inequities. In addition, this pre-selection of beneficiaries
contradicts the humanitarian goal of assisting the most vulnerable victims of
armed conflict or natural disaster.
Health
Armed conflict,
displacement and restrictions on the delivery of aid have increased Sri Lankans’
vulnerability to malnutrition and disease. In addition, many health facilities in the North and East have been
damaged or destroyed. However, the lack of information on the health situation
in conflict-affected areas somewhat conceals the urgency of the crisis. Due to
intentional obstruction of access to vulnerable areas by both the GoSL and the
LTTE, it is extremely difficult to assess the health situation for children in
certain areas of the country. For example, The
New York Times reported on an incident in which the government allegedly
blocked the release of an emergency assessment by the UN that found signs of an
increase in child malnutrition in
Jaffna,
according to The New York Times, “
Sri
Lanka
’s Scars Trace Lines of War Without
End,“ June 15, 2007.
The World Food
Program (WFP) warned of a humanitarian emergency in
Jaffna and Batticaloa and an acute food and
livelihood crisis in five other districts in the North and East, specifically
in the districts of Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee, Mannar and parts of
Vavuniya in May 2007, Executive Brief:
Sri Lanka Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification (IPC),
May 2007. WFP has called the armed conflict in
Sri Lanka
a “serious threat” to
food security and to ongoing efforts to eradicate poverty in the North and
East. Substandard hygienic conditions and a lack of clean water have
exacerbated risks of infections. Only 30 percent of the people in the northern
districts of Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu have access to latrines, clean water
and sanitation, according to WFP. Children suffer particularly under these
conditions.
Malnutrition is undeniably one of the most serious
health concerns that children in
Sri Lanka
face. Almost one third of
children under five years old in
Sri Lanka
are reported to be
underweight and approximately 14 percent suffer from acute malnutrition or
wasting, according to UNICEF’s figures between 1999 and 2005. WFP regards armed conflict as one of the main
reasons for malnutrition, with the highest levels in the North and East and
some deprived areas in central
Sri
Lanka
, Food
Security Assessment, April 2007. WFP’s 2007 assessment specifically
identified the need for a supplementary feeding program for malnourished
children under five in conflict areas.
Malnutrition has
affected girls disproportionally as families tend to discriminate against them
in their food distribution, according to WFP’s Food Security Assessment of
April 2007. Growth of girls under five was almost 40 percent more likely to be
severely stunted than that of boys and approximately 70 percent of girls were
more likely to be underweight than boys, according to the same assessment. One
explanation for this discrimination may be that Sri Lankans tend to follow
traditional gender roles so that men and boys receive food first, leaving only
the leftovers for women and girls. This discrimination may also impact the food
consumption of pregnant women and increase risks for the unborn child. Further
studies are required to better understand the gender disparities related to
nutrition, according to WFP.
Displacement,
government restrictions and a lack of agricultural inputs or markets have
deprived many IDPs and vulnerable communities in conflict-affected areas of
their livelihoods. The fishing and farming sectors, the two main sectors in the
North and East, have been particularly affected by the conflict. Many farmers
and fishermen have lost land or tools during the war or have had to interrupt
their work due to continued fighting or displacement. Moreover, the
GoSL has imposed security-related restrictions on fishing and farming in the
entire North and some parts of the East. It has also declared certain areas
HSZs rendering them inaccessible for civilians. From August to December 2006, the
average fisherman in
Jaffna
lost about three quarters of his usual income, according to WFP’s Sri Lankan Food Security Assessment of
June 2007. The production rates in the fishing industry also dropped to an
estimated 10 percent of pre-conflict levels according to IRIN, “
Sri Lanka
: Malnutrition Rising in
Jaffna, Aid Deliveries Struggling,”
July 18, 2007. Due to import restrictions, prices of agricultural
imports, fuels and other products have increased dramatically, according to
WFP.
As a result of poverty
and despair, some families in the conflict areas have reduced the number of
meals they eat each day, borrowed money, stolen from others or pawned jewelry
or household belongings. Economic despair and lack of food may also motivate
some families to allow their children to join the LTTE or the TMVP/Karuna
faction to alleviate the tight household budget, as both
armed groups have offered financial or other benefits to families whose
children joined, or directly to the child recruits, according to HRW, Complicit in Crime. State Collusion in
Abductions and Child Recruitment by the Karuna Group, January 2007 (see
below: Child Soldiers).
WFP reported in June
2007 that approximately 800,000 people needed lifesaving humanitarian emergency
assistance in Jaffna and Batticaloa, including IDPs, as well as families which
had been living below the poverty line before the conflict and who were no
longer able to sustain themselves due to the conflict. In
Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, Vavuniya and Trincomalee, another 900,000
people needed help with livelihood generation, according to WFP.
In spite of this
dire situation, between August 2006 and April 2007 food assistance was reduced
by half due to security concerns, logistical constraints and lack of
humanitarian access to the North and East, according to WFP. There is an urgent
need to address this food and livelihoods crisis and to assist IDPs and other
vulnerable groups in the North and East.
Increasing the
provision of safe water for poverty eradication is a priority policy for the
GoSL and international agencies working in the country, according to WFP, Sri Lanka Food Security Assessment, June
2007. The increasing number of IDPs and other vulnerable populations has
strained the already weak water and sanitation services in
Sri Lanka
. As of 2007, about one
third of households did not have access to sanitation facilities and about one
quarter did not have access to safe drinking water, according to UNICEF.
Approximately 18 percent of children in
Sri Lanka
did not have access to
any water or sanitation facilities. Conditions in IDP camps are particularly
severe (see above: Refugees and IDPs).
The discrepancies
between districts regarding access to safe water are considerable. While 95 percent of the population in
Colombo has access to safe
water, only 21 percent in Mannar have access to safe water, according to WFP.
Other districts with poor access are Mullaitivu, Kilinochchi and Kegalle.
Sri Lanka
’s nationwide health
indicators are generally positive with a remarkable reduction of mortality
rates of infants and under-5-year-olds between 2000 and 2005, according to the
World Bank, World Development Indicators
Database, April 2007. Within this five-year period, infant mortality rates
dropped from 16 to 12 per 1,000 deaths and mortality rates for children under 5
years old dropped from 19 to 14 per 1,000 deaths according to the World Bank.
This is due in large part to the fact that immunization coverage in
Sri Lanka
has reached approximately 90 percent on average in all districts, according to
WFP, Sri Lanka Food Security Assessment,
June 2007. As a result of high overall immunization coverage, WFP concludes
that there is no high threat of outbreaks of communicable diseases even in
highly populated displacement areas.
The situation in
conflict-affected areas is somewhat more difficult. In these areas many people
have lost their immunization cards due to displacement and have not received
all doses for multi-dose immunizations. Additionally, preventive health
services, including antenatal care and vaccinations were completely disrupted
in non-accessible areas due to the armed conflict from September to December
2006, according to WFP, Health Lines.
Newsletter of the Country Office for
Sri Lanka
, December 2006.
Containment services throughout the country are too overloaded and are unable
to cope with large scale emergency situations or outbreaks of diseases and
hygiene-related illnesses, according to UNOCHA, CHAP in Sri Lanka</
