Indicators
INDICATORS |
Sri Lanka
|
Population |
Estimated 20.7 million people in 2005, including an estimated 6.1
million children (UNICEF, 2007) |
Gross National
Income (GNI) per Capita |
US $1,300 in 2006 (World Bank, 2007) |
Refugees and
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) |
Estimated 97,000 refugees in Tamil Nadu (
India
)
as of December 2007, including an estimated 20,000 refugees from the
post-January 2006 conflict
Estimated 456,000 IDPs as of November 2007,
including an estimated 189,000 from the post-April 2006 conflict
Children constitute approximately 39
percent of IDPs (UNHCR, January 2008) |
Infant Mortality |
12/1,000 in 2005 (UNICEF, 2007) |
HIV/AIDS |
Less than 0.1 percent estimated prevalence rate as of 2005 (UNAIDS,
WHO and UNICEF, 2006) |
Education |
Estimated 97 percent net enrollment rate
for primary education, not accounting for regional differences or actual
student attendance as of 2005; near gender parity in school enrollment
(UNESCO, 2007) |
Gender-Based
Violence (GBV) |
Conflict-related
GBV, including sexual violence in IDP camps, trafficking, sexual
exploitation, early marriages and sexual harassment at military checkpoints.
Specific data on prevalence of GBV is scant |
Trafficking |
As of 2004, an estimated 5,000 Sri Lankan children had been trafficked
for commercial sex, domestic work and child recruitment (ILO, 2004) |
Landmines and
Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) |
Estimated 99 sq km of land is contaminated by ERW and 730 villages are contaminated by landmines,
according to GoSL estimates (Landmine
Monitor Report 2007) |
Small Arms |
Estimated 1 to 2.4
million small arms in circulation in Sri Lanka, half of which are owned by
civilians (independent experts, cited in Small Arms Survey, 2004) Estimated 45,000
small arms in circulation according to GoSL officials (SAS, 2004) |
Child Soldiers |
6,248 cases of child recruitment by the LTTE, including 2,469 girls,
were reported to UNICEF between January 2002 and December 2007. 453 cases of
child recruitment, including one case of a girl, by the TMVP/Karuna faction
with alleged complicity of the GoSL were reported to UNICEF between April
2004 and December 2007. Actual numbers of recruitment are thought to be
significantly higher (UNICEF, 2008) |
Abductions and
Disappearances |
More than 1,100 new
abductions and “disappearances” of civilians, including children, reported
between January 2006 and June 2007, mainly Tamils (HRW, August 2007) |
Attacks on
Humanitarian and Human Rights Workers |
At least 28
humanitarian NGO workers were intentionally killed from January 2006 to
November 2007 (UNOCHA, 2007) |
International
Treaties Signed (S)/ Ratified (R)/ Acceded (A) (Year) |
International
Treaties Not Signed |
· Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (R)
(1991)
· Optional Protocol
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (R) (2000)
· Optional Protocol
on the
Sale
of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (R) (2006)
· The
Geneva
Conventions of 1949 (R) (1959)
· International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (A) (1980)
· International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (A) (1980)
· Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (A) (1982)
· Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (A) (2004)
· Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (A) (1950)
· International Labor Organization (ILO)
Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor (R) (1991) |
· Additional Protocols to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949
· 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol
· Convention
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (“Mine Ban Treaty”)
·
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
· Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment |
UN Security Council Resolutions on
Sri Lanka
|
UN Security Council
has not adopted any country specific resolutions on
Sri Lanka
|
UN Security Council
Resolutions on Children and Armed Conflict |
1612 (July 2005),
1539 (April 2004), 1460 (January 2003), 1379 (November 2001), 1314 (August
2000), 1261 (August 1999) |
Note: In September
2006, the Sri Lankan Supreme Court “declared that neither United Nations
conventions signed by Sri Lanka nor the directives of monitoring bodies are
binding on the country” according to a statement by the Asian Human Rights
Commission (AHRC), Sri Lanka: Supreme
Court Removes Country from Obligations under International Law, Raises
Unprecedented Questions for UN, September 18, 2006. [1]
Sri Lanka
’s children have been embroiled in a
brutal armed conflict which has killed more than 67,000 civilians in the last
two decades and caused untold suffering among the Sri Lankan population. Gross
human rights violations committed by Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) forces, the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and armed breakaway groups, like the
Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP)/Karuna faction, have created a climate
of constant fear and insecurity throughout the country.
Both the GoSL and the
LTTE have restricted or denied the delivery of vital humanitarian aid to the
Jaffna peninsula and the
Vanni area in the North, certain areas in the East and GoSL-declared high
security zones. Adding to considerable bureaucratic barriers, humanitarian and
human rights workers have been increasingly harassed, threatened and even
killed while carrying out their lifesaving work. Additionally, restrictions on
the movement of civilians have exacerbated the humanitarian crisis by preventing
civilians from escaping into safety or seeking assistance. Perpetrators commit violations against
children and other civilians with impunity. Today, the establishment of an
independent human rights monitoring system is more critical than ever since the
recent dissolution of the cease-fire agreement and the subsequent withdrawal of
the Nordic-led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM).
Children throughout
Sri Lanka
face a broad spectrum of violations against their security and rights,
perpetrated by various armed forces and groups. In this report, Watchlist
illustrates this situation and provides practical recommendations for urgent
actions needed to protect Sri Lankan children.
Refugees and IDPs
Between April 2006 and
April 2007, the resumption of violent conflict displaced more than 300,000
people within
Sri Lanka
and
forced more than 20,000 to seek safety in
India
. Approximately half a million Sri Lankans had
been displaced prior to April 2006. Children comprise approximately 39 percent
of the displaced population.
Internally displaced
persons (IDPs) suffer as a result of poor sanitary conditions and strained
health facilities, as well as insufficient food supplies in host communities
and IDP camps. The lack of security in and around the camps has exposed
children to abduction, recruitment and sexual violence. Some IDP camps have
become direct targets of military attacks. Similarly, Sri Lankan refugees in
India
live in difficult conditions. Though given minimal assistance by the Indian
government, many live in refugee camps with outdated infrastructure from the
1980s and 1990s. In addition, approximately 23,000 Sri Lankan refugees living
outside the camps are not entitled to any assistance.
Some Sri Lankan
children have grown up in the confines of IDP or refugee settings. While
finding durable solutions for IDPs and refugees is a priority, humanitarian
organizations have considered the recent returns of many IDPs premature and
have criticized the GoSL for forcing thousands of IDPs to return to insecure
areas. The lack of clear policies and plans for IDPs has stirred tensions among
various groups, mainly along ethnic lines.
Health
Armed conflict,
displacement and restrictions in the delivery of humanitarian aid have
increased Sri Lankans’ vulnerability to malnutrition and disease. In addition,
many health facilities in the North and East have been damaged or destroyed.
The World Food Program warned of an emerging humanitarian emergency in
Jaffna and Batticaloa and
an acute food and livelihood crisis in five other districts in the North and
East in May 2007. Ongoing armed conflict and access restrictions have prevented
people in conflict-affected areas from accessing life-saving medical care.
Children in particular suffer under these conditions.
HIV/AIDS
At the end of 2005,
the estimated national HIV prevalence rate among people between the ages of 15
and 49 was less than 0.1 percent in Sri Lanka, according to UNAIDS.
Nonetheless, GoSL, international and national agencies warn that HIV may spread
further among the population, particularly among older children, due to lack of
awareness, stigmatization and unsafe sexual practices. Even health care
personnel and officials in the education sector are known to have discriminated
against individuals with HIV/AIDS. Armed conflict and
consequent displacement have created conditions that make the spread of HIV
more likely in the North and East.
Education
Sri Lanka
’s armed conflict has turned schools into
military targets, IDP camps and military shelters. More than 250,000 children
in
Sri Lanka
,
mostly in the North and East, have been forced to interrupt their education due
to the renewed outbreak of armed conflict in 2006. Military attacks had damaged
or destroyed 261 schools as of September 2007 and their reconstruction has been
delayed due to insecurity. The massive outflow of educational staff in recent
years from conflict-affected areas has resulted in a serious lack of teachers
in the North and East. Exceptionally high student dropout and absentee rates
are prevalent in conflict areas, particularly among displaced children. Many
students who remain in school require special attention as a result of distress
due to conflict-related experiences or because they missed years of education.
Gender-Based Violence
There is a dearth of
information about conflict-related cases of gender-based violence (GBV) in
Sri Lanka
,
which makes it difficult to assess the nature and scope of the problem.
However, anecdotal information suggests that this lack of information does not
necessarily reflect the reality of the situation. Rather, it is likely that
incidents of GBV have increased due to the armed conflict, yet incidents are
not reported or systematically documented due to survivors’ fear of
stigmatization or retribution and the lack of access to adequate and
appropriate legal, medical and social services for them.
Landmines and ERW
Before the 2002
cease-fire, the LTTE and the GoSL had used antipersonnel mines extensively
throughout the conflict. The mines’ proximity to civilian settlements has
endangered the lives of the war-affected populations in the North and East.
Children accounted for 30 percent of casualties from landmines and explosive
remnants of war (ERW) in 2006. Lack of access to these areas due to mine
contamination has hindered humanitarian assistance, economic reconstruction and
the return of displaced people to their homes. Since the upsurge of violence in
mid-2006, agencies have been forced to slow down or even halt demining efforts. In some cases, clearance efforts may have
been deliberately blocked by the military. Recent reports also point to renewed
use of landmines by the LTTE, including claymore mines which are notorious for
their indiscriminate and lethal effects on civilians.
Small Arms
The proliferation of
illicit small arms has become one of the main barriers to achieving sustainable
peace and human security for children and their communities in
Sri Lanka
.
Independent experts estimate that 1 to 2.4 million small arms are in
circulation in
Sri Lanka
,
mostly owned by civilians. Despite its active participation in international
efforts to stave off the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, the
GoSL has not been able or willing to monitor or control the circulation of
illicit arms in its territory. For its part, the LTTE has employed an effective
network for guaranteeing a steady flow of small arms into the country. The
European Union, as well as the
United
States
and other countries have declared the
LTTE a terrorist organization and introduced measures to prevent it from
raising money for arms or other purposes.
Child Soldiers
Sri Lankan children
currently face the ubiquitous threat of being abducted, recruited and used as
soldiers whether they are in areas controlled by the GoSL or the LTTE. UNICEF’s
child recruitment database, the authoritative source on child recruitment and
use, documents 6,248 cases of child recruitment by the LTTE between January
2002 and December 2007, including many girls, and 453 cases of child recruitment
by the TMVP/Karuna faction, with alleged complicity of the GoSL, between April
2004 and December 2007. However, UNICEF relies exclusively on voluntary
reporting by parents and communities, therefore it is likely that the actual
numbers are much higher.
Despite promises to do
so, the GoSL has not yet conducted a credible and thorough investigation into
the alleged complicity of certain elements of its security forces with the
TMVP/Karuna faction in the recruitment of children. Both the LTTE and the TMVP/Karuna
faction have been named by the UN Secretary-General as repeat offenders of this
crime. There is currently no formal disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration (DDR) process for children, nor policies or programs to protect
and reintegrate children who surrender to the GoSL or seek its protection after
they escape from armed groups.
Other Violations and
Vulnerabilities
Sri Lankan children
continue to face a spectrum of other violations of their security and rights,
including trafficking, child labor, prostitution, abuse in orphanages and
arbitrary and illegal arrests. While Sri Lankan children were vulnerable to
these violations even before the armed conflict, anecdotal information suggests
that incidents likely have increased due to the conflict.
Recommendations
In this report, the Watchlist on Children and
Armed Conflict makes urgent recommendations to the GoSL, the LTTE, the
TMVP/Karuna faction; the United Nations Security Council; the 1612 Taskforce in
Sri Lanka
; the humanitarian
community in
Sri Lanka
;
donors; and other governments. Of primary importance, is the call to all armed
forces and groups in
Sri
Lanka
to immediately halt violations against
children. Additionally, all actors must take immediate action to protect
children in
Sri Lanka
from further abuse and to find ways to assist and support those who have
suffered the consequences of decades of armed conflict.
For more than two decades, the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has been fighting with the Sinhalese-dominated Government
of Sri Lanka (GoSL) to establish an independent Tamil state or a degree of
autonomy for Tamils in the North and East of Sri Lanka. For decades, the LTTE
has accused the GoSL of discriminating against the Tamil minority in
Sri Lanka
’s
multi-ethnic state. [2]
After
Sri Lanka
’s
independence from
Britain
in 1948, the Sinhalese majority government passed a number of laws that barred
Tamils from certain educational and employment opportunities. Most notably,
Sinhala became the official language of
Sri Lanka
in 1956, [3] costing thousands of Tamils their civil service jobs. At the time, many Tamils
staged demonstrations against these policies, demanding equal rights and
adequate political representation. [4] The GoSL’s excessive use of force against the protesters incited counter force
by emerging militant Tamil groups. What began as a largely nonviolent movement
turned into a brutal civil war in the 1980s. Full-blown armed conflict broke out in 1983 after Tamil
militants killed 13 GoSL troops, triggering violent ethnic riots and a massive
displacement of Tamils.
The LTTE, under the leadership of Velupillai
Prabhakaran, emerged as the dominant Tamil armed group, violently eliminating
its rivals. To solidify its territorial claims, the LTTE established a “quasi” state
in parts of the Vanni area [5] ,
the northern mainland, controlling Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi and parts of
Vavuniya and Mannar. [6] Today, the LTTE administers government-like
services in these territories, including a police force, justice system and tax
regime. The Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) has effectively acted as
the LTTE’s humanitarian wing. Most recently, the TRO has been accused of
supporting the LTTE’s war efforts. [7] In
addition to these institutions, the Tamil diaspora in the United States,
Canada, the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia provides a secure financial base
for the LTTE’s military and other operations, according to a Human Rights Watch
(HRW) report, Funding the “Final War,” LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the
Tamil Diaspora, March 14, 2006.
Sri
Lanka
’s armed conflict has been characterized by
massive human rights violations committed by both the GoSL and the LTTE. The
LTTE has employed suicide bombers, landmines, claymore mines [8] and other explosive remnants of war (ERW), used children as soldiers and
civilians as shields, abducted civilians, engaged in politically motivated
killings and blocked water supplies from the civilian population.
Similarly, the GoSL has committed grave abuses of
human rights, including indiscriminate shelling and aerial bombardment of
LTTE-controlled areas, arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial killings, torture,
forced returns of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to unsafe areas and
forced evictions. More recently, Sri Lankan security forces have been accused
of complicity in the recruitment and use of child soldiers by the Tamil Makkal
Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP)/Karuna
faction, a paramilitary group operating in the East. [9]
In what many describe as a war on civilians, gross
human rights violations have created a climate of constant fear and insecurity. An
estimated 67,000 civilians have lost their lives in the conflict between the
LTTE and the GoSL since 1983, according to the United Nations, in United Nations Concerned by Civilian Deaths
in Sri Lanka, January 2, 2007. At
least 45 children were killed and 77 maimed due to armed conflict between
November 1, 2006 and September 14, 2007, according to the 2007
Secretary-General’s Report on Children and Armed Conflict (S/2007/758, para.
24). Fighting has been concentrated in the North and East, but has also
spilled into the South with the LTTE staging suicide bombings and other
violence in
Colombo
and other areas. Today’s disregard for the rule of law, increased hostilities
and rampant impunity have caused innumerable problems, including the
polarization of communities, the militarization of the civilian population and
the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. Extremely high levels of
violence in the country have also led to the development of new and multiple
armed breakaway factions.
The emergence of the TMVP/Karuna faction, an unregistered political party and
paramilitary group, added to the volatile environment in
Sri Lanka
. Vinayagamoorthy
Muralitharan, alias Colonel Karuna, the LTTE’s leading commander in the East,
founded the TMVP/Karuna faction in March 2004 after
splitting from the LTTE. The TMVP/Karuna faction allegedly cooperates with the
GoSL to fight against the LTTE, according to HRW, Return to War. Human Rights under Siege, August 2007. This
cooperation enabled the TMVP/Karuna
faction to establish itself in the districts of Ampara, Trincomalee and Batticaloa.
Although the GoSL officially regained control of these territories, its
security forces have failed to disarm the TMVP/Karuna faction and other smaller paramilitary groups or to stop their human rights
violations against the civilian population.
After leaving the TMVP/Karuna faction,
Colonel Karuna was arrested in the
UK
on November 2, 2007, on pending
immigration charges. Pillayan, the TMVP’s second in command, has declared
himself the new leader of the TMVP/Karuna faction. However, internal power
struggles within the faction have resulted in breakaway factions and increased
human rights violations with no clearly identified group to hold accountable
for violations.
In 2002, the GoSL and the LTTE signed a
cease-fire agreement (CFA) brokered by
Norway
, and agreed to move towards
a negotiated settlement. An independent monitoring mission, the Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM), initially comprised of staff from five Nordic
countries (
Norway
,
Sweden
,
Finland
,
Denmark
and
Iceland
) [10] was established to investigate violations of the CFA. Peace talks between the
GoSL and the LTTE started in September 2002 with
Norway
acting as the mediator. Four
co-chairs (
Norway
, the
United States
,
Japan
, and the European Union) were
also designated to support the peace process, particularly post-conflict
rehabilitation and development.
Despite this international support for the peace
process, the LTTE unilaterally abandoned the process in April 2003, citing its
exclusion from donor talks. The LTTE predicated future negotiations upon the
acceptance of its proposal to establish a self-governing authority for the
North and East. The GoSL opposed this demand viewing it as an effective
secession of these territories. There have been several attempts to re-engage
both parties in the peace process since then, most recently in October 2006. None of these have
yet succeeded.
Between 2002 and 2005, the CFA led to some
improvements in the human rights and humanitarian situation for civilians. Yet,
political assassinations, child recruitment and ethnic clashes between Muslims
and Tamils, often over unsettled land issues, continued.
Following the devastating Asian tsunami in
December 2004, the GoSL and the LTTE agreed to cooperate in relief efforts as
part of the Post-Tsunami
Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS). Many donors tied assistance to shared aid
structures, viewing this as an opportunity to overcome ethno-political
barriers. However, the P-TOMS eventually collapsed following the Sri Lankan
Supreme Court’s decision to render the shared aid system unconstitutional.
India
, the
United States
,
Canada
and the
UK
,
as well as other countries and the European Union (EU) have declared the LTTE a
terrorist organization. The
United States
and the
UK
have suspended some aid to the GoSL in response to alleged human rights
violations by military groups with which the GoSL cooperates. [11] Despite warnings and sanctions, violations of the CFA continued by both sides.
The SLMM reported 4,181 violations of the CFA between February 2002 and April
2007, of which the vast majority, 3,830 violations, were committed by the LTTE.
On January 3, 2008, the GoSL officially abrogated the CFA of 2002, and
the SLMM consequently terminated its operational activities in
Sri Lanka
on January 16, 2008. Top UN officials and many governments, including
Japan
,
Norway
,
and the
US
,
as well as the EU, raised concerns about the protection of civilians and
humanitarian access to affected areas following the GoSL’s declaration. UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has called for an end to bloodshed through a
political solution.
During the few years before the formal end of
the cease-fire in 2008, the political climate had increasingly turned towards a
resumption of hostilities. The assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman
Kadirgamar in 2005 prompted the GoSL to enact the Emergency Regulations of
August 2005, giving the security forces broad powers to arrest and detain
civilians. After presidential elections in November 2005, the United People’s
Freedom Alliance (UPFA) coalition government led by President Mahinda Rajapakse
of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, assumed a
more confrontational stance against the LTTE than the preceding government and
expanded the Emergency Regulations in December 2006. The LTTE, for its part,
reinforced belligerence with a series of suicide attacks and political
killings.
The GoSL, likely encouraged by territorial
gains in the East, appears determined to defeat the LTTE militantly before
entering into further peace negotiations. To achieve this “military solution,”
it is widely believed that the GoSL is collaborating with the TMVP/Karuna
faction, using the group’s insider knowledge of the LTTE, and its intelligence
and troops, including child soldiers, to fight the LTTE. The GoSL also raised
its military expenditure by almost 20 percent from 2007 to 2008, according to BBC News, “Sri Lanka Defense Budget to
Soar,” October 10, 2007. In the preceding year, the government had raised
military expenditure by 40 percent, according to The Economist, “A War Strange as Fiction,” June 7, 2007. The LTTE
has similarly engaged in a massive funding campaign, urging and, in some cases,
coercing members of the Tamil diaspora to contribute to a “final war” according
to HRW, Funding the “Final War,” LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil
Diaspora, March 14, 2006. In preparation, it has re-engaged in a campaign
of “compulsory training and mobilization of civilians” in Vanni since 2006,
according to OCHA, Common Humanitarian
Action Plan (CHAP) for Sri Lanka 2007, July 17, 2007.
Already, efforts to achieve a military solution have resulted in massive
human rights violations and a humanitarian crisis in the conflict-affected
areas. More than 3,000 civilians have been killed in the conflict since the
renewal of fighting in 2006, according to the UN, United Nations Concerned by Civilian Deaths in Sri Lanka, January
2, 2007. More than 50 civilians were killed in aerial bombardments, shelling
and claymore mine attacks in the last two weeks of November 2007, according to
Amnesty International (AI)/HRW, Human
Rights Council: Urgent Action Needed to End Abuses in Sri Lanka, December
7, 2007. In addition, reports indicate that fighting has intensified in the
northern areas of Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi, Mannar, Vavuniya, Weli Oya and
Jaffna, as well as at sea.
The absence of a functioning human rights
monitoring system in
Sri
Lanka
has put the lives of those speaking
out against human rights violations in jeopardy while allowing perpetrators to
commit crimes with impunity. National and international human rights
organizations have thus been demanding the establishment of an independent
monitoring mission under the auspices of the Office of the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR). [12] This office would receive complaints of human rights violations and conduct
appropriate investigations. [13] This need for monitoring became even more critical with the dissolution of the
CFA and withdrawal of the SLMM. Yet, the GoSL continues to oppose an
independent human rights monitoring mission, referring to existing mechanisms
and commissions established by the government such as the Human Rights
Commission (HRC), the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (CoI) [14] and a number of other commissions. [15]
The current armed conflict has triggered
humanitarian emergencies in two districts and acute food and livelihood crises
in five others in the North and East, according to the World Food Program
(WFP), Executive Brief: Sri Lanka
Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification (IPC), May
2007. The upsurge in violence since April 2006 has also caused the displacement
of more than 300,000 people. Approximately 189,000 of these people were still
displaced as of November 2007 according to UNHCR (see below: Refugees and
IDPs). Restrictions on the movement of civilians have also exacerbated the
humanitarian crisis. For example, people can only leave the Vanni area if
issued a local pass by the LTTE and on the condition that one family member is
left behind (S/2007/758, para. 40).
The GoSL and the LTTE do not provide the
people living in these crisis areas with adequate assistance. Instead, they
have at times obstructed the delivery of vital humanitarian assistance.
Humanitarian organizations are especially concerned about the lack of access to
the
Jaffna
peninsula in the North, the Vanni, certain areas in the East and parts of the
country declared by the GoSL as high security zones (HSZs). Beginning in August
2006, the government closed the A9 highway, the only land route linking
Jaffna to the rest of the
country. The LTTE, in turn, put up a sea blockade, cutting off 600,000 people
in
Jaffna from
aid supplies, according to AI Report 2007.
Humanitarian programs also continue to face restrictions on operational space.
For example, in June 2007, if permitted through a checkpoint at Madavachchiya,
a main highway intersection, humanitarian trucks were forced to offload goods
for inspection and then had to transfer them to other trucks, which delayed the
provision of assistance and jeopardized lives.
The conditions for humanitarian access
improved somewhat in some areas between August 2007 and November 2007,
according to IRIN, “
Sri Lanka
: Humanitarian access
improving in resettlement areas in East,” November 21, 2007. Although relief
and humanitarian agencies were still required to go through a cumbersome
bureaucratic process to access certain regions, particularly in the East, a new
government system allowed them access to most conflict-affected areas,
including resettlement sites. Nevertheless, many agencies, especially those dealing with protection
issues, are still rarely permitted to access these areas.
Humanitarian aid workers are increasingly
being harassed, threatened and even killed in the North and East. In many
instances, the LTTE has forced national aid workers to join its ranks or to
contribute money or labor to its war efforts, according to the UN
Secretary-General’s 2007 report on children and armed conflict in
Sri Lanka
(S/2007/758, para. 40). Since January 2006, at least 28 humanitarian aid
workers have been intentionally killed, according to IRIN, “
Sri Lanka
:
UN urges investigations of deaths and more security for aid workers,” November
14, 2007. This includes 17 Sri Lankan aid workers from the international NGO
Action Contre la Faim (Action Against Hunger, ACF) who were murdered, execution
style, allegedly by Sri Lankan security personnel, in the eastern town of
Muttur in the Trincomalee
district in August 2006. To date, no one has been held accountable for the
crime. UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Sir John Holmes,
described
Sri Lanka
as one of “the most dangerous places in
the world for aid workers” in an interview with Reuters, “Sri Lanka Rebukes UN Aid Chief Over Safety Fears,” August
10, 2007. This heightened aggression against aid workers has caused many NGOs
to increase their security measures, limit their movement and scale down their
operations or even suspend them in some cases.
Free media and information exchange has
become elusive in
Sri Lanka
’s
current climate of fear and intimidation against journalists, local and
international NGOs, humanitarian workers and human rights activists. [16] International human rights and humanitarian NGOs are frequently accused of
clandestine support for the LTTE in the local media or on official GoSL
websites. Those who publicly criticize the security forces or the government’s
human rights record risk harassment, abduction and death. [17] Accusations against international NGOs and UN agencies undermine the
credibility of humanitarian and human rights work to the detriment of people in
need. Moreover, they endanger the lives of humanitarian and human rights
workers.
Security forces are allowed to arrest members
of the media and civil society organizations for peaceful activities protected
under Sri Lankan and international law under the emergency Prevention and
Prohibition of Terrorism and Specified Terrorist Activities regulations of
December 6, 2006. [18] The
GoSL also established a Parliamentary Select Committee responsible for
investigating NGO activity in
Sri
Lanka
.
In those areas that have been blocked to the
UN, NGOs and the media, the government or the LTTE are the only information
sources, resulting in unbalanced information and propaganda. Both the GoSL and
the LTTE want to persuade their respective constituency of their military
successes to justify the costs and sacrifices, according to the National Peace
Council (NPC), a Sri Lankan think tank that supports the nonviolent settlement
of armed conflict.
Refugees and IDPs
The resumption of violent conflict caused the
new displacement of more than 300,000 people within
Sri
Lanka
from April 2006 to April 2007 and the movement of
an estimated 20,000 refugees to
India
,
according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), Civilians in the Way of Conflict: Displaced
People in Sri Lanka, September 26, 2007. The newly displaced persons originate mainly from the areas of
Batticaloa, Vanni, Trincomalee, Ampara and
Jaffna, according to UNHCR. Reflecting the ethnic make up of these
regions, the majority of them are Tamils and Muslims, according to IDMC. In addition, approximately half a million
people were displaced by conflict prior to April 2006 and by the 2004 tsunami,
according to IDMC. Thousands of IDPs who are not registered are not included in
these figures [19] and do
not benefit from any official assistance. [20]
Even after more than a decade, a number of IDPs have not received
adequate assistance to end their displacement. While tens of thousands of people have
returned home spontaneously or through government-run resettlement programs, a
total of 456,000 displaced persons remained in
Sri Lanka
as of November 2007. This
includes 189,000 IDPs from the post-April 2006 conflict. A total of 97,000 Sri Lankan refugees were still
living in
India
’s
Tamil Nadu state as of December 2007, according to UNHCR.
The causes of displacement are many, as
parties to the conflict have not spared the civilian population and in some
cases have specifically targeted them. Civilians have fled violent clashes,
landmine and ERW contamination and recruitment of children (see below: Child
Soldiers). Some families fled in a desperate attempt to spare their children
from recruitment by either the LTTE or the TMVP/Karuna faction, according to AI, Waiting to Go
Home - The Plight of the Internally Displaced, June 29, 2006.
Children have been acutely affected by
displacement in
Sri Lanka
.
According to UNHCR’s estimates, children constitute approximately 39 percent of
the displaced population. In the turmoil of the armed conflict, thousands have
been separated from their families and live in vulnerable circumstances without
proper guardianship.
Lives
of Internally Displaced
Persons
For many IDPs the
flight from their homes was the first phase of a strenuous and long
displacement which they initially envisioned as a temporary situation. The
majority of IDPs live in government-run IDP camps, so-called “welfare centers,”
which have been established in public buildings. Others stay with host families
or relatives.
The arrival of large
numbers of IDPs has strained sanitary and health facilities, as well as food
supplies in host communities and IDP camps (see below: Health). In some
clinics, one doctor must see on average 150 IDP patients per day compared to
the 50 patients per day recommended by the internationally accepted SPHERE
standards for humanitarian relief in emergencies, according to International
Medical Corps (IMC), Save
Sri Lanka
’s
Neglected Population, IMC’s Mobile Clinics Bring Health Care to Those Who Need
it Most, August 31, 2007. The lack of adequate sanitation facilities in
many camps heightens the risk of infections. On average, more than 16 individuals must share one toilet in the
government-run IDP camps in
Jaffna,
according to the Danish Refugee Council Sri Lanka and UNHCR, Sri Lanka: Jaffna Welfare Centre Assessment
– Final Report, July 31, 2007. Worse yet, many of the toilets were not
usable, according to the same assessment. Malnutrition has become another serious
concern in many IDP camps, particularly for infants and children under 5 years
old, according to OCHA, CHAP: Sri Lanka 2007. In many instances,
restricted humanitarian access to the displaced populations has added to the
difficult plight of these children.
The lack of security in and around camps also poses a severe risk for IDP
children in
Sri Lanka
.
They are exposed to threats from armed groups roaming around camps and are
vulnerable to recruitment into armed groups, including cases of abduction and
recruitment from the camps (see below: Child Soldiers). Over a period of 18 months
in 2006 and 2007, more than 200 protection incidents were reported in the
government-run IDP camps in
Jaffna,
according to Danish Refugee Council Sri Lanka and UNHCR, Sri Lanka: Jaffna Welfare Centre Assessment – Final Report, July
31, 2007. Afraid of abductions en route to or in school, some displaced parents
have forbidden their children to attend school according to AI. The lack of
security in the camps has also reportedly exposed women and girls to increased
levels of domestic and sexual violence (see below: GBV).
In many instances, military sites are in close proximity to IDP camps,
thereby endangering both IDPs and humanitarian workers. In fact, some IDP
camps, including schools used as temporary shelters, have become direct targets
of military attacks (see below: Education). In addtion to livelihoods and
humanitarian access, the UN Special Representative on Human Rights of IDPs,
Walter Kälin, has highlighted the need for physical security as a key concern
of IDPs, UN Press Release, “UN Expert
Emphasizes Sustainable and Durable Solutions for Sri Lanka’s Internally
Displaced Persons,” December 27, 2007.
An estimated 20,000
Tamil refugees arrived in camp sites in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu between
2006 and 2007, raising the number of refugees living in the camps to 74,000
people as of December 2007, according to UNHCR. After passing through a transit
facility, they usually move into one of the 117 refugee sites where the Indian
government gives them basic assistance. New arrivals in particular need this
assistance after having spent a large portion of their savings and sold their
belongings to pay for the passage, according to The Washington Times, “Tamils Flee Sri Lankan War for Jobs in
India; Families Sell Possessions to Make Journey,” November 18, 2006. In
addition, approximately 23,000 Tamil refugees are living outside the camps and
are not entitled to any assistance, according to UNHCR.
As the armed
conflict has continued for more than twenty years, some children have grown up
in the confines of camps and have been unable to lead normal lives. Refugees
generally must ask for official permission to leave the camps and have to
return to the camp at a certain time, according to BBC News, “War Weary Tamils Face India Hardship,” June 4, 2007.
Some refugees have also encountered difficulties when trying to find a job,
rent a house or set up bank accounts in
India
, according to BBC News. Once refugee children have
finished school, these challenges may hamper their prospects of finding
employment in the highly competitive Indian job market.
Despite the minimal
assistance they receive, refugees tend not to complain for fear of inciting
resentment among members of the Indian host communities who in some cases may
be living in equally destitute circumstances. Some of the refugee camp
infrastructure dates back to the 1980s and 1990s and requires urgent repair,
especially water facilities and toilets, according to the US Bureau of
Population, Refugees and Migration, FY
Guidelines for Proposal Submissions for IO and NGO Protection and Assistance
Programs for Sri Lankan Refugees in India, August 27, 2007.
Some recent reports state that refugees have
been prevented from escaping to
India
by sea by Sri Lankan authorities. The Sri Lankan Navy reportedly fired at the
ship of a refugee family that was fleeing from the Mannar mainland coast on
October 18, 2007, killing a man and two children, ages 11 and 16 years, and
injuring a woman and two other younger children, according to a report by the University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna)
(UTHR(J)), a leading independent human rights organization in Sri Lanka, Slow Strangulation of Jaffna: Trashing
General Larry Wijeratne’s Legacy and Enthroning Barbarism, Special Report No. 28, December 4, 2007.
The GoSL has sought to resolve the displacement crisis quickly to
demonstrate its ability to address the humanitarian situation and to downplay
other human rights concerns. In this vein, the government started major return campaigns
in September 2006 and March 2007, during
which more than 100,000 IDPs went back to their homes in the Trincomalee and
Batticaloa districts. Many of them were coerced to return. Security forces at
times have allegedly threatened to withhold water and food rations from IDPs
who refuse to cooperate with return programs. This prompted WFP to link the
government’s food aid requests to conditions of voluntary return, according to Reuters, “
Sri Lanka
’s War Displaced Seek New
Start - Yet Again,” June 19, 2007.
Security forces,
nevertheless, have continued to threaten IDPs stating that they will no longer
guarantee the security of those staying in the camps, according to HRW, Return to War: Human Rights under Siege,
August 2007. Some government officials exerted considerable pressure on IDPs in
the days leading up to the returns. At times, they forced IDPs in the camps
onto buses that would take them back to their home communities without allowing
the IDPs to wait for their children to come back from school or for others
relatives to return from work outside the camps. Some displaced persons have
told humanitarian workers that security forces threatened to beat or kill them
if they refused to return, or said that they would consider the IDPs to be part
of the LTTE if they didn’t go home.
Humanitarian
organizations have also raised concerns about whether these premature returns
allow returnees to live under the “safe, dignified and sustainable” conditions
that international standards require. With the security situation unchanged and
humanitarian access restricted in some of these areas, resettlement exposes
many IDPs to the same dangerous and insecure environment from which they had
hoped to escape.
The GoSL has in some cases not ensured that
returnees have shelter, the ability to earn a livelihood or access to basic
services. According to initial assessments by humanitarian organizations, the
conditions and areas of return are unsatisfactory and there appears to be an
urgent need to support the returnees with food and equipment to restart their
livelihoods. As many schools in the areas of return are not open, some parents
decide to leave children behind with host families so they can continue their
education in IDP camps, according to Save the Children in
Sri Lanka
, Emergency Response Monthly Update, May 2007. Due to the lack of
coordination in the resettlement process, some children in the North and East
missed their “O” level exams in December 2007, delaying the completion of their
education for another year, according to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee
(IASC) (see below: Education).
Humanitarian organizations wanting to provide
returnees with livelihood support in the initial stages of return have been
denied access to some areas of the Batticaloa district by the government,
citing security concerns, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The absence of humanitarian assistance and human
rights monitoring may inhibit the ability of returnees to thrive and creates an
environment where human rights violations take place. Access
constraints have also made it difficult to obtain reliable information on
living conditions and protection needs of resettled people and newly displaced
persons in these conflict areas.
In March 2007, UNHCR
officially stated that “heavy pressure has been applied on internally displaced
people” to return. It then received assurances from the GoSL that future IDP
returns would be safe and voluntary. Subsequently, UNHCR noted an improvement
in the situation and released a statement in May 2007 stating that the majority
of returns were meeting minimum international standards. Several human rights
organizations disapproved of UNHCR’s turnaround in light of ongoing violations
in the return process, according to South Asians for Human Rights (SAHR).
The lack of clear
policies and plans for IDPs has stirred tensions among various groups that
accuse the GoSL of favoritism and discrimination. The LTTE and the government
are well aware that the return of displaced populations can change the ethnic
make up of certain areas. Minorities in the East fear that the GoSL is pursuing
a policy of “Sinhalization” in some areas to change the ethnic demography of
the Eastern Province in its favor, according to SAHR, Report on the Fact Finding Mission to the North and East to Assess the
State of Displaced Persons, August 2007. They accuse the GoSL of changing
administrative borders, moving Sinhalese settlers to Tamil and Muslim areas and
constructing Buddhist temples on these lands to acquire territory for the
Sinhalese majority. Similarly, the LTTE has allegedly encouraged Tamils to move
to Muslim areas according to AI, Waiting to Go
Home - The Plight of the Internally Displaced, June 29, 2006.
Moreover, human
rights organizations have cast doubts on the nature of some government-declared
high security zones (HSZs), which are only accessible to the military, and
which are seen as discriminating against Tamils. Most IDPs in Jaffna and many
in Trincomalee are unable to return to their communities because their homes
are located in HSZs. Paradoxically, the government deemed one area in the
Trincomalee district as a HSZ in 2007, yet opened it for economic investment,
according to UTHR(J), Can the East be Won
by Human Culling? Special Economic Zones. An Ideological Journey Back to 1983,
August 2007. [21] More
than 4,250 families, mainly Tamils, are currently stranded in transit sites as
a result of their area of origin being deemed a HSZ in Trincomalee and have not
been offered viable alternatives by the GoSL, according to UTHR(J).
The GoSL rarely
offers alternatives for displaced people who cannot or do not wish to return
and generally does not approve of local integration or resettlement to other
areas of Sri Lanka except if the area of return is mined or has been designated as a HSZ. This strict policy
prevents a large percentage of Muslim IDPs in Puttalam in western
Sri Lanka
from formally starting their new lives. Having been displaced for 17 years,
some people who were displaced as children have lived in the district almost
all of their lives, started families and developed social ties there.
Nevertheless, current policies prevent them from acquiring resident status and
property rights and participating in resettlement programs. They cannot leave
the camps unless they return to their areas of origin.
The government’s
strict policy also does not account for the well-founded security concerns of
Muslim IDPs in Puttalam, Trincomalee and
Anuradhapura
about returning to areas formerly controlled by the LTTE. Muslim IDPs from
Puttalam and
Anuradhapura
had been expelled by the LTTE in the 1990s to make space for Tamils.
Finally, some donors
have earmarked funding for tsunami-displaced areas or IDPs, thereby creating
disparities between the tsunami-induced and conflict-induced displaced people.
While villages for tsunami-affected IDPs in the South were rebuilt for the
largely Sinhalese population, Tamil and Muslim IDPs in the North and East
hardly benefited from the funding as HSZs and insecurity impeded reconstruction
efforts, according to AI, Waiting to Go Home, June, 29, 2006. This “funding divide” between
tsunami-induced and conflict-induced IDPs prevents aid organizations from
addressing such inequities. In addition, this pre-selection of beneficiaries
contradicts the humanitarian goal of assisting the most vulnerable victims of
armed conflict or natural disaster.
Health
Armed conflict,
displacement and restrictions on the delivery of aid have increased Sri Lankans’
vulnerability to malnutrition and disease. In addition, many health facilities in the North and East have been
damaged or destroyed. However, the lack of information on the health situation
in conflict-affected areas somewhat conceals the urgency of the crisis. Due to
intentional obstruction of access to vulnerable areas by both the GoSL and the
LTTE, it is extremely difficult to assess the health situation for children in
certain areas of the country. For example, The
New York Times reported on an incident in which the government allegedly
blocked the release of an emergency assessment by the UN that found signs of an
increase in child malnutrition in
Jaffna,
according to The New York Times, “
Sri
Lanka
’s Scars Trace Lines of War Without
End,“ June 15, 2007.
The World Food
Program (WFP) warned of a humanitarian emergency in
Jaffna and Batticaloa and an acute food and
livelihood crisis in five other districts in the North and East, specifically
in the districts of Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee, Mannar and parts of
Vavuniya in May 2007, Executive Brief:
Sri Lanka Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification (IPC),
May 2007. WFP has called the armed conflict in
Sri Lanka
a “serious threat” to
food security and to ongoing efforts to eradicate poverty in the North and
East. Substandard hygienic conditions and a lack of clean water have
exacerbated risks of infections. Only 30 percent of the people in the northern
districts of Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu have access to latrines, clean water
and sanitation, according to WFP. Children suffer particularly under these
conditions.
Malnutrition is undeniably one of the most serious
health concerns that children in
Sri Lanka
face. Almost one third of
children under five years old in
Sri Lanka
are reported to be
underweight and approximately 14 percent suffer from acute malnutrition or
wasting, according to UNICEF’s figures between 1999 and 2005. WFP regards armed conflict as one of the main
reasons for malnutrition, with the highest levels in the North and East and
some deprived areas in central
Sri
Lanka
, Food
Security Assessment, April 2007. WFP’s 2007 assessment specifically
identified the need for a supplementary feeding program for malnourished
children under five in conflict areas.
Malnutrition has
affected girls disproportionally as families tend to discriminate against them
in their food distribution, according to WFP’s Food Security Assessment of
April 2007. Growth of girls under five was almost 40 percent more likely to be
severely stunted than that of boys and approximately 70 percent of girls were
more likely to be underweight than boys, according to the same assessment. One
explanation for this discrimination may be that Sri Lankans tend to follow
traditional gender roles so that men and boys receive food first, leaving only
the leftovers for women and girls. This discrimination may also impact the food
consumption of pregnant women and increase risks for the unborn child. Further
studies are required to better understand the gender disparities related to
nutrition, according to WFP.
Displacement,
government restrictions and a lack of agricultural inputs or markets have
deprived many IDPs and vulnerable communities in conflict-affected areas of
their livelihoods. The fishing and farming sectors, the two main sectors in the
North and East, have been particularly affected by the conflict. Many farmers
and fishermen have lost land or tools during the war or have had to interrupt
their work due to continued fighting or displacement. Moreover, the
GoSL has imposed security-related restrictions on fishing and farming in the
entire North and some parts of the East. It has also declared certain areas
HSZs rendering them inaccessible for civilians. From August to December 2006, the
average fisherman in
Jaffna
lost about three quarters of his usual income, according to WFP’s Sri Lankan Food Security Assessment of
June 2007. The production rates in the fishing industry also dropped to an
estimated 10 percent of pre-conflict levels according to IRIN, “
Sri Lanka
: Malnutrition Rising in
Jaffna, Aid Deliveries Struggling,”
July 18, 2007. Due to import restrictions, prices of agricultural
imports, fuels and other products have increased dramatically, according to
WFP.
As a result of poverty
and despair, some families in the conflict areas have reduced the number of
meals they eat each day, borrowed money, stolen from others or pawned jewelry
or household belongings. Economic despair and lack of food may also motivate
some families to allow their children to join the LTTE or the TMVP/Karuna
faction to alleviate the tight household budget, as both
armed groups have offered financial or other benefits to families whose
children joined, or directly to the child recruits, according to HRW, Complicit in Crime. State Collusion in
Abductions and Child Recruitment by the Karuna Group, January 2007 (see
below: Child Soldiers).
WFP reported in June
2007 that approximately 800,000 people needed lifesaving humanitarian emergency
assistance in Jaffna and Batticaloa, including IDPs, as well as families which
had been living below the poverty line before the conflict and who were no
longer able to sustain themselves due to the conflict. In
Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, Vavuniya and Trincomalee, another 900,000
people needed help with livelihood generation, according to WFP.
In spite of this
dire situation, between August 2006 and April 2007 food assistance was reduced
by half due to security concerns, logistical constraints and lack of
humanitarian access to the North and East, according to WFP. There is an urgent
need to address this food and livelihoods crisis and to assist IDPs and other
vulnerable groups in the North and East.
Increasing the
provision of safe water for poverty eradication is a priority policy for the
GoSL and international agencies working in the country, according to WFP, Sri Lanka Food Security Assessment, June
2007. The increasing number of IDPs and other vulnerable populations has
strained the already weak water and sanitation services in
Sri Lanka
. As of 2007, about one
third of households did not have access to sanitation facilities and about one
quarter did not have access to safe drinking water, according to UNICEF.
Approximately 18 percent of children in
Sri Lanka
did not have access to
any water or sanitation facilities. Conditions in IDP camps are particularly
severe (see above: Refugees and IDPs).
The discrepancies
between districts regarding access to safe water are considerable. While 95 percent of the population in
Colombo has access to safe
water, only 21 percent in Mannar have access to safe water, according to WFP.
Other districts with poor access are Mullaitivu, Kilinochchi and Kegalle.
Sri Lanka
’s nationwide health
indicators are generally positive with a remarkable reduction of mortality
rates of infants and under-5-year-olds between 2000 and 2005, according to the
World Bank, World Development Indicators
Database, April 2007. Within this five-year period, infant mortality rates
dropped from 16 to 12 per 1,000 deaths and mortality rates for children under 5
years old dropped from 19 to 14 per 1,000 deaths according to the World Bank.
This is due in large part to the fact that immunization coverage in
Sri Lanka
has reached approximately 90 percent on average in all districts, according to
WFP, Sri Lanka Food Security Assessment,
June 2007. As a result of high overall immunization coverage, WFP concludes
that there is no high threat of outbreaks of communicable diseases even in
highly populated displacement areas.
The situation in
conflict-affected areas is somewhat more difficult. In these areas many people
have lost their immunization cards due to displacement and have not received
all doses for multi-dose immunizations. Additionally, preventive health
services, including antenatal care and vaccinations were completely disrupted
in non-accessible areas due to the armed conflict from September to December
2006, according to WFP, Health Lines.
Newsletter of the Country Office for
Sri Lanka
, December 2006.
Containment services throughout the country are too overloaded and are unable
to cope with large scale emergency situations or outbreaks of diseases and
hygiene-related illnesses, according to UNOCHA, CHAP in Sri Lanka, 2007.
A shortage of
essential drugs and vaccines persists in
Jaffna
and Vanni as private pharmacies have run out of supplies, according to UNICEF.
In Mannar district, for instance, insufficient supplies of vaccine and lack of
health professionals disrupted immunization services in 2007. In conflict areas
there have also been more incidences of malaria, malnutrition among children,
mental illness and drug resistant viruses, according to the UN. Due to the lack
of safe water and sanitation, a high percentage of children suffer from some
form of diarrheal disease every year, according to UNICEF.
As a result of the
tense security environment, health institutions have struggled to operate in
the North and East of Sri Lanka, according to the UN. For example, on November
2, 2006, the Sri Lankan Army dropped bombs close to the hospital in
Kilinochchi, according to UNOCHA, Sri
Lanka: United Nations Condemns Indiscriminate Use of Force, November 9,
2006. The UN Country Team verified cases of attacks on hospitals committed by
the Sri Lankan security forces in Batticaloa and Vavuniya between October 18,
2006 and July, 14, 2007, according to the UN Secretary-General’s 2007 report on
children and armed conflict in
Sri
Lanka
(S/2007/758 para. 33). In another
incident, doctors in
Trincomalee
General
Hospital
were harassed and threatened by unidentified armed assailants demanding money.
This led the doctors to protest in September 2007 according to IASC Country
Team Sri Lanka, Situation Report # 92,
Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Mannar, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara Districts,
September 13-20, 2007. According to various reports this was not an
isolated incident.
Ongoing fighting and
access restrictions have prevented people in conflict-affected areas from
accessing lifesaving medical care. In August 2006, severely ill patients could
no longer be transferred from Jaffna Teaching Hospital to
Colombo due to fighting close to Muhamalai
which forced roads to be closed according to ICRC Annual Report Sri Lanka 2006. While the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) intervened by transporting patients by air
the following month, such ad hoc contingency operations do not alleviate the need for systematic medical supply
and care in conflict-affected areas.
Medical facilities
are often difficult to reach for many people in conflict-affected areas in
Sri Lanka
.
Some patients have to travel up to four hours to the nearest medical center. In
some cases they must pass through several military checkpoints only to wait
hours to see a doctor after their arrival. Apart from the long travel, many
patients fear being abducted by armed groups on their way to seek medical
attention. These obstacles have caused patients to delay or skip treatment, sometimes
with fatal consequences, according to IMC, Save
Sri Lanka’s Neglected Population IMC’s Mobile Clinics Bring Health Care to
Those Who Need it Most, August 31, 2007.
To assist IDPs and
other vulnerable populations in remote or difficult to access areas, the Sri
Lankan Ministry of Health and humanitarian organizations have established some
mobile health clinics. However, the government-run health clinics are not
operational in LTTE-controlled areas like Paduvankarai, leaving hundreds of
thousands of people in these areas without any access to health care, according
to the UTHR(J), The Choice between
Anarchy and International Law with Monitoring, Special Report No. 23,
November 7, 2006.
If left untreated,
people risk dying of curable diseases such as diarrhea and acute respiratory
infections, according to IMC. Some people in conflict areas have died of
snakebites because they did not have access to timely treatment. UNICEF
reported at least one maternal death in 2007 as a result of a late transfer due
to curfews. Access restrictions also contributed to the death of two girls, an
infant and a two-year-old in
Kilinochchi
Hospital in May 2007
(S/2007/758, para. 39). Additionally, the long and strenuous journey to medical
facilities is a primary reason that Trincomalee has the highest maternal
mortality rate in the country, according to IMC.
When people seeking
medical assistance reach their destination, they often find medical facilities
lacking medical staff, medicine and other vital supplies. Medical and health
care service clinics are extremely short of doctors and other qualified health
professionals in areas on the periphery of the conflict-affected districts,
according to OCHA, CHAP: Mid-Year Review of the Appeal 2007 for Sri
Lanka, July 17, 2007. Jaffna district, for example, faced a shortage of 17
medical consultants, 20 specialists, one dental surgeon, 176 medical officers,
38 registered medical officers, 327 nurses, 18 grade one nurses, 152 public
health midwives and other hospital personnel, according to the IASC’s
assessment, September 6 – 13, 2007. As of early 2007 there was only one
pediatrician responsible for
Jaffna’s
half a million people, according to MSF-USA, MSF Responds to Ongoing Violence in Sri Lanka, January 24, 2007.
The increased numbers of returning IDPs have strained health facilities in
Trincomalee and Vaharai, according to OCHA, CHAP,
Mid-Year Review of the Appeal 2007 (see above: Refugees and IDPs). In
addition, access restrictions have limited the supply of medicine to conflict-affected
areas. Hospitals need surgical kits as well as medicine for chronic diseases,
according to the WFP’s December 2006 newsletter.
HIV/AIDS
At the end of 2005, the estimated national
HIV prevalence rate among people between the ages of 15 and 49 was less than
0.1 percent in Sri Lanka, according to the 2006
Epidemiological Fact Sheet on HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections,
produced by the Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), WHO and UNICEF. The fact
sheet also reported that 5,000 adults and children were living with HIV/AIDS in
Sri Lanka
;
no estimates for the number of children living with HIV or orphaned due to AIDS
were available.
HIV/AIDS experts in
Sri Lanka
consistently note that
the lack of access to certain areas in the country has resulted in a lack of
information about HIV/AIDS prevalence.
Sri Lanka
has been classified as a
low-level epidemic country by the UN. GoSL agencies and international and
national agencies working on HIV/AIDS issues warn that HIV may spread further
among the population due to lack of awareness, stigmatization and unsafe sexual
practices. Additionally, there are a considerable number of cases likely not
accounted for since counseling and testing services are unavailable, according
to the World Bank, HIV/AIDS in Sri Lanka,
June 2005. Also, fear of stigmatization if one is known to be HIV positive may
discourage Sri Lankans from seeking HIV testing and support. Finally, the risk
of contracting HIV and sexually transmitted infections (STIs) is further
compounded by a low use of condoms among Sri Lankan males, according to the
World Bank’s brief on HIV/AIDS in Sri
Lanka, June 2005.
Armed conflict and subsequent displacement
have created conditions that make the spread of HIV more likely to take place
in the North and East, according to the Center for Policy Alternatives (CPA), a
Sri Lankan policy think tank, in its study HIV/AIDS
in
Sri Lanka
.
A Profile on Policy and Practice, July 2007. Transactional and unsafe
sexual practices may be used as coping strategies for those impacted by the
deterioration of communities due to the armed conflict. The breakdown of family
and social structures and unsafe conditions in some IDP and refugee camps may
expose children to sex at a younger age. There are reportedly more incidents of
gender-based violence (GBV) in camps than in traditional communities, leading
to a higher risk of STIs, including HIV/AIDS, according to WFP’s Sri Lanka Food Security Assessment, 15-30
April 2007, June 2007. Reproductive health services are rarely available in
the conflict-affected areas, particularly when humanitarian access to these
areas is interrupted. Finally, conflict
areas tend to have large numbers of soldiers and police officers who may engage
in risky sexual behavior.
Conflict-related violence has also obstructed
efforts by the humanitarian community to work on HIV prevention and care in
Sri Lanka
.
Besides the lack of access to large and vulnerable parts of the country, the
tense situation makes it difficult to gain the trust of people who may need
support.
While many of these risk factors specifically
impact children and youth, data on HIV/AIDS and war-affected children and youth
is scarce in
Sri Lanka
.
This information is crucial to better understanding their situation and
addressing their particular concerns.
Stigmatization of people living with HIV is a
major obstacle to preventing HIV/AIDS and caring for patients in
Sri Lanka
.
Many people simply do not know what HIV/AIDS is and how it can be transmitted,
which can easily lead to harmful behavior. Out of fear and ignorance,
communities, especially in rural areas, have at times turned violent against
community members living with HIV, chasing them away or burning their homes,
according to the news source Global
Information Network, “Sri Lanka: Social Workers Fight for Acceptance of
AIDS Orphans,” July 6, 2007. Even many health care personnel and officials in
the education sector are unaware of what HIV/AIDS is and how it is contracted,
according to CPA and the Asia Pacific Leadership Forum (APLF), A Profile of the Stigma and Discrimination
Faced by People Living with HIV/AIDS, 2005. The Salvation Army, which works
with people with HIV/AIDS in Sri Lanka explained in an interview with the Global Information Network that some medical
personnel have refused to treat HIV patients and that some schools have
rejected pupils living with HIV, “Sri Lanka: Social Workers Fight for
Acceptance of AIDS Orphans,” July 6, 2007.
CPA reported in its 2007 study on HIV/AIDS in Sri Lanka one case in which
hospital nurses would not touch the sheets of a mother living with HIV. They
marked her bed with a sign to identify her as a patient with an infectious
disease. As a result, people passing by started to insult her. Later, at the
Lady Ridgeway Children’s Hospital in
Colombo,
nurses prohibited the mother’s child from playing with other children and the
mother from using the common bathroom, according to CPA.
This kind of discrimination against
individuals with HIV/AIDS can have devastating consequences on family members.
For example, in 2001, some villagers harassed the family of a man living with
HIV. Unable to endure the situation, the man committed suicide. Afterwards, the
villagers set the family’s house on fire with his family inside. Although his
widow and children managed to escape, they could not return to their village,
according to CPA, HIV/AIDS in
Sri Lanka
.
A Profile on Policy and Practice, July 2007.
Countering discrimination against people
living with HIV in
Sri Lanka
is essential for many reasons, including the fact that stigmatization
discourages individuals from seeking HIV testing, thereby increasing the risk
of further spread of the infection.
Lack of Information
A National Adolescent Survey conducted by UNICEF
and the GoSL in 2004 highlighted the lack of knowledge among 10 to 18 year olds
about HIV/AIDS and other STIs, including modes of prevention and common
symptoms. According to the survey, fewer than 45 percent of adolescents
surveyed knew about STIs, including HIV/AIDS. This lack of knowledge is likely
related to the stigma connected to HIV/AIDS, according to UNESCO’s study on Adolescent Reproductive Health in South
Asia: Sri Lanka, 2007. This lack of knowledge can also lead to unsafe
sexual practices as well as discrimination against persons who are HIV
positive.
Overall,
Sri Lanka
has high primary and
secondary school enrollment levels, making schools an effective place to teach
young people about sexual and reproductive health, including HIV/AIDS and other
STIs, according to WHO. The GoSL has made sexual and reproductive health
education part of its standard school curriculum. However, high dropout rates
in conflict-affected areas prevent many children from learning about HIV/AIDS.
Efforts by the UN to reach out-of-school youth through youth clubs and
vocational training have recently been hampered by the escalation of the armed
conflict.
Access to Care
Prevention, treatment and care of HIV/AIDS
patients are linked to containing the spread of HIV/AIDS and should therefore
be part of an integrated approach to dealing with HIV/AIDS in
Sri Lanka
. At the moment, however,
most programs and initiatives are part of the National HIV/AIDS Prevention
Project (NHAPP) and mainly address prevention rather than treatment, care and
support, according to CPA. In addition, many STI clinics in
Sri Lanka
lack infrastructure and qualified
personnel to provide care for people living with HIV, according to CPA, HIV/AIDS in
Sri Lanka
. A Profile on Policy and
Practice, July 2007.
The GoSL has supported freely available
public sector provision of antiretroviral treatment (ARV) since 2004. As
part of the policy, pregnant women infected with HIV are entitled to receive
free therapy to prevent transmission to the baby, according to UNAIDS. However,
this free treatment is only offered in
Colombo,
according to the Joint UN Team on AIDS in
Sri
Lanka
, Situation
& Response Analysis, Update 2006, Key Findings from the External Review of
the STD & AIDS Response in
Sri
Lanka
, 2006. It thus leaves out some of
the most vulnerable and conflict-affected groups outside the capital,
particularly in the North and East. As the overall health system has been
severely damaged by the armed conflict in these areas, this population requires
more, not less attention, resources and assistance for coping with HIV/AIDS
(see above: Health). For example,
the
Jaffna
hospital does not have a doctor trained to deal with STIs and people living
with HIV, according to CPA.
More than 250,000 children in
Sri Lanka
, mostly in the North and East, have been forced to
interrupt their education due to the renewed outbreak of conflict, according to
UNICEF, Humanitarian Action.
Sri Lanka
.
Donor Update, June 24, 2007.
Sri Lanka
’s armed conflict has
turned schools into military targets, IDP camps and military shelters. Military
attacks had damaged or destroyed 261 schools as of September 2007 and their
reconstruction has been delayed due to insecurity (S/2007/758, para. 28).
As of 2005, prior
to the renewed armed conflict, the national net enrollment rate was 97 percent for
primary education with near gender parity, according to UNESCO’s Education for All (EFA) Global Monitoring
Report 2008. However, this high enrollment level does not take into account
regional differences and actual student attendance. For example, in July 2007,
291 primary and secondary schools were forced to close due to security reasons,
preventing more than 107,000 children from attending school, according to
UNICEF figures reported in the Joint UN
North East Situation Monitoring Report – August 2007.
Sri Lanka
’s educational
authorities, UNICEF and international and national NGOs have initiated a number
of local activities to provide educational continuity in conflict-affected
areas to the extent possible. This is critical as the GoSL’s failure to address
educational grievances in the past is considered one of the root causes of the
armed conflict and has the potential to stir ethno-political tensions again,
according to the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (“the Coalition”).
In 2006 and 2007,
both parties to the conflict attacked schools, mainly in the
Jaffna, Mullaitivu, Kilinochchi, Trincomalee,
Vavuniya, Mannar and Batticaloa districts. For example, while fighting against
the LTTE, the Sri Lankan military fired salvos at the
Vigneshwara
Vidyalayam
School in Kathiravelli on
November 8, 2006, according to HRW’s Return
to War: Human Rights under Siege, August 2007. About 2,000 people were
living in the school compound at the time of the shelling. The school had
housed IDPs since August 2006. In the incident, 62 people died, 47 people were
injured, including 23 children, and the school building was damaged. The
military reportedly delayed the entry of the ICRC and SLMM for hours after the
attack. During its investigations HRW found no evidence to back the
government’s claim that the LTTE had used the IDPs as “human shields.” On
December 12, 2006, the LTTE launched a similar attack on a school in Kallar
village, Trincomalee district, killing one child and wounding ten others,
according to the Office of the Special Representative for Children and Armed
Conflict, Sri Lanka – LTTE Attack on
School is a Grave Violation of Rights of Children, December 12, 2006.
The breakdown of
civilian-military boundaries and the proximity of military checkpoints and the
TMVP’s political party offices to schools has exposed civilians to military
attacks, violence, harassment and arbitrary and illegal arrests (see below: GBV
and also Other Violations and Vulnerabilities). The LTTE has recruited children
on their way to and from school and in the past used schools as recruitment
sites, according to HRW, Living in Fear.
Child Soldiers and the Tamil Tigers in
Sri Lanka
, November 2004 and Complicit in Crime, January 2007 (see
below: Child Soldiers).
In addition to
schools being destroyed or damaged by armed groups during attacks, many schools
have been forced to close as thousands of displaced people have sought shelter
in school buildings. When fighting flared up in April 2006, the Batticaloa
school district temporarily closed 324 schools to accommodate IDPs according to IRIN, “Many schools in East reopen,
though fear persists,” May 21, 2007. During this period of time, the education
of more than 135,000 was interrupted, at least in the short term, according to
the Batticaloa Divisional Secretary, cited by IRIN, “Sri Lanka: Many schools in East reopen.” Approximately one
year later, 86 schools still could not reopen because they either sheltered
IDPs or were considered to be too insecure.
In Trincomalee, for
example, 35 schools in Muttur town are still closed due to past conflict, or
are in a HSZ and/or area not suitable for resettlement due to mines and
explosive remnants of war (ERW), according to the Joint UN North East Situation Monitoring Report of June 2007. As a
result of the intense security environment, little progress has been made on
the reconstruction of schools. Even after the schools are vacated, they require
repairs and cleanup before they can reopen for students.
Even post-tsunami
reconstruction, which had initially received ample funding, has come to a
standstill in the North and East due to the poor security situation, according
to IRIN, “Uneven Progress in Post-Tsunami
Schools’ Reconstruction,” September 9, 2007. Not a single school
project has been finished in the three northern districts of
Jaffna, Mullaithivu and Kilinochchi thus far.
Although the destruction resulted from the tsunami, the failure to rebuild is
due to the poor security situation, specifically the difficulties in importing
materials, recruiting workers and dealing with constant work interruptions
according to IRIN, “Sri Lanka:
Shortage of construction materials hampers rebuilding in Jaffna,” July 9, 2007.
As a result of these
delays and interruptions, potential and current donors have also refrained from
fulfilling their initial financial commitments. For example, all donors, except
for UNICEF, have withdrawn their support for tsunami reconstruction in
Jaffna and Mullathivu
where 25 schools were destroyed, according to Tsunami Education Rehabilitation
Monitoring Trust (TERM), a GoSL agency.
The GoSL would have
to employ at least 5,000 new teachers in the North and East to meet current
education needs, according to UNICEF’s Learning
Years, 2007. There has been a massive outflow of educational staff in
recent years as a result of the armed conflict. An estimated 1,800 teachers
have been displaced and others have moved away from conflict-affected areas to
safer, more prosperous areas, according to UNICEF, Humanitarian Action.
Sri
Lanka
. Donor Update, June 24, 2007.
Moreover, many teachers from the northern district of Kilinochchi were cut off
with the closure of the A9 road in August 2006 when they were visiting their
families in
Jaffna
during the school holidays. They have not been able to return to Kilinochchi to
date.
Recruiting and
transferring new teachers to the North and East has proven difficult due to the
general shortage of qualified teachers in
Sri Lanka
. Low teacher salaries is
considered to be one of the main reasons for this shortage, negatively
impacting the performance of teachers and the quality of new applicants,
according to UNICEF Regional Office for South Asia (ROSA), Social Inclusion: Gender and Equity in Education SWAPS in South Asia,
Sri Lanka Case Study, 2007. In addition, some local politicians have at
times blocked the transfer of teachers to understaffed schools to please their
constituencies, according to UNICEF.
The lack of teachers
may cause school authorities to be more lenient than appropriate on remaining
teachers regarding violations against schoolchildren. While corporal punishment
is not illegal in
Sri Lanka
,
the Ministry of Education has prohibited corporal punishment, and cruelty
against children is punishable under the Penal Code of Sri Lanka. However,
teachers and school principals have allegedly harassed and tortured
schoolchildren without disciplinary or penal consequences, according to the
Asia
Legal
Resource
Center’s Alternative Report to the Second Periodic
Report of Sri Lanka to the Committee against Torture, September 2005
Exceptionally high
student dropout and absentee rates are prevalent in the North and East. In
2003, the dropout rate for children in the North and East was estimated to be
15.8 percent, four times higher than the national rate, according to the
National Institute of Education and UNICEF, Rapid
Needs Assessment Survey: Education of Children in Conflict Affected Areas of
Sri Lanka, 2003. Dropout rates were highest among displaced children.
Although education is free through university level in Sri Lanka, conflict
induced economic hardship appears to be one of the key factors in determining
whether a child drops out of school or continues his or her education.
Some children,
particularly adolescents, must forgo their education because they are forced to
assume adult responsibilities, such as caring for siblings or earning money due
to hardship caused by the armed conflict. For example, a 14-year-old boy told
UNICEF in an interview that he had to help take care of his nine siblings and
his paralyzed mother after his father was killed in the war, according to Making a Difference with Catch-up Education,
2007. Many poor families cannot afford expenses for bus transport, school
supplies and food, and some children lost their school books and uniforms when
fleeing their villages. Humanitarian organizations identified the lack of
materials as one of the main obstacles to children’s regular school attendance,
according to OCHA, CHAP, Mid-Year Review of the Appeal 2007 for
Sri Lanka
,
July 17, 2007.
Many children who
are able to remain in school must overcome multiple obstacles in order to
continue their education. First, long and dangerous school routes put them at
risk of abduction and recruitment. Once they arrive, classes usually take place
in provisional huts with poor water and sanitation facilities. Additionally, classes
are often overcrowded and noisy, making it difficult for students and teachers
to concentrate. A teacher in Point Pedro explained that school assemblies take
place on the road, according to IRIN,
“
Sri Lanka
: Shortage of
construction materials hampers rebuilding in
Jaffna,” July 9, 2007.
Many students who
remain in school need special attention and care as a result of their distress
due to conflict-related experiences. Some children suffer from symptoms such as
a sense of insecurity and/or psychosocial distress and may require psychosocial
support. Likewise, those who have missed years of education due to conflict
require specialized catch up and non-formal education. Simply repeating grades
could put students at odds with
Sri
Lanka
’s age-specific grades and
examinations, according to UNICEF.
Some children in
conflict-affected districts also encounter problems in the enrollment process
because they may not have received a birth certificate or may have lost it due
to displacement or related circumstances. Most documents in schools in
Eachchilampattai in Trincomalee district, for example, were destroyed due to
the conflict, including birth certificates, admission forms, certificates and
other relevant documents. As a result, children may have difficulties registering
for exams and common competitions, according to preliminary findings of IASC’s
situation report, 13 - 20 September 2007.
Several suicide and other attacks carried out
by the LTTE in southern cities have left parents and schoolchildren there in a
constant state of alert. For example, parents immediately responded to rumors
in June 2006 about possible attacks on schools in
Colombo and two other major towns by keeping
their children at home for several days, according to education officials cited
by Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “Nervous
Sri Lankan Parents Pull Kids From Schools Amid Bomb Rumours,” June 28, 2006. As a preventive measure, some school authorities
have established security checks at the entrance of school premises to identify
explosive devices.
New Educational Initiatives
School authorities,
supported by UNICEF, have recently introduced a new consolidated syllabus for
children who have missed school for up to six months, according to UNICEF, New Syllabus Helps Conflict-Affected
Children Get Back to School in Sri Lanka, November 5, 2007. Based on the
syllabus, UNICEF is training teachers to assist students in catching up on
their missed education and to address the emotional impact of armed conflict on
children. At the time of writing, the trainings
had been initiated in Batticaloa and Trincomalee. Other initiatives to address
the psychosocial needs of children in the educational systems are ongoing.
Advocacy with the
Sri Lankan Ministry of Education in late 2006 and early 2007 to strengthen its
emergency response resulted in the establishment of a network of emergency
education focal points at the central, provincial and zonal levels within the
existing education system, according to UNICEF, Humanitarian Action, Sri Lanka Donor Update, June 24, 2007. In
addition, the Ministry of Education affirmed its commitment to providing
education for every child affected by the conflict and has dispatched
textbooks, uniforms and supplies, according to UNICEF.
Gender-Based Violence
Incidents of
conflict-related gender-based violence (GBV) against children in
Sri Lanka
appear non-existent. The UN Secretary-General’s reports on children and armed
conflict in
Sri Lanka
of 2006 and 2007 did not report a single case of grave sexual violence against
children (S/2006/1006, para. 44, S/2007/758, para. 34). The lack of reports may
leave the impression that the armed conflict has not impacted rates of
gender-based violence. However, anecdotal information indicates that this is
not the case. In fact, the most likely scenario is that cases of
conflict-related GBV are not reported or systematically documented due to fear
of stigmatization and the lack of access to adequate and appropriate legal,
medical and social services in conflict-affected areas. The lack of reports,
outdated studies and insufficient statistical data of GBV make it difficult to
assess the nature and scope of the problem and to devise adequate policies and
programs to prevent and respond to incidents of conflict-related GBV in
Sri Lanka
.
Lack
of Protection in IDP Camps
Some IDP camps in
Sri Lanka
have not taken into account the protection and privacy needs of women and
children, exposing them to situations that make them vulnerable to sexual
harassment, sexual abuse and rape, according to AI, Waiting to Go Home - The
Plight of the Internally Displaced, June 29, 2006. For example,
up to eight family members, including extended family members, often share
small huts with no private areas. Bathrooms and toilets regularly require
residents to walk long distances on unlit paths at night, which increases their
risk of being attacked, according to AI. In a case reported by AI, an
unidentified person raped a 13-year-old girl who was walking in one of
Batticaloa’s transitional camps where she was living. In general, “poverty,
cramped living conditions and hopelessness” have fueled violence in many IDP
camps in
Sri Lanka
,
according to AI. In addition, stress-related alcohol abuse in camps may cause
some men to turn violent, even against their own family members. All of these
conditions may contribute to sexual violence in IDP camps.
Sexual
Violence by Armed Forces and Groups
The proximity of
military institutions and checkpoints to schools, IDP camps and health facilities
exposes children to sexual violence, according to the Coalition/Chatham House, Child Recruitment in South Asian Conflicts.
A Comparative Analysis of
Sri Lanka
,
Nepal
and
Bangladesh
, 2006. For example,
residents of Vavuniya welfare centers who passed through military checkpoints
several times each day complained about such abuses, according to the
Coalition.
Early
Marriages as a Protective Strategy
The fear of child
recruitment has encouraged parents to marry off their boys and girls at early
ages, such as 14 or 15 years old, because of a widespread belief that the LTTE
does not recruit people who are married. However, the “protective” strategy of
early marriage has failed to keep the LTTE from recruiting children, according
to the Coalition.
International and
national organizations working on GBV in
Sri Lanka
emphasize that children
in conflict areas are at risk of being raped or subjected to other forms of
sexual violence. However, these groups have been unable to systematically
document cases to substantiate this as few cases of sexual violence are ever
reported. The underreporting of GBV cases can be explained by several factors.
Potential
Repercussions for Reporting
Many survivors of sexual violence, afraid of
stigmatization and potential socio-economic repercussions for their families
and communities, choose to remain silent. Cultural taboos relating to
sexuality, STIs and sexual violence make it difficult for parents, teachers,
and community leaders to speak about and address these fears. Even though sexual violence committed by family members is
reportedly a major problem in IDP camps, it is considered a “family problem”
and has not been widely addressed by those serving the IDP population.
Survivors of intra-family violence who do speak out often encounter antagonism
by other members of their families. Even more, they risk losing their families’
vital economic and social support, which would be particularly difficult to
cope with in displacement settings.
Moreover, survivors’
fears for their physical safety may prevent them from reporting, particularly
if the perpetrators belong to security forces or armed groups. Community
workers reportedly are also afraid that they could be identified as supporters
of an armed group if they assist survivors who complain about GBV, according to
information from a locally based organization. In an increasingly insecure
environment, many local organizations working on violence against women
struggle to be adequately visible, trusted and accessible for the communities
they strive to serve, according to the same confidential source.
The proliferation of
small arms, often in the hands of civilians or paramilitary groups paired with
the lack of effective legal protection, feeds this sense of insecurity. Tense
inter-ethnic relations also pose an obstacle to reporting as Tamil or Muslim
children are often hesitant to report cases of GBV to Sinhala caseworkers and
vice versa. Police officers often lack the linguistic ability and cultural
sensitivity to interview witnesses and effectively investigate violence within
the Tamil and Muslim communities, according to the Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions to the Commission on Human
Rights following his mission to
Sri
Lanka
from November 28 to December 6, 2005
(E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.5).
Access
to Services
Displacement and
insecurity in the North and East make it difficult for survivors of GBV to seek
out care from appropriate and compassionate service providers. This includes
legal and judicial actors, such as the local police or court officials, health
care workers, and social workers and other social service providers. Without
access to appropriate and confidential health, psychosocial, legal and
protection services, few if any survivors of GBV will ever report an attack.
While national NGOs
working on issues related to violence against women provide services for GBV
survivors [22] throughout the country, all relevant service
providers need strengthened comprehensive case management and referral systems.
Government-run District Child Development Committees, comprised of
multi-disciplinary teams, have recently been set up with the support of UNICEF
to facilitate referrals and case management.
In the East and LTTE-controlled areas, very few
organizations, if any, provide comprehensive case management services to
survivors of GBV, and access to health services is extremely limited. To
receive post-rape health services from a government health center, a survivor
of abuse is often asked to present a completed police report form, given to her
by the police department. This is particularly true for survivors under the age
of 18. Many health workers believe that they will be penalized for failing to
report the rape of a minor to the police. Health centers in many districts have
been known to refuse services to GBV survivors who did not have a completed
police form. However,
many survivors of sexual violence wish only to receive medical care and not to
report the case of abuse to the police and pursue legal action. This is
particularly true in cases where the perpetrator is a member of an armed force
or group.
Many police officers
are not trained to handle cases of GBV and are not skilled in working with
survivors. As a result, they rarely respect principles of confidentiality or
the needs of survivors, according to anecdotal reports shared with Watchlist.
In a case reported by the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), the police at
Rattota in the Central Province of Sri Lanka interrogated a 13-year-old rape
survivor alongside the suspect, exposing the girl to mental trauma, according
to AHRC, Sri Lanka: Rattota Police
Mishandle Case of Child Rape Victim, November 26, 2007. In the same case,
the police also failed to obtain critical evidence of the rape after a hospital
refused to admit the girl, arguing that their medical staff was not qualified
to conduct a medical examination to determine rape. The police did not arrest a
suspect or conduct any investigation of this case as of November 26, 2007,
according to AHRC.
Some police officers
have reportedly discouraged victims from filing complaints to avoid
confrontations with the military in cases where the military is the accused
perpetrator. One
local women’s organization noted that the case of a 14-year-old girl had been
dropped by the police when it was discovered that the perpetrator was a member
of the TMVP/Karuna faction. The police have even allowed members of armed
forces or the police who are suspected of perpetrating gender-based violence to
be transferred to other locations, according to the World Organization Against
Torture (OMCT), Violence against Women in
Sri Lanka
.
Report Prepared for the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women, 2002.
On a positive note,
the GoSL maintains women and children’s desks in many police stations to
encourage women and children to report criminal cases of violence, including
GBV, to women police officers in private settings. However, the absence of
these desks in some areas undermines the purpose of providing an accessible and
gender-sensitive channel for reporting GBV cases.
Many Sri Lankans
have lost confidence in legal mechanisms as few perpetrators of violence are
punished, which may also dissuade some GBV survivors from reporting. While
legislation against violence against women and children exists, weak mechanisms
to implement and enforce this legislation breed a climate of impunity,
according to OMCT, State Violence in
Sri Lanka
.
Alternative Report to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, January
2004. For example, it is not uncommon for a victim to wait more than a decade
before the case is prosecuted, according to a written statement submitted by
the Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC) to the UN Economic and Social Council (E/CN.4/2005/NGO/116),
February 17, 2005.
This extended delay
works against the survivor as evidence may get lost, witnesses may disappear or
forget important facts and perpetrators can use the time to threaten victims
and witnesses, according to ALRC. The lack of witness protection also helps
explain the low conviction rate of four percent in criminal cases. The Ministry
of Justice and Law Reform is currently considering a draft bill for the
Assistance and Protection of Victims of Crime and Witnesses.
In some cases,
family heads or village and religious leaders have led informal arbitration
processes which often obligate the perpetrator to compensate survivors or the
families of survivors, avoiding formal legal proceedings altogether, according
to Zinthiya Ganeshpanchan, Domestic and
Gender-based Violence among Refugees and Internally Displaced Women, 2005.
Landmines and ERW
Before the 2002
cease-fire, the LTTE and the GoSL had used antipersonnel mines extensively
throughout the conflict. The mines’ proximity to civilian settlements has
endangered the lives of the war-affected populations in the North and East.
Lack of access to these areas due to mine contamination has hindered
humanitarian assistance, economic reconstruction and the return of displaced
people to homes that are in high contamination areas.
In general, children
are particularly vulnerable to death and injury by landmines and explosive
remnants of war (ERW) because they may mistake them for toys. In addition, their
small body size intensifies the impact of the explosion when the devices are
detonated.
Between 2002 and
2006, there were no confirmed reports of new use of antipersonnel mines by
either government forces or the LTTE with the exception of command-detonated
claymore mines by the LTTE, according to the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines’ Landmine Monitor Report 2007.
However, there are credible allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by the
LTTE since 2006, according to this report.
To date, both
parties have refused to accept an independent mission to verify allegations of
new use of antipersonnel mines. The GoSL and the LTTE have made negotiations on
banning antipersonnel mines contingent on progress in peace negotiations,
according to Landmine Monitor Report 2007. Thus, the GoSL has not signed the
Mine Ban Treaty, and the LTTE has not signed the Deed of Commitment that would
obligate them to observe a total ban on antipersonnel mines and to cooperate on
mine action.
Since February 2004,
the government has engaged in a comprehensive humanitarian mine action program
to make
Sri Lanka
mine-free by the end of 2008. However, mine action operators have questioned
the feasibility of this objective given the upsurge of violence since mid-2006,
the levels of known contamination, reports of new use of landmines and the
refusal of the military to allow mine clearance in HSZs, according to the Landmine Monitor Report 2007.
Since June 2007,
there has been no comprehensive national effort for surveying the extent of
landmine and ERW contamination in
Sri Lanka
, according to Landmine Monitor Report 2007. There are
therefore varying estimates on the extent of national contamination. The
National Steering Committee for Mine Action (NSCMA), which has been responsible
for mine action policy since August 2002, planned to carry out a national
technical survey through UNDP of all mine-affected areas in 2006. However,
faced with access constraints due to renewed armed conflict, NSCMA has not yet
been able to carry out the survey, according to Landmine Monitor Report 2007.
The GoSL estimated
ERW to affect 99 square kilometers of land in April 2006, but actual numbers
are estimated to be considerably lower, according to Landmine Monitor Report 2007. Landmines are estimated to
contaminate 730 villages, of which 173 have reportedly been cleared, according
to the same source. On the other hand, the LTTE’s alleged use of new landmines
and recent armed attacks by both the government and the LTTE may have led to an
increase in landmines and ERW, according to the Landmine Monitor Report 2007. Landmines and ERW are known to affect
the districts of
Jaffna,
Vanni, Batticaloa, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee and Ampara. Half of all
landmines in
Sri Lanka
are thought
to be in
Jaffna,
which is also the area with the most casualties from landmines and ERW.
In total, the
UNDP/Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, the most
reliable source for information on landmines and ERW casualties in
Sri Lanka
, recorded 1,349 civilian mine or ERW
casualties in
Sri Lanka
from 1985 to December 2006, according to Landmine
Monitor Report 2007. These attacks killed 271 people and injured 1,132,
including 275 children. UNDP/ IMSMA believes the actual number of casualties to
be much higher. In 2006, casualty rates increased for the first time since
2000, with 27 civilians killed and 37 injured, including 15 boys and four
girls, according to UNICEF figures cited by Landmine
Monitor Report 2007. Children thus accounted for 30 percent of the
casualties. Almost half of the casualties were caused by ERW.
Many mine-related incidents affecting children
may not be reflected in official statistics. LTTE’s new child recruits have suffered from severe
mine-related injuries during their military training, according to HRW, Living in Fear: Child Soldiers and the Tamil
Tigers in Sri Lanka, November 2004. Landmines have at times
exploded in children’s hands, injuring or maiming them. In one case, a
17-year-old girl lost a finger during training. The LTTE has forced some child
soldiers to sleep on landmines as a punishment, according to HRW.
Landmines and ERW
continued to kill and injure civilians in 2007, according to Landmine Monitor Report 2007. At
least eight children were killed and 20 maimed by the indiscriminate use of
claymore mines and other explosive devices between November 1, 2006 and
September 14, 2007 (S/2007/758, para. 27). In one example, the GoSL accused the
LTTE of a bus explosion at a government check point in Ampara on April 2, 2007,
which killed three children (aged 4, 6 and 17 years) and maimed four more (aged
1, 3, 11 and 17 years) (S/2007/758, para. 27). In another incident, a claymore
bomb killed eleven people, including seven school children, who were traveling
in a bus on the road between Thunukkai and Kokkaavil, according to HRW/AI, Human Rights Council: Urgent Action Needed
to End Abuses in Sri Lanka, December 7, 2007. The GoSL and the LTTE have
accused each other of carrying out the attack, according to HRW/AI.
The NSCMA sets mine
action policy and priorities and coordinates mine action, mine risk education
and victims’ assistance. UNDP has coordinated demining operations since 2006.
Demining
organizations cleared a total of seven square kilometers of land in 2006 and
half a square kilometer in the first four months of 2007, according to UNDP.
The UNDP mine action office has viewed the eastern region of Sri Lanka,
including the Batticaloa and Trincomalee districts, as a priority area for mine
and ERW clearance due to massive displacements and relocations of people,
according to IRIN, “Sri Lanka:
Conflict Disrupts Ongoing Demining Effort,” August 2, 2007.
The escalation of
armed conflict and subsequent security concerns have slowed down and at times
temporarily stopped demining activities in 2006 and 2007, according to IRIN, “Sri Lanka: Conflict Disrupts Ongoing
Demining Effort,” August 2, 2007. From 2005 to 2006, demining productivity was
reduced by approximately 60 percent as operators were forced to suspend their
work as a result of renewed conflict, according to the Landmine Monitor Report 2007.
Insecurity also discourages donors from funding demining activities. Unless the
security situation improves, demining efforts cannot be carried out
effectively, according to the UNDP mine action office in
Sri Lanka
as cited in IRIN.
Mine
Risk Education
The NSCMA is also
responsible for the overall coordination of Mine Risk Education (MRE) implementation
with support from UNICEF. The MRE works through community-based initiatives,
mass media campaigns and school-based programs to reach target groups. This
includes children who face the highest risk of becoming victims of ERW,
according to Landmine Monitor Report 2007.
Between 2003 and 2006, more than 1.8 million people benefited from these
programs, excluding those reached through mass media campaigns, according to Landmine Monitor Report 2006. In the
North and East, many children receive MRE through their formal education as
part of the school curricula. Since 2004, UNICEF has established approximately
140 children’s clubs in the Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara districts to
provide out-of-school children with MRE.
Conflict-related
insecurity and displacement has recently reduced the ability of UNICEF and its
local partners to conduct MRE in certain areas, according to Landmine Monitor Report 2007. Even so,
UNICEF is working to carry out both emergency MRE and established MRE
priorities.
Survivor
Assistance
In
Sri Lanka
, six district mine action
offices coordinate survivor assistance and provide technical assistance. The
GoSL’s plans to devise a national policy to assist survivors of landmine and/or
ERW have been postponed due to the pressing mine action issues arising from the
current intensified armed conflict.
In 2006, 1,494
people with disabilities due to mine and/or ERW-related incidents benefited
from services, according to Landmine
Monitor Report 2007. These services included medical care, physical
rehabilitation, psychosocial support, socio-economic reintegration and
educational support and other services. The National Policy on Disability
entitles Mine/UXO survivors to a one-time grant the equivalent of US $75 to US
$250, depending on the severity of the disability. To encourage child
survivors’ swift return to school, the government offers some educational
grants for their families.
Small Arms
Independent experts cited in Small Arms Survey (SAS) 2004 speak of 1
to 2.4 million small arms in circulation in
Sri Lanka
. [23] Most of these weapons, between 600,000 and 1.9
million, are privately owned by civilians. However, official government sources
put the number of small arms in circulation as low as 45,000, according to the
Small Arms Survey (SAS).
The availability and
use of small arms has put the security of civilians, including the security of
children, in serious jeopardy. The proliferation of small arms has played a
major role in prolonging the brutal armed conflict and allowed armed groups to
augment their forces with children (see below: Child Soldiers). In addition,
persistently high military expenditures on weapons and related items have
absorbed a large portion of
Sri
Lanka
’s scarce resources, often at the
expense of social sector expenditures in education or health. In 2007, the GoSL
increased its defense budget by 40 percent, according to The Economist, “A War Strange as Fiction,” June 7, 2007. It is set
to rise again in 2008.
There is growing
evidence that the proliferation of small arms due to armed conflict in
Sri Lanka
is contributing to escalating crime rates throughout the country, including the
South. Official statistics have recorded over 1,900 violent crime incidents on
average each year, as armed gangs are perceived to have taken advantage of the
ready availability of guns for their illegal activities, according to South
Asia Small Arms Network Sri Lanka and Saferworld, Small Arms and Light Weapons. Challenges in
Sri Lanka
and Options for the
Future, May 2006. For example, the high number of army deserters in the
Puttalam district, which borders the northern districts of Mannar and Vavuniya,
may explain the rise in crimes involving guns in the
North
Western
Province, according to
South Asia Small Arms Network Sri Lanka and Saferworld.
There are a host of
reasons to explain the growing availability of small arms throughout
Sri Lanka
.
Civil society organizations name the lack of transparency and accountability
among public and private security forces and the police as a factor in the
increasingly violent armed conflict in
Sri Lanka
, according to South Asia
Small Arms Network Sri Lanka and Saferworld, Small Arms and Light Weapons. Challenges in
Sri Lanka
and Options for the
Future, May 2006. There are reports that private security guards, police
and security forces make a profit by renting small arms to criminal gangs in
urban areas, according to South Asia Small Arms Network Sri Lanka and
Saferworld.
There is growing
evidence that illicit arms circulate freely in
Sri Lanka
, surfacing from various
channels such as army deserters. Many take their guns with them to later sell
or rent. Likewise, there are reports that federal and district level
politicians sometimes do not return weapons issued to them for the purpose of
protection during elections, according to South Asia Small Arms Network Sri
Lanka and Saferworld. These and other such guns often reappear in black
markets. The GoSL has so far not been able or willing to monitor or control
arms flows domestically, though it regularly accuses the LTTE of smuggling arms
into the country. Meanwhile, the proliferation of illicit small arms has become
one of the main barriers to achieving sustainable peace and human security for
children and their communities in
Sri Lanka
, the South Asia Small
Arms Network Sri Lanka and Saferworld claim.
The GoSL is
obligated to play a central role in monitoring and controlling arms
proliferation across borders and within its territory. It has played an active
role in advancing the UN Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the
Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (UN PoA). [24]
As a first step
towards the PoA’s implementation, the GoSL established a National Commission
against the Proliferation of Small Arms in Sri Lanka (NCAPISA) on November 5,
2004, to coordinate and monitor the control of illegal small arms and light
weapons in
Sri Lanka
,
and to collaborate with civil society. In addition, the GoSL explored options
to revise legislation to regulate the civilian ownership and use of firearms
with the Firearms Ordinance in 1916 and the Firearms Act in 1996, though both
need updating. [25] However, it should be noted that
Sri Lanka
has yet to sign the UN
Firearms Protocol, an important measure to enhance domestic regulation.
Formal disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) or security sector reform (SSR)
activities have failed to take place to date. The LTTE has refused to hand in
their weapons until a formal peace agreement is signed and their security
guaranteed. Similarly, the government has failed to disarm the TMVP/Karuna
faction despite provisions in the CFA that clearly stated that “no armed group
or person other than the GoSL security forces will carry arms or conduct armed
operations in GoSL controlled areas.” The lack of trust by either side in peace
negotiations mitigates any serious movement in this regard.
Although the GoSL
attempted to collect some of the vast amount of small arms owned by civilians
in 2004 and 2005, these efforts have not yielded meaningful returns. Neither
amnesty processes nor buyback schemes for unlicensed weapons have yielded large
returns of weapons. Members of civil society suggest that the public had not
been adequately educated about these schemes and were thus not inclined to heed
the government’s calls.
New weapons continue
to be smuggled into the country. The LTTE has an effective network to guarantee
the steady flow and circulation of small arms in
Sri Lanka
. The LTTE has been
receiving, partly through extortions, funding from the Tamil diaspora that now
comprises approximately 600,000 to 800,000 people worldwide and is mainly based
in Canada, the UK and other Western countries, according to HRW, Funding the “”Final War,” LTTE Intimidation
and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora, March 14, 2006. As of 2003, the LTTE
received an estimated US $1 million a month from the Tamil diaspora, according
to SAS, In the Shadow of a Cease-fire:
The Impacts of Small Arms Availability and Misuse in Sri Lanka, October
2003. This stable financial support has allowed the LTTE to operate its own
merchant fleet of ocean-going vessels to import weapons illegally from
Southeast Asia, according to Funding the “Final War.” Given the wide availability of arms
domestically, the LTTE has also used “domestic procurement” such as the capture
of the Sri Lankan Army’s stocks, according to SAS, 2003.
International
efforts to shut down the supply of new weapons to the LTTE have focused
primarily on banning small arms. In
recent years, the EU and the
US
and other countries have declared the LTTE a terrorist organization and
introduced measures to prevent it from raising money for arms or other
purposes.
Child Soldiers
International condemnation has not put an end
to the recruitment and use of child soldiers in
Sri Lanka
. The LTTE has forced
thousands of children in the North and East into their ranks. More recently,
the TMVP/Karuna faction, with the alleged
complicity of the government, has also recruited hundreds of children as
soldiers. Sri Lankan children currently face the ubiquitous threat of being
abducted and recruited, whether they are in areas controlled by the GoSL or the
LTTE. The Special Adviser to the UN Special Representative for Children and
Armed Conflict in
Sri Lanka
,
Ambassador Allan Rock, drew attention to the continued recruitment and use of
child soldiers in
Sri Lanka
after returning from his ten-day fact finding mission to
Sri Lanka
in November 2006.
Flaunting international commitments and
repeated pledges, the LTTE has recruited thousands of children into its ranks
throughout the past two decades. The UN Secretary-General has named the LTTE as
a party that recruits and uses children in four recent annual reports on
children and armed conflict to the UN Security Council (S/2002/1299,
S/2003/1053, S/2005/72, S/2006/826). Nevertheless, reports of child recruitment
and use by the LTTE continue.
In 2006 and 2007, the TMVP/Karuna faction increasingly recruited and used children in
the East, an area formally under GoSL control. During his visit, the UN Special
Adviser found “strong and credible evidence” pointing to the complicity of
“certain elements of the Government security forces” in the abduction and
forced recruitment of children by the TMVP/Karuna faction, according to UN News Center, “UN adviser finds Sri Lanka’s children ‘at
risk from all sides’ in the bloody conflict,” November 14, 2007. HRW reiterated
these claims and further stated that the GoSL has been fully aware of this
recruitment practice since June 2006, Complicit
in Crime, January 2007.
Following the UN Special Adviser’s mission,
the LTTE, the TMVP/Karuna faction and the GoSL
promised to cooperate with UNICEF in ending the recruitment and use of child
soldiers in
Sri Lanka
.
However, none of the parties have fulfilled their commitments.
Pledges and
Commitments
LTTE
The LTTE formally agreed to end child
recruitment and release all child soldiers in its ranks under the Action Plan signed
with the GoSL in June 2003, the Child Protection Act of January 1, 2007, and
the new Action Plan signed on October 15, 2007. The LTTE increased the official
minimum age of recruitment to 18 years old, in accordance with international
law, on October 15, 2007 as result of advocacy by child protection agencies. It
had raised the age to 17 years on October 15, 2006. The LTTE also claims to
screen new recruits at least twice and to reject those who are underage.
Furthermore, the LTTE committed in November 2006 to work with UNICEF to speed
up the release of child soldiers and to complete the process by December 31,
2007. While some progress has been made (see below: Trends), these promises
have not been fulfilled.
In October 2007, the LTTE signed a new Action
Plan [26] ,
which commits the LTTE to end the recruitment and use of children under 18
years old and to release all underage children by December 31, 2007. However,
the Action Plan does not give the UN country team full access for verification
or provide guidelines and timeframes for the safe and timely release of
children. It also does not address ways to prevent re-recruitment (S/2007/758,
para.48).
TMVP/Karuna
Faction
The TMVP/Karuna faction released new military
regulations on January 2, 2007, setting 18 as the minimum age for recruitment
and making recruitment conditional on the provision of a birth certificate and
the child’s explicit consent, according to HRW, Complicit in Crime, January 2007. Further, the TMVP/Karuna faction promised UNICEF unimpeded access to its
camps and to release any children remaining in its ranks. For those members who
conscript children, the TMVP/Karuna
faction’s
provisions set penalties according to HRW, Complicit
in Crime. [27] These
promises have not been fulfilled. The
TMVP/Karuna faction does not have a formal action plan for the release of
children in its cadre and the cessation of child recruitment.
GoSL
In reaction to allegations of GoSL complicity
in the TMVP/Karuna faction’s child recruitment
practices, President Rajapakse assured the UN Special Adviser during his visit
to Sri Lanka that the government would conduct a credible and thorough
investigation and hold those responsible accountable. At the time of writing,
such a investigation had not taken place (see below: GoSL Complicity).
UNICEF and, until recently, the SLMM, have
been monitoring abduction and recruitment of children in
Sri Lanka
for several years. [28]
UNICEF
Child Recruitment Database
UNICEF has been collecting and compiling data
on the recruitment, re-recruitment and release of children in
Sri Lanka
since 2002. This
primarily includes information on the LTTE and, more recently, the TMVP/Karuna faction. Parents in communities can file reports of
missing children and possible cases of child recruitment with UNICEF, the SLMM,
UNHCR, Save the Children and others working on child protection issues. These
agencies generally refer the reported cases to UNICEF which then verifies each
case and tracks it in a database. [29]
Most recently, the increasingly tense
security situation in
Sri
Lanka
has negatively affected UNICEF’s
ability to monitor child recruitment as its information exclusively relies on
reporting by parents and communities, according to the Coalition, Sri Lanka: The LTTE and Child Recruitment, July 2006. Some parents do not
report their children’s “disappearance” and recruitment because they fear
retaliation. Others may not be aware of the process or may live too far away
from reporting channels. Moreover, as efforts to end child recruitment have
dragged on for several years, some communities have lost confidence in UNICEF’s
strategy, according to HRW, Living in
Fear. Child Soldiers and the Tamil Tigers in
Sri Lanka
, November 2004. Those parents who support the LTTE’s child
recruitment practices are also unlikely to report occurrences.
The LTTE has disputed UNICEF’s figures as
exaggerated while the TMVP/Karuna faction has altogether disputed the presence
of child soldiers in its ranks, according to HRW. Moreover, both
parties have restricted UNICEF’s access to military sites, severely hampering
its ability to effectively monitor child recruitment and use. The TMVP/Karuna
faction even obstructed the UN’s verification process by leading a team to a
false training camp in Batticaloa (S/2007/785 para. 52). It has also asked
citizens to report cases of child recruitment to their party directly rather
than to the police, according to the
Nonviolent Peaceforce Quarterly Report, January – March 2007.
SLMM
Monitoring Initiative
Before its departure from
Sri Lanka
, the SLMM conducted
independent on-site monitoring missions to investigate child abduction and
recruitment in accordance with its obligations under the CFA. [30] However, the SLMM did not make child recruitment a priority.Some SLMM members denied the relevance of
human rights issues in the peace process and applied a narrow interpretation of
their mandate under the CFA, according HRW, Living in Fear. Child Soldiers
and the Tamil Tigers in
Sri
Lanka
, November
2004. Due to the sensitivity of the issue, the SLMM has not released any
statements regarding child recruitment although more than 45 percent of the CFA
violations from February 22, 2002 to December 31, 2006 concerned the
recruitment of children by the LTTE.
Scope of the
Problem: Trends of Child Recruitment and Use [31]
Existing statistical data on child
recruitment and use is based on UNICEF’s child recruitment database, which relies primarily on families reporting
potential cases of child recruitment. However, the actual number of children recruited into armed groups is likely to
be much higher as many families are not able or willing to file reports. [32]
Trends
in the LTTE
The following information is drawn from the
UNICEF child recruitment database. In total, there were 6,248 reported cases of
child recruitment by the LTTE, including 2,469 cases of girls, between January
2002 and December 2007. UNICEF has recorded 2,042 cases of release by the LTTE,
while other child recruits have escaped or died. [33] However, there were a reported 1,429 outstanding cases of recruitment and
re-recruitment, including 205 cases
concerning children under age 18 as of December 2007. Of the reported
cases, 60 percent are boys and 40 percent are girls. Most of the reported cases
of child recruitment by the LTTE occurred in Batticaloa, but there were also
reported cases in
Jaffna,
Kilinochchi, Ampara and Mullaitivu, as well as Polonaruwa.
Between 2002 and 2006, LTTE’s child
recruitment declined by approximately 60 percent. Between 2006 and 2007 it
declined by approximately 38 percent, according to the UNICEF child recruitment
database. Based on this trend, some analysts suspect that the LTTE may have
conceded to international pressure and is now attempting to refrain from
recruiting children.
Other observers have argued that the apparent
decrease in the LTTE’s child recruitment figures could be a reflection of low
reporting levels due to increased insecurity, displacement and fear. Another
possibility is that reporting dropped because UNICEF has little presence in the
Vanni area, where LTTE recruitment is now focused, as compared to the East
where recruitment previously took place.
Finally, it must be noted that the number of
children recruited by the LTTE almost always outnumbered those released every
month according to UNICEF statistics. Only since February 2007 have the numbers
of children released exceeded those recruited, which is primarily due to
reduced recruitment. In 2007, 160 cases of child recruitment by the LTTE were
reported to UNICEF.
Trends
in the TMVP/Karuna Faction
The following information is drawn from the
UNICEF child recruitment database. The TMVP/Karuna faction began intensive recruitment of children in July 2006. By 2007, the
TMVP/Karuna faction’s reported rate of
recruitment outstripped that of the LTTE. In total, there were 453 reported
cases of child recruitment by the TMVP/Karuna faction, including the case of
one girl, between April 2004 and December 2007. UNICEF has recorded 122 cases
of release by the TMVP/Karuna faction, while other child recruits have escaped
or died. [34] However, there were a reported 229 outstanding cases of recruitment or
re-recruitment by the TMVP/Karuna faction, including 160 cases concerning
children under age 18 by the end of December 2007. Most of the reported cases
of child recruitment by the TMVP/Karuna faction occurred in the Batticaloa
district or other areas in the East. In 2007, 252 cases of child recruitment by
the TMVP/Karuna faction were reported to UNICEF.
LTTE
Recruitment Practices
Since the beginning of the
civil war in 1983, the LTTE has recruited children between nine and 18 years
old into its armed group, forming a so-called “Baby Brigade.” The group has
generally demanded that each family “voluntarily” contribute one child to its
war effort, according to HRW,
Sri Lanka
, Living in Fear. Child Soldiers and the
Tamil Tigers in
Sri Lanka
,
November 2004. In return, families of child soldiers generally attain higher
social status and are granted special economic privileges, such as exemption
from taxes and preferential access to the LTTE’s social services.
When parents do not comply with the order to send their children to the
LTTE, children are sometimes taken by force, or other siblings or family
members are recruited in their place, according to HRW, Living in Fear, November 2004. On July 10, 2006, for example, a member of
the LTTE reportedly beat two 17-year-old boys living in the Batticaloa district
in their family’s home when they refused to join their ranks. Three days later,
the same LTTE member beat and abducted the boys. Eyewitnesses from the village
confirmed the incident and identified the abductors. The children reportedly
escaped from the LTTE camp but were too afraid to return home (S/2006/1006,
para. 14).
The LTTE encourages recruitment by promising
education, food and services for children once they join. These promises
particularly attract children from poor, uneducated families, orphans and
children who have been victims of abuse. The LTTE’s propaganda campaigns have
aimed to recruit children in schools or through street plays. For example, LTTE
members speak directly to students in classrooms about the Tamil’s liberation
struggle and urge them to become part of the effort. At the same time, recruitment drives
typically occur during temple festivities and school holidays when children are
easier to access. LTTE forces may abduct children from streets, festivals or
their houses, according to various sources.
Aware of the international political
repercussions for child recruitment, the LTTE has attempted to hide its child
recruitment policies by using intermediaries. The Coalition cites anecdotal
evidence that the LTTE has hired members of village communities to identify and
recruit children, Sri Lanka – The LTTE
and Child Recruitment, 2005. In
2005, under the guise of conducting civil defense training, the LTTE, in fact,
conducted military training for children from the age of 16 years along with
adults in the Batticaloa, Ampara, Trincomalee and Kilinochchi districts,
according to the Secretary-General’s Report on Children and Armed Conflict of
2006 (S/2006/1006, para. 23).
In 2007, the LTTE reportedly changed its “child quota system” to a “family quota
system” (S/2007/758, para. 5), demanding that every family contribute at least
one family member to the LTTE. According to UTHR(J), the LTTE allegedly keeps a
record of children’s ages to recruit them once they turn 18 without breaching
international law.
TMVP/Karuna
Faction Recruitment Practices
Until early 2004, Colonel Karuna served as
the LTTE’s eastern commander and had approximately 1,800 child soldiers under
his command. After Colonel Karuna’s split from the LTTE in March 2004, his
forces were attacked by the LTTE and then disbanded. However, in mid-July 2006,
Colonel Karuna formed the TMVP/Karuna
faction and began to recruit children, including those who had already been released
from the LTTE, according to HRW.
Small armed groups of TMVP/Karuna faction soldiers generally abduct and recruit
children from homes, work places, temples, playgrounds, public roads and IDP
camps, according to HRW, Complicit in
Crime, January 2007. Like the LTTE, the TMVP/Karuna faction recruits primarily from families who are poor, uneducated and living in
rural areas. Some of these families have reportedly received a TMVP/Karuna faction soldier’s salary of 6,000 to 12,000 Sri
Lankan rupees per month, which is equivalent to US $60 to US $120 and thus a
little more than a laborer’s monthly salary (S/2007/758, para. 9). Also, like
the LTTE, the TMVP/Karuna faction demands that
families contribute children to their war efforts. Families who have already
contributed one child are often forced to send another.
The opening of TMVP/Karuna faction political offices often coincides with a
rise in the number of children abducted, according to HRW, Complicit in Crime, January 2007.For
example, the very day a TMVP/Karuna
faction office opened in Chenkalady town, 12 boys and men were abducted, according to HRW.Similar patterns occurred in other districts
where TMVP/Karuna faction opened offices,
including in Batticaloa town, Trincomalee town, Akkrapattu in the Ampara
district and near Welikander in the Polonnaruwa district.
Government
Complicity with the TMVP/Karuna Faction
The TMVP/Karuna faction’s recruitment of children relies on the complicity of the GoSL’s
security forces, the Sri Lankan armed forces and the government’s overall
acquiescence throughout the recruitment process, according to various sources.
Sri Lankan armed forces have at times accompanied TMVP/Karuna faction members as they abduct and recruit children
(S/2006/1006, para. 27).Once
recruited, the TMVP/Karuna faction has temporarily
held child recruits in its political offices which are commonly guarded by the
Sri Lankan army and the police, according to HRW, Complicit in Crime, January 2007. In February 2007, for example,
HRW observed Sri Lankan soldiers and police blatantly passing by children, some
of them armed, who were guarding the offices of TMVP/Karuna faction in the Batticaloa district, including in
Valaichchenai and Morrakkottanchenai. According to HRW, TMVP/Karuna faction abductions happen in close vicinity to
police or army camps.
Once abducted, children are transferred to
TMVP/Karuna faction training sites.
During the transfer, the TMVP/Karuna
faction passes through checkpoints of army and police in areas firmly under GoSL
control, according to HRW.In one
instance, local human rights activists told HRW that a child who escaped from
the Karuna camp had gone to the Sri Lankan army for protection, but the
soldiers handed him directly back to the Karuna faction.
Parents and concerned communities have made
repeated attempts in vain to alert and seek assistance from GoSL officials for
children who have been recruited by the TMVP/ Karuna faction. In July 2006, a group of 48 mothers from Batticaloa submitted a
petition for their abducted sons, including children, to the Supreme Court with
copies to the President, relevant ministers and the UN. During the
investigation, the Sri Lankan army pressured the mothers to refer to members of
the TMVP/Karuna faction as an “unidentified
group” despite their better knowledge, according to HRW. When parents file
complaints of abductions to the police, the police frequently refuse to
register the complaint or fail to conduct a proper investigation, according to
HRW.
To date, the GoSL has still not conducted a
thorough and credible investigation into the alleged complicity of Sri Lankan
security forces with the TMVP/Karuna
faction on child recruitment. Moreover, an internal army inquiry has cleared the Sri
Lankan security forces of any allegations linking them to the TMVP/Karuna faction’s abduction of children. The Presidential
Commission on Disappearance, which consists of one person, conducted the
inquiry on child abduction in a manner considered inconsistent with commonly
accepted practices, according to HRW.
Finally, the government has strongly denied
all charges of complicity with the TMVP/ Karuna faction in child recruitment. In 2006, the GoSL accused the UN Special Adviser,
who had raised the issue of complicity, of supporting LTTE propaganda,
according to HRW, Return to War: Human
Rights under Siege, August 2007.
LTTE
In a recent comprehensive study, HRW
described the harsh conditions faced by children recruited by the LTTE. Once
inside the LTTE, children were forced to sever their family ties and were
subjected to strict disciplinary measures, according to HRW, Living in Fear, November 2004. As part
of their initiation, the children’s hair was cut short and they were forced to
undergo at least four months of training. During their time in the military
camps, children often suffered ill-treatment and harsh punishment, according to
the Coalition, Sri Lanka – The LTTE and
Child Recruitment, 2005. In one case reported by HRW, the LTTE burned a
girl with hot water to punish her for not being able to carry heavy weapons
even though she was sick with fever and cramps.
According to the HRW report, the LTTE usually
deployed child soldiers in mass attacks during major battles, as infantry
soldiers, security and intelligence officers, medics and even suicide bombers.
Many of these children were killed or disabled in combat. Just like adult
members of the LTTE, these children usually carried a cyanide suicide capsule
that they were instructed to take if captured alive, according to HRW.
There is little information on the roles
child soldiers are currently fulfilling in the LTTE and their living
conditions.
TMVP/Karuna Faction
There is relatively little information
available on the life of child soldiers recruited into the ranks of the TMVP/Karuna faction. Children generally undergo minimal military
training before being deployed into combat and other military functions,
according to HRW, Complicit in Crime,
January 2007. Some of them have been issued weapons and assigned duties within
two weeks of their initial recruitment, according to reports received by
Watchlist. Children assume various roles, including fighters in combat and
office guards. At times, families have been able to visit their children for
one night in the military camp. During one of these visits, a child told his
father that had he lost his ear and leg after a mine exploded near him during
combat, according to HRW. Some commanders have reportedly beaten child soldiers
under their command, according to anecdotal information shared with Watchlist.
LTTE
Over the years, the LTTE has recruited a
considerable number of girls into its armed forces. According to 2007 UNICEF
statistics, 40 percent of the LTTE’s child soldiers are female. Girls who
escape have been particularly fearful of re-recruitment by the LTTE because
their short military hair cuts may expose them as former soldiers, as Tamil
girls in rural areas generally grow their hair long, according to HRW.
There are no reports of grave sexual violence
in
Sri Lanka
,
according to the Secretary-General’s Report of 2006, including among girls
associated with armed forces and groups (S/2006/1006, para. 44). According to
HRW’s 2004 report, the LTTE generally prohibits sexual relations among recruits
and establishes strict rules for relations between its male and female
recruits. In 2006, the Coalition reported that the LTTE’s girl recruits lived
in separate quarters from the boys but could talk to them.
TMVP/Karuna
Faction
In contrast to the LTTE, there is only one
reported case of a girl soldier in the TMVP/Karuna faction, according to UNICEF.
Informal DDR for
Children
There is currently no formal DDR process for
children in
Sri Lanka
.
LTTE
The 2003 Action Plan [35] for Children Affected by War, a framework for the LTTE’s release of children,
expired in July 2006. The LTTE signed a new action plan in October 2007.
Under the 2003 Action Plan, the LTTE was
supposed to automatically transfer all children in the group to transit centers
run by the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) with minimal support from
UNICEF. Children were to stay in the transit centers for no more than three
months before returning to their families. If conditions in the child’s family
were favorable, they were to be directly released to them. The Action Plan
provided for the establishment of three transit centers in LTTE-controlled
areas. In reality, this plan did not come to fruition because of the low number
of child soldiers released. The center in Kilinochchi district, which opened in
October 2003, transferred 173 children before closing in 2005. The other two
centers never opened, according to HRW,
Sri Lanka
. Complicit in Crime, January 2007.
Overall, the DDR process envisioned by the
2003 Action Plan was fraught with problems. First, the LTTE did not comply with
its commitments to release children and to end child recruitment. Second, by
putting children in the care of the TRO, which effectively functioned as the
LTTE’s humanitarian organization, the LTTE was virtually permitted to retain
ultimate control over the children. After numerous negotiations between UNICEF
and the LTTE to restructure the Action Plan’s release mechanism, UNICEF finally
announced its opposition to the transit centers and explained its preference
that released children should be promptly reunified with their families, IRIN, “In Sri Lanka children still go to war,” May 24, 2007.
More than 90 percent of child soldiers
released from the LTTE between 2002 and 2007 have returned directly to their
homes instead of transiting through centers, according to UNICEF. After their
return to their communities, children and their families are supposed to
receive reintegration support through international nongovernmental programs
that provide protection, psychosocial, education and livelihood services. [36] As of 2007, 3,179 children had completed such support programs and 1,354
children were still under reintegration support, according to UNICEF (see
below: Reintegration,
Re-recruitment and Insecurity).
Despite the official closure of the transit
centers, the LTTE has continued to transfer child soldiers under its command to
TRO-run Educational Skills Development Centres (ESDCs), which provide catch up
education and vocational training to youth. UNICEF has strongly opposed the
transfer of former child soldiers to these centers due to the alleged close
links between the LTTE and the TRO and does not acknowledge the transfer as a
release. Instead, it advocates for the children’s reunification with their
families. As of August 22, 2007, at least eight children formerly associated
with the LTTE remained in the ESDCs (S/2007/758, para. 14).
TMVP/Karuna
Faction
The TMVP/Karuna faction does not have an official action plan for the release of children in
its ranks or for ending its practice of child recruitment. UNICEF has
repeatedly attempted to open a dialogue with the TMVP/Karuna faction to establish an action plan, but has not
achieved any substantive progress.
Surrenders
There is currently no policy or program to
protect and reintegrate children who surrender to the GoSL or seek its
protection after their escape from armed groups. As a result, former child
soldiers have frequently been put in prison, along with adult soldiers, with no
clearly identified mechanism for their release. In June 2007, the GoSL held 218
children who had surrendered from the LTTE in prisons in Pallekele, Kandy and
Jaffna, according to the National Child Protection Authority (NCPA) cited in IRIN, “Sri
Lanka: UNICEF cautiously welcomes Tigers’ release of child soldiers, June
19, 2007.
Some children who had spent less than a month in the LTTE were detained for
more than six months, according to a report from a protection agency received
by Watchlist.
Treating former child soldiers as criminals
defies international standards for
the special protection of children recruited and used in armed conflict. While most children
were released to their parents or to rehabilitation centers, 28 children
remained in prisons at the beginning of January 2008, according to UNICEF. The
remaining children are expected to be transferred to a new child rehabilitation
center in Ambepussa city in western
Sri Lanka
, which is expected to
open in February 2008. UNICEF is currently working with different governmental
ministries to develop a comprehensive policy to address this issue.
Reintegration, Re-recruitment and Insecurity
Insecurity and re-recruitment obstructs former child soldiers’
reintegration into their families and communities. In 2007, there were 73
reported cases of re-recruitment by the TMVP/Karuna faction and 30 cases of
re-recruitment by the LTTE, according to UNICEF’s database. In fact, children
released from the LTTE or the TMVP/Karuna faction are generally at higher risk
of re-recruitment by either group due to their prior military experience. In
some cases the TMVP/Karuna faction has re-recruited children within days of
releasing them (S/2007/758, para. 17). It has also punished the families of
children who have escaped by physically assaulting them or recruiting a family
member in the child’s place, according to a report received by Watchlist. In
addition, the Sri Lankan Special Task Forces have kept children formerly
associated with the LTTE under close supervision (S/2007/758, para. 60). The
LTTE has prevented some children released from its ranks from reunifying with
their families outside the Vanni by imposing travel restrictions on all
citizens, including children 13 years old and above (S/2007/758, para. 15).
The continual targeting of former child soldiers compromises the
children’s acceptance by their families and communities, feeding into fear and mistrust
among community members. According to anecdotal reports received by Watchlist,
some people have betrayed neighbors whose children have returned to their
communities. The stigma attached to former child soldiers has also caused some
community members to deny former child soldiers access to public services,
including schools and community activities. Without effective protection and
nowhere else to go, some child soldiers choose to remain in armed groups
despite opportunities to leave, according to information shared with Watchlist.
Trafficking
To date, there is no
current comprehensive information available on trafficking of children in
Sri Lanka
.
As of 2004, approximately 5,000 Sri Lankan children were exploited for
commercial sex, domestic work and child recruitment after having been
trafficked by criminal networks, according to the International Labor
Organization (ILO) Child Labour and
Responses Overview Note on Sri Lanka, November 2004. Children’s vulnerability
to trafficking has likely increased as a result of the armed conflict.
Children who have
been separated from their families or orphaned during armed conflict are more
vulnerable to trafficking, as they lack the traditional protection given by their
families and communities. Also, families which have lost their livelihoods in
the course of armed conflict and displacement are often hard-pressed to protect
their children and find it difficult to resist offers for income or better
futures for their children, even from dubious business people, according to
ILO. Trafficking networks tend to operate in border areas near
conflict-affected districts. Children in these districts are particularly
vulnerable to child labor, prostitution and abuse, according to ILO.
Sri Lanka
is a major
entry and exit point for trafficking of women and children, according to the US
Department of State’s Trafficking in
Persons Report, June 2006. The main destination areas are the Middle East,
China
,
Korea
,
Russia
and other former
Soviet Union countries, but many children and women are
also trafficked within the country. Organized criminal gangs have taken advantage of
families’ economic despair and the lack of law enforcement in the North and
East. Male children are internally trafficked from the areas on the border of
northern and eastern districts, according to the US Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in
Sri Lanka 2006.
Following
repeated reports of sex tourism and child trafficking, the government has made
some strides in combatting trafficking in
Sri Lanka
. For example, the Sri Lanka Tourist Board and NCPA have been working
with UNICEF and ILO to develop national action plans to combat child sex
tourism and trafficking in labor in
Sri Lanka
.
Child
Labor
The practice of
child labor in
Sri Lanka
is not a new phenomenon. However, conflict-related socio-economic hardships
have intensified the pressure on children to earn money or to work at home,
according to ILO. Due to the conflict, many children have been forced to
survive on their own after being separated from their parents or after their
parents were killed.
Almost one
million children living in Sri Lanka were economically active in 1999,
according to a national survey on child labor, conducted by the
Ministry of Finance and Panning with the support of ILO in 1999. While the
majority simultaneously followed some form of education, an estimated 26
percent worked exclusively. In the survey, 52 percent of working children were
under 15 years old. Sixty-two percent were male and 95 percent lived in rural
areas. In 2003, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child raised
concerns regarding the high proportion of children, including young children,
working as domestic servants in the plantation sector, on the street and in
other parts of the informal sector. Approximately 100,000 children were
estimated to be employed as domestic workers, performing household tasks
including cleaning, ironing, cooking, child care and gardening for households,
according to 1999 UNICEF estimates.
Economic
hardship has also reportedly forced some women and girls, many from the North
and East, to migrate to the Middle East to seek an income, according to the
Refugees Studies Centre, Children &
Armed Conflict in Sri Lanka, 2001. Mothers who lost their husbands in the
armed conflict often view this as their only way to survive, according to the
Refugee Studies Centre.
Child
Prostitution
Economic hardship induced by the armed conflict has
forced children and women in the North and East into prostitution, according to
the Women in Development IQC, Gender
Assessment for USAID/Sri Lanka, February 17, 2004.
Estimates indicate
that more than 30,000 women and girls and 15,000 boys work as child prostitutes in Sri
Lanka, according to the Ministry of Health, Sri
Lanka Country Report on Follow Up to the Declaration On Commitment on HIV/AIDS
(UNGASS), December 2005 and the World Bank, HIV/AIDS, June 2005,
respectively. Young boys in
particular are involved in “sex tourism” in coastal resort areas, according to
the US Department of State, Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices 2006.
Sri Lanka
, March 6, 2007.
Abuse
in Orphanages
War and displacement
are the two main reasons children have been placed in orphanages, according to the
Ministry of Child Development and Women’s Empowerment, Out of Sight - Out of Mind, July 24, 2007. There are
currently 488 voluntary children’s homes in
Sri
Lanka
, according to IRIN,
“
Sri Lanka
:
Orphanages used as Last Resort by Parents of 19,000 Children,” September 3,
2007. Sixty-six of them are in the conflict-affected Batticaloa district
according to IRIN. In some
cases, children have lost or been separated from one or both parents. In other
cases, poverty has prompted parents to put their children in institutional
care. The loose criteria for placing children in orphanages has further
encouraged desperate parents to place their children in these homes, hoping to
gain greater protection for them.
Out of the 488
children’s homes in Sri Lanka, only 12 complied fully with current standards of
care, according to IRIN, “Sri Lanka:
Orphanages used as Last Resort by Parents of 19,000 Children,” September 3,
2007. The majority of children’s homes are overcrowded, lack sufficient staff
and do not meet hygiene standards, according to IRIN. In one case, seven children had to take turns sleeping in two
beds. Save the Children found that staff have paid little attention to the
emotional well-being and needs of children in Home Truths, Children’s Rights in Institutional Care in
Sri Lanka
,
February 28, 2006. Also, once in institutional homes, many children are not
able to attend formal education, according to Save the Children. Communication
with parents and relatives is often restricted out of fear that parents may discover
staff abuse and file reports or complaints with protection authorities,
according to IRIN.
Given these
conditions, both Save the Children and UNICEF have called for alternatives to
institutional care, including foster families and targeted support to families
in need. No large scale programs have been established yet to facilitate the
reunification of abandoned or separated children with their families.
Arbitrary
and Illegal Arrests, Forced Evictions, Extrajudicial Killings and Torture
As part of
Sri Lanka
’s
Emergency Regulations, police have engaged in the arbitrary and illegal arrest
of Tamils, particularly young males, in
Sri Lanka
. This is because security
forces often suspect Tamils of complicity with the LTTE, according to HRW, Return to War: Human Rights under Siege,
August 2007. Families rarely dare to report these serious violations by the
police or take legal action, for fear of potential retributions. The UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, stressed that the direct appointment
of commissioners to Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Commission, the main body for
receiving and dealing with such complaints, has “undermined confidence in its
efficacy and independence,” Press Statement, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on Conclusion of Her Visit to Sri
Lanka, Colombo,” October 13, 2007.
The
Sri Lankan police recently conducted forced evictions and arbitrary arrests of
Tamils in and around
Colombo,
justifying their actions as security measures following attacks blamed on the
LTTE. For example, in June 2007, the police evicted 376 Tamils from
Colombo, returning them against their will to the North
and East, according to Reuters, “
Sri Lanka
battles rebels, evicts Tamils from capital,” June 7, 2007. The arrests targeted
ethnic Tamils with temporary residence in the capital without “valid reasons” for their stay,
which reportedly included elderly women and mothers carrying children,
according to BBC News, “Police Evict
Tamils from
Colombo,”
June 7, 2007. In another case, the GoSL, allegedly in response to a bomb attack
blamed on the LTTE, ordered the arrest of more than 1,000 Tamils in
Colombo and its suburbs on
December 2, 2007, according to HRW and AI, Human
Rights Council: Urgent Action Needed to End Abuses in Sri Lanka, December
7, 2007. Following complaints by national NGOs, the Supreme Court ordered a
halt to these evictions and arbitrary arrests of minority ethnic Tamils from
the capital and is currently reviewing both cases. [37]
In
November 2007, the Sri Lankan army reportedly entered houses and schools to
identify Tamil boys in
Jaffna
whom they accused of collaboration with the LTTE according to UTHR(J): Slow Strangulation of Jaffna: Trashing
General Larry Wijeratne’s Legacy and Enthroning Barbarism, December 4,
2007. They took their identity cards away and required them to report to the
army camp for repeated and often brutal interrogation. Fearful of Sri Lankan
security forces, at least 200 civilians in
Jaffna have put themselves into voluntary
official protective custody, according to UTHR(J).The UTHR(J) reports the case of a family of
five with three children who asked to be put in voluntary custody on October
22, 2007 after having been interrogated by the Sri Lankan army. Similarly, a
mother sought protective custody with the HRC for her son in October 2007 after
a soldier marked the Tamil boy as an LTTE suspect on his bus ticket while
passing through the security clearance process from Jaffna to Colombo,
according to UTHR(J).
In
prison or detention centers, children face a number of risks as detention facilities are often overcrowded, dirty
and lack the appropriate separation of different groups of prisoners, according
to Manfred Nowak, the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment while in detention centers. [38] For
example, the GoSL’s security forces detained two boys in
Jaffna who reportedly went missing thereafter
(S/2007/758, para. 22). In another case, on November 4, 2007, five youth,
including a 17-year-old boy, were found shot dead after having been arrested
the day before by Sri Lankan army personnel close to the army camp at
Thavasikkulam near Vavuniya town, according to AHRC, “Sri Lanka, Extrajudicial Killings of Five Youths in
Vavuniya,” November 6, 2007.
Following his mission to Sri Lanka in
November 2007, the UN Special Rapporteur noted that the worst cases of the
“numerous consistent and credible allegations” he received on abuse and torture
of detainees by the police and the army related to the current armed conflict,
according to UN News, “UN Human
Rights Expert Reports Allegations of Torture in Sri Lanka,” November 16, 2007.
Despite numerous indictments filed under the 1994
Torture Act, only three people in
Sri Lanka
have been convicted under
the act as of November 2007.
UN Security Council Actions
Sri
Lanka
is not on the official agenda of the UN
Security Council. However, the Security Council has addressed the situation of
children through its Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict and through
its review of the UN Secretary-General ’s annual reports on the situation of
children and armed conflict.
In February 2005, the UN Secretary-General included
in his fifth report on Children and Armed Conflict to the Security Council
(S/2005/72) a section on developments in
Sri Lanka
, briefly describing the
continued recruitment and use of children by the LTTE. The report noted that the LTTE had recruited
and re-recruited more than 1,000 children, often by abduction, since November
2003 despite its commitments under the Action Plan of July 2003.In Annex 2 of the report, the UN
Secretary-General named the LTTE as a party recruiting or using children in
armed conflict.
In October 2006, the UN Secretary-General included
in his sixth report on Children and Armed Conflict to the Security Council
(S/2006/826) a section on developments in
Sri Lanka
, briefly describing the
escalation of armed conflict and massive displacement, particularly in the
North and East, since early December 2005. The report also described the lack
of free humanitarian access to civilians in need.It noted that children have been injured and
killed in bombing raids and attacks on schools. The UN Secretary-General
further reported some progress on implementing the Action Plan, mentioning the
establishment of a dialogue forum between UNICEF and LTTE on technical aspects
of ending child recruitment and releasing children, and the LTTE’s creation of
a child protection unit.In Annex II of
the report, the UN Secretary-General named the TMVP/Karuna faction and the LTTE
as parties that recruit or use children in armed conflict. Both parties have
also been responsible for abducting children.
UNSC Resolutions on
Children and Armed Conflict
Since 2003, the UNSC has adopted two
resolutions on children and armed conflict, adding to the Security Council’s
four previous Children and Armed Conflict (CAC) resolutions. These resolutions
set out important and practical steps to be taken by various members of the UN
system, donors, NGOs and others to expand child protection in conflict-affected
areas. The following highlights how the two latest CAC resolutions address
issues relevant to
Sri Lanka
.
Resolution 1539 (2004)
· Strongly condemns the recruitment and use of child soldiers by parties
to conflict and other CAC violations
· Requests that the UN Secretary-General regularly review compliance by
parties to conflict to halt the recruitment and use of child soldiers
· Calls upon parties to conflict to prepare action plans for halting the
recruitment and use of child soldiers, which will be coordinated by focal
points identified by the UN Secretary-General
· Expresses its intention to consider imposing targeted and graduated
measures such as, inter alia, a ban
on the export or supply of small arms and light weapons and other military
equipment and assistance
· Reiterates its request to all concerned to include children in all DDR
programs and to monitor demobilized children in order to prevent re-recruitment
· Requests the UN Secretary-General to propose effective measures to
control the illicit trade and trafficking of small arms
· Encourages support for the development and strengthening of capacities
to ensure the sustainability of local initiatives for CAC
Resolution 1612 (2005)
· Strongly condemns the recruitment and use of child soldiers by parties
to conflict and other CAC violations
· Expresses serious concern regarding the lack of progress in developing
and implementing action plans to halt the recruitment and use of child soldiers
· Reiterates its intention to consider imposing targeted and graduated
measures such as, inter alia, a ban
on the export or supply of small arms and light weapons and other military
equipment and assistance
· Requests that the UN Secretary-General implement a monitoring and
reporting mechanism (MRM) on violations against children in five armed conflict
situations plus
Sri Lanka
and
Uganda
· Decides to establish a working group of the Security Council on children
and armed conflict consisting of SC member states
· Urges member states and other parties concerned to take appropriate
measures to control the illicit trade of small arms to parties to armed
conflict
· Calls upon all concerned parties to ensure that the concerns of the CAC
are specifically integrated into all peace processes and post-conflict
reconstruction
· Calls upon all concerned parties to abide by their international
obligations and commitments relating to the protection of CAC
· Urges all parties concerned to support the development and strengthening
of the capacities of national institutions and local civil society networks for
CAC
· Requests that the UN Secretary-General direct all relevant UN entities
to take specific measures, within existing resources, to ensure systematic
mainstreaming of CAC issues within their respective institutions
UNSC Working Group on Children and Armed
Conflict
In December 2006, the UN Secretary-General presented his first report on
Sri Lanka
to the UN Security Council Working Group on CAC (S/2006/1006). This report
contained detailed information on egregious violations against children in
Sri Lanka
in the six categories identified by the Security Council in Resolution 1612
between November 1, 2005 and October 31, 2006.The report highlighted that the LTTE used and recruited children in
spite of its commitments not to do so. In addition, it noted with concern that
the TMVP/Karuna faction abducted and recruited children in the East. The
Secretary-General also outlined the challenges in delivering humanitarian
assistance to conflict-affected children in
Sri
Lanka
, including the deteriorating security situation,
the restrictions in humanitarian access, weak state institutions, impunity and
obstacles in monitoring and reporting, particularly for the 1612 Country Task
Force in
Sri Lanka
(see below).
In response to the UN Secretary-General’s
report, the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict
examined the situation in
Sri
Lanka
in its 7th meeting on
February 9, 2007 (S/AC.51/2007/9). The Working Group identified the LTTE as the
principal party responsible for serious violations against children in armed
conflict in
Sri Lanka
.
The Working Group concluded that, in contrast to the small number of children
released, the LTTE’s ever-increasing number of abductions, recruitment and use
of children violates prior commitments under the 2003 Action Plan.
The Security Council Working Group thus urged
the LTTE’s leadership to immediately end the abduction, recruitment and use of
children. On behalf of the Security
Council Working Group, the Chairman called on the LTTE to cooperate with UNICEF
on the following:
- The verification of children’s release, including free access to
LTTE military camps
- The release of children directly to their families rather than to
the TRO’s
Educational
Skills
Development
Center
Moreover, the Security Council Working Group
demanded that the LTTE respect the security of schools, hospitals and religious
institutions and grant free humanitarian access to areas under its control. The
Chairman stated that the LTTE must abide by its international obligations,
including SCR 1612, or it would consider “further steps.”
At the same time, the Working Group expressed
alarm about the recent increase in abduction and recruitment of children by the
TMVP/Karuna faction in the East and the alleged complicity of certain elements
of the security forces in government-controlled areas. The Permanent Representative of
Sri Lanka
to the UN maintained that the GoSL would not tolerate any recruitment and use
of children in armed conflict. Accordingly, it would investigate the
allegations against elements of the security forces regarding the recruitment
and abduction of children by the TMVP/Karuna faction.
Subsequently, on the occasion of the Security
Council Working Group’s 8th meeting on May 10, 2007, the Chairman
released a public statement to reiterate its warning against the LTTE for its
continued abduction, recruitment and use of children. The Working Group also addressed
a formal letter to the GoSL and requested a follow up report from the UN
Secretary-General.
In December 2007, the UN Secretary-General
submitted his second report on children and armed conflict in
Sri Lanka
(S/2007/758) to the Security Council Working
Group, which included the Working Group’s latest conclusions and
recommendations and an update on the six grave violations against children in
Sri Lanka
. The report covers the period between November 1, 2006 and September 14,
2007.
Noting some progress in the release of children by the LTTE and the
TMVP/Karuna faction, the report emphasized that neither group had applied the
recommendations of the Security Council Working Group and both had continued to
commit egregious violations against children, including abduction, killing,
maiming and the denial of humanitarian access. The report specifically urged
the LTTE and the TMVP/Karuna faction to work with the UN Country Team to ensure
that action plans to end the recruitment and use of children and to release all
children associated with their groups would be devised or brought in line with
international standards. The report also demanded full access to military
locations under their control. If the LTTE and the TMVP/Karuna faction did not
meet these demands regarding the recruitment and use of child soldiers within
the next reporting period, the report recommended the Security Council Working
Group to consider targeted measures against both groups.
The report welcomed the GoSL’s establishment of a multidisciplinary task
force on children and armed conflict [39] but
reiterated its demand for a report on the alleged support of certain government
security forces in the recruitment of children by the TMVP/Karuna faction. It
also urged the government to end the abduction, recruitment and use of children
by armed groups in areas under its control.
Other key recommendations included the need for free and safe
humanitarian access to areas under the parties’ control, capacity-strengthening
activities for law enforcement authorities and an immediate halt to all attacks
against civilian targets, including schools and hospitals.
The 1612 Country Taskforce in
Sri Lanka
Sri
Lanka
was one of seven pilot countries selected by
the UN to implement the UN-led Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) in
2005. The UN officially established the 1612 Country Taskforce in
Sri Lanka
in July 2006.
The Taskforce is chaired by the UN
Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator in
Sri Lanka
while the UNICEF
Representative serves as the Deputy Chair. Members of the Taskforce include the
UN Development Program (UNDP), UNICEF, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), the International Labor Organization (ILO), Oxfam Great
Britain
,
and Sarvodaya, a national NGO. Two agencies of the Government of Sri Lanka—the
National Child Protection Authority (NCPA) and the Human Rights Commission
(HRC)—also serve as members. [40] The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) serves as an observer on
the Taskforce.
The Taskforce has made some progress in
monitoring and reporting children’s rights violations despite the adverse
security environment in the country. However, some challenges remain.
In its report, Getting It Done and
Doing It Right: Implementing the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Children
and Armed Conflict in Sri Lanka, Watchlist identifies challenges faced in
implementing the MRM in Sri Lanka and opportunities to build upon the
Taskforce’s successes to date. [41] In particular, the report identifies challenges and opportunities related to
the participation of NGOs in monitoring and reporting; maintaining security and respecting the
rights of respondents, children and information collectors; leveraging networks
and resources; and triggering a response to violations.
High levels of insecurity remain one of the key factors preventing or
limiting the participation of both local and international NGOs in the
implementation of the MRM. The obstacle that safety and security poses to the
participation of NGOs in the implementation of the MRM cannot be overstated.
The deteriorating security situation poses obvious challenges for all
actors implementing the mechanism. While human rights monitors and aid workers
face risks in documenting and reporting abuses perpetrated by armed groups,
respondents and survivors of abuse face long-term risks to their safety and
security as they are unlikely to be able to relocate to safer areas and may be
subjected to retributive or repeated attacks, threats and abuse. Respecting the
confidentiality and informed consent of survivors and respondents is a key way
to mitigate the risks of retributive attacks and other violence against them
while ensuring respect for their rights and dignity.
Given the level of fear that has resulted from widespread insecurity in
Sri Lanka
,
collecting verified information about abuses perpetrated by armed groups
remains a challenge. In turn, this has impacted the ability of many agencies to
share information and effectively collaborate and coordinate their activities.
This restriction makes it critical that the Taskforce work to leverage
previously existing data collection systems and structures in order to feed
information into the MRM.
Collecting information on rape and other forms of sexual violence
remains a significant challenge for the Taskforce. Although many experts have
noted that sexual violence perpetrated by armed groups is a problem, to date no
such cases have been reported to the Taskforce. Many obstacles exist which
prevent the timely and ethical collection of GBV-related data. Perhaps the
biggest challenge to collecting GBV-related information, however, is the
fundamental lack of available services in the conflict-affected areas of
Sri Lanka
.
Without access to appropriate and confidential health, psychosocial, legal and
protection services administered by well-trained professionals, few if any
survivors of GBV will ever report an attack (see above: GBV).
A variety of responses may be undertaken to address the needs of
individuals or communities after a violation has occurred. These range from
undertaking national and international public advocacy, revising existing
policies to protect the rights of children, working to restore or improve
judicial systems to help decrease impunity, improving service-delivery programs
to better address the needs of children and taking immediate action to provide
services and support to child survivors.
Responding to abuses is a critical part of monitoring and reporting
violations of children’s rights. However, various members of the Taskforce
disagree about the extent to which the Taskforce should respond to incidents.
This ultimately stems from a difference of opinion between Taskforce members
about the objectives of the MRM. With regard to advocacy, some respondents
noted that they hope UNICEF and the Taskforce would become more vocal and
increase advocacy efforts in the future, while others largely saw this as
unfeasible given the prevailing climate of insecurity.
In its report, Watchlist offers practicable and action-oriented
recommendations to key stakeholders and decision-makers to advance and improve
monitoring and reporting on children’s rights in Sri Lanka (see below:
Recommendations to the 1612 Taskforce and Related Organizations).
· Strictly comply with international human rights
and humanitarian law with particular attention to the Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC) and its Optional Protocols, and comply with all signed
agreements.
· Immediately halt all violations perpetrated by
Sri Lankan security forces against the security and rights of Sri Lankan
children.
· Re-engage in the peace process, making human
rights and the protection of children an integral part of peace negotiations.
· Conduct prompt, impartial and exhaustive
investigations into all violations against children and hold accountable all
government security forces who are responsible for violations.
· Ensure that policies to protect the security and
rights of children affected by armed conflict are an integral part of all
government institutions. To this end, train relevant government servants such
as the police, justice professionals, teachers, health professionals and social
workers on the rights and needs of children affected by armed conflict and the
roles and responsibilities of the various actors involved in protecting
children’s rights.
· Take steps to ensure the effective protection of
survivors and witnesses of violations against children, including the
investigation and prosecution of individuals responsible for reprisals against
them.
· Accept and fully cooperate with an independent
human rights monitoring mission under UN auspices to investigate and report on
all violations of international human rights and humanitarian law with a
special focus on the security and rights of children.
· Ensure that human rights defenders are protected
and supported in their efforts to bring public attention to violations of human
rights, including children’s rights. Support programs and policies that would
halt crimes against human rights defenders.
· Provide humanitarian actors with unrestricted
and secure access to all areas and guarantee all civilians safe, unimpeded and
sustained access to humanitarian assistance, including emergency relief
supplies.
· Refrain from making unsubstantiated allegations
against humanitarian and human rights agencies in the media and on official
websites.
· Respect the rights of refugees and IDPs to a
voluntary and safe return or provide them with viable alternatives, if
necessary, including resettlement and local reintegration into host
communities. This should be done with special attention to the rights and needs
of displaced children.
· Adopt and implement a national IDP policy in
accordance with the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.
· Take all possible precautions to avoid attacks
on schools and remove military checkpoints and camps from the immediate
vicinity of schools. Ensure that schoolchildren are protected on their way to
school and in school compounds from abduction and recruitment in
government-controlled areas.
· Ensure that all children, including refugees and
IDPs, have free and safe access to quality primary and secondary education in
accordance with the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE)
Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early
Reconstruction. To this end, ensure that teachers receive adequate training and
compensation and that there is a sufficient number of qualified teachers in
conflict-affected areas.
· Strengthen and increase existing “catch-up
education” programs for children who have missed out on school due to conflict,
building on the current curriculum and extending it for children who have
missed more than six months of school.
· Repair and
rehabilitate schools affected by the armed conflict and replenish educational
materials.
· Ensure
that all barriers survivors face in accessing the police report form and
GBV-related health services are removed. Ensure that all survivors receive
clinical care regardless of their decision to complete the police form.
· Improve civilians’ access to health care
services and train health care staff.
· Ensure adequate representation of Tamils and
Muslims among civil servants as well as the presence of Tamil-speaking
officials in governmental services in the North and East.
· Strengthen the capacity of national agencies to
ensure effective and impartial investigations of violations committed against
children affected by armed conflict.
· Increase socially oriented spending in the
budget, with a focus on addressing imbalances in the provision of educational,
social and health services to children throughout
Sri Lanka
.
· Ensure the proper destruction of all stockpiled
landmines and ERW and provide survivors of mine blasts with appropriate legal
and medical assistance.
· Guarantee the safe and unimpeded access of
demining teams to all mined and ERW contaminated areas.
· Enact the revised firearms legislation in
Parliament and formally establish NCAPISA under an Act of Parliament.
· Immediately launch a thorough and credible
investigation into the involvement of
Sri Lanka
security forces in aiding
the recruitment and/or abduction of children by the TMVP/Karuna faction and
hold those responsible accountable for their crimes.
· Ensure that policies against the recruitment or
use of child soldiers are strictly enforced. Take strong and effective
disciplinary actions against cadre responsible for such recruitment and share
information of disciplinary actions taken with the UN Country Team.
· Take steps to end the recruitment and use of
child soldiers in government-controlled areas. This includes:
o Close TMVP/Karuna faction political offices used
for the recruitment and training of children.
o Instruct Sri Lankan security forces to actively
investigate all reported cases of child abduction and/or recruitment and hold
those accountable who fail to comply with these orders.
· With technical support from UNICEF, immediately
develop appropriate reintegration policies and programs for children released
from armed groups. Children surrendering from armed groups and currently held
in detention must be immediately released and transferred either to their
families, alternative care givers, or appropriate child welfare service
providers.
· Establish a means to appropriately, safely and ethically
identify and assist child survivors of exploitation, including prostitution,
labor and trafficking.
· Allow
human rights organizations to actively monitor arrests and detention,
particularly mass arrests, and to report their findings to UN child protection
authorities. Make lists of detainees available to families and others.
· Sign,
ratify and/or accede to relevant international treaties:
o Additional Protocols to the
Geneva
Conventions of 1949
o 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol
o Convention
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (“Mine Ban Treaty”)
o
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
o Optional Protocol to the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
o International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
· Strictly comply with all international
commitments and uphold international human rights and humanitarian law, with
particular attention to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and its
Optional Protocols.
· Immediately halt all violations perpetrated by
the LTTE against the security and rights of Sri Lankan children.
· Ensure that policies against the recruitment or
use of child soldiers are strictly enforced. Take strong and effective
disciplinary actions against cadre responsible for such recruitment and share
information of disciplinary actions taken with the UN Country Team.
· Lift restrictions on the flow of information in
and out of LTTE controlled areas, especially information on security and
well-being of children.
· Cease all rights violations connected with the
entrapment of civilians, including the extraction of taxes and forced
recruitment of civilians by intimidation, which creates an environment of
extreme danger and vulnerability for children.
· Allow for the freedom of movement of civilians,
particularly children. This includes the immediate abolishment of a local pass
system which prevents civilians from moving in and out of the Vanni area.
· Immediately halt all suicide attacks on civilian
targets throughout the country.
· Guarantee safe, unimpeded and sustained access
to humanitarian assistance for all civilians, especially children, in all areas
controlled by the LTTE.
· Immediately stop operating out of schools and
other civilian facilities and the use of humans as shields.
· Make a unilateral declaration renouncing the
use, manufacture and transfer of antipersonnel mines, particularly claymore
mines.
· Ensure that policies against the recruitment of
child soldiers are strictly enforced. Take strong and effective disciplinary
actions against personnel responsible for such recruitment and share
information of disciplinary actions taken with the UN Country Team.
· Immediately cease all new recruitment of
children, immediately release all children currently in the LTTE forces and
give those recruited before age 18 the option to leave, providing all necessary
documentation for their effective demobilization and reintegration. Coordinate
closely with the UN Country Team to release children to their families or
interim care centers. Cease transferring released children to Educational
Skills Development Centres (ESDCs).
· Working with the UN Country Team, develop a
time-bound action plan for the release of all children in the LTTE and the
cessation of new recruitment. This includes unrestricted access for
humanitarian personnel to military installations to identify and support the
demobilization of children.
· Strictly comply with all international
commitments and uphold international human rights and humanitarian law, with
particular attention to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and its
Optional Protocols.
· Immediately halt all violations perpetrated by
the TMVP/Karuna faction against the security and rights of Sri Lankan children.
· Ensure that policies against the recruitment or
use of child soldiers are strictly enforced. Take strong and effective disciplinary
actions against cadre responsible for such recruitment and share information of
disciplinary actions taken with the UN Country Team.
· Immediately cease all new recruitment of
children, immediately release all children currently in the LTTE forces and
give those recruited before age 18 the option to leave, providing all necessary
documentation for their effective demobilization and reintegration. Coordinate
closely with the UN Country Team to release children to their families or
interim care centers.
· Together with the UN Country Team, develop a
time-bound action plan for the release of all children in the TMVP/Karuna
faction and the cessation of new recruitment. This includes unrestricted access
for humanitarian personnel to military installations and TMVP political offices
to identify and support the demobilization of children.
· Call on all relevant parties to implement the
recommendations of the UN Secretary-General’s report on the situation of
children and armed conflict in Sri Lanka (S/2006/1006, S/2007/758) and the
conclusions of the SCWG-CAC (S/AC.51/2007/9) bearing in mind relevant UNSC
resolutions, particularly resolution 1539 (2004) and 1612 (2005).
· In any
future peace negotiations or agreements, ensure that the protection of
children’s security, rights and participation is prioritized. To this end, call
on the UN Country Team to prioritize these imperatives.
· Call on the GoSL, the LTTE, the TMVP/Karuna
faction and other paramilitary groups to immediately cease all attacks on
civilians and to halt all violations perpetrated by armed forces and groups
under their control against the security and rights of Sri Lankan children. As
a precautionary measure, require them to relocate their political offices and
military camps at a significant distance from IDP camps, schools, hospitals and
other civilian sites.
· Call on all parties to the conflict in
Sri Lanka
to immediately halt the abduction, recruitment and use of children.
· Urge the GoSL to accept an independent
international monitoring mission to investigate and report on all violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law with a special focus on the
security and rights of children.
· Urgently call upon all relevant actors to ensure
that human rights defenders are protected and that their efforts to bring
public attention to violations of human rights and child rights are supported.
Closely monitor the complete, transparent and timely investigations into the
threats and murder of human rights and humanitarian workers in
Sri Lanka
.
· Send a delegation of members of the SCWG-CAC to
conduct a field trip to Sri Lanka (including partially affected areas) to draw
attention to the plight of children affected by armed conflict in all parts of
Sri Lanka, to investigate allegations of violations, to review progress by the
monitoring and reporting mechanism (MRM) in Sri Lanka and to follow up by
submitting a comprehensive report including recommendations for further action
by the Security Council.
· Send a special envoy to engage in high level
diplomacy to promote safe and unhindered humanitarian access in northern
Sri Lanka
and to facilitate the work and scope of humanitarian agencies, including on
visa issues. Develop transparent, substantive, well-defined and agreed upon
guidelines and parameters for rapid and sustained humanitarian access to
unstable or LTTE-controlled areas. Ask the special envoy to report to the
Security Council on the progress of its efforts.
· Emphasize
the urgent need for an expedited rollout of the “Saving Lives Together”
initiative in
Sri Lanka
to ensure that NGOs are effectively included under the security umbrella of the
UN and that their security needs are accounted for.
· Call on the GoSL to cooperate fully with UNHCR
to guarantee the voluntary and safe return of IDPs and refugees to their areas
of return in accordance with international law. This includes conducting
systematic evaluation missions and “go and see” visits to areas of return.
· Urge national governments to ban arms sales to
Sri Lanka
until the GoSL has prosecuted military officials alleged to have recruited
child soldiers, provided humanitarian groups and reporters access to Tamil
areas of the country and agreed to allow the UN to establish a human rights
office in the country.
· Set clear benchmarks that the LTTE as a repeat
offender must meet within a strict and limited time period to end the
recruitment of children under age 18 and release all children in its cadre to
the UN Country Team. If these benchmarks are not met, the Security Council should
apply targeted measures, including an arms embargo, and a travel ban and an
asset freeze on the leadership.
· Set clear benchmarks that the TMVP/Karuna
faction as a repeat offender must meet to end the recruitment of children under
age 18 and release all children in its cadre to the UN Country Team. If these
benchmarks are not met, the Security Council should apply targeted measures,
including an arms embargo, and a travel ban and asset freeze on the leadership.
The TMVP/Karuna faction should also immediately enter into good faith dialogue
with UNICEF to develop a credible action plan to end all recruitment of
children.
· Urge the GoSL to meet without any further delay
its promise to conduct an immediate, thorough and credible investigation of the
alleged complicity of certain elements of the
Sri Lanka
security forces in the
recruitment and/or abduction of children by the TMVP/Karuna faction. Request
the GoSL to share information on concrete progress achieved in these
investigations with the 1612 Taskforce and related organizations. The
government should also inform the 1612 Taskforce and related organizations on
steps taken to end the abduction and recruitment of children in
government-controlled areas and to secure the release of children from the
TMVP/Karuna faction.
· Call on the GoSL to develop appropriate
reintegration policies and programs for children released from armed groups.
Children surrendering from armed groups and currently held in detention must be
immediately released and transferred either to their families, alternative care
givers or appropriate child welfare service providers.
· Bring to the attention of UN agencies and donor
governments the need for more concerted international advocacy and awareness
raising on the protection of civilians, including children, in
Sri Lanka
in close cooperation with nongovernmental organizations and local communities.
· To the Taskforce:
o Examine
the various roles and responsibilities of each Taskforce member to help create
a more formal division of labor and responsibility within the Taskforce.
o Identify
confidential ways for NGOs and other actors to submit information about
violations perpetrated by armed groups at the district level.
o Improve
collaboration with experts on human rights monitoring, gender-based violence
(GBV) and database management.
o Devise a
list of potential and specific responses which Taskforce members or other
actors can take upon receiving information on child rights violations.
· To the UN
Security Council, ensure that the GoSL, the LTTE and the TMVP/Karuna faction
fully support and facilitate the implementation of the MRM, and grant Taskforce
members full access to all areas in
Sri Lanka
.
· To donors, support the work of UNICEF and other
relevant agencies to increase the capacity of the monitoring and reporting
mechanism, including funding to increase the capacity of the members of the
Country Taskforce and the international and national NGOs contributing
information to the MRM.
· Immediately expedite the rollout of the “Saving
Lives Together” initiative in
Sri
Lanka
to ensure that NGOs are effectively
included under the security umbrella of the UN and that their security needs
are accounted for.
· With technical advice from UNHCR, assist the
GoSL in developing a comprehensive plan for the return of IDPs and refugees, to
be informed by consistent consultations with IDPs and refugees representing all
ethnic communities.
· Actively engage with the relevent educational
and politico-administrative authorities to ensure that children have adequate
access to quality education and other social services.
· Utilize international standards, such as the
INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, increase the availability
of catch up classes, including for children and youth who missed more than six
months of school and provide in-service training and distance learning
opportunities to increase the number of qualified teachers and education
officials.
· Ensure access of IDP children to health and
sanitation facilities, in particular by extending the provision of mobile
health clinics to conflict-affected areas and territories bordering these
areas. The special needs of women and girls should be taken into consideration.
· Assess conditions for Sri Lankan refugees living
in camps in Tamil Nadu state.
· Strengthen ongoing efforts to prevent
malnutrition of children and mothers in all conflict-affected areas. To this
end, analyze and address the causes of gender-based discriminatory health and food
distribution in families.
· Strengthen efforts to teach children,
particularly out-of-school youth, about sexual and reproductive health,
including the prevention of HIV/AIDS and other STIs.
· Prioritize the implementation of the actions
outlined in the Inter-Agency Standing
Committee’s Guidelines on Gender-based Violence Interventions in Humanitarian
Settings.
· Ensure adequate and appropriate legal, medical
and social services to GBV survivors throughout
Sri Lanka
, particularly the
conflict-affected areas. To this end, conduct a mapping of GBV-related services
available to survivors at the local level.
· Increase support for mine action programs with
special attention to the threat and impact of landmines and ERW on children.
· Urgently conduct a study on trafficking of
children in
Sri Lanka
and how it relates to the situation of armed conflict. Support the GoSL in
devising adequate policies to halt trafficking; address the root causes and
assist children who have been trafficked.
· In collaboration with the GoSL, devise a
comprehensive plan for separated and unaccompanied children in
Sri Lanka
using the Inter-Agency Guiding Principles
on Unaccompanied and Separated Children. This includes strengthening the
capacity of relevant ministries, NGOs and local communities to develop relevant
policies, and promoting standard approaches.
· Fully support the IASC response plans, including
the Common Humanitarian Acton Plan 2008 and contingency plans.
· Convene a donor conference to discuss new
approaches that take into account widespread human rights abuses and the
renewal of armed conflict, including conditionality of aid. The conference
should aim to increase support for civilian protection and humanitarian
initiatives and ensure that humanitarian aid is provided in a non-discriminatory
manner and in accordance with the Guiding Principles for Humanitarian and
Development Assistance in
Sri
Lanka
and with SPHERE standards. It should
also encourage the GoSL to sustain and increase its own funding for social
services.
· Support national capacities for child protection
monitoring, reporting and response. This includes financial and technical
support to an effective witness and victim protection program.
· Ensure that humanitarian programs and services
that benefit Sri Lankan refugees and IDPs are fully funded. In addition,
special efforts should be made to ensure that new IDP camps are established or
existing IDP camps are given adequate support.
· Support community-level initiatives on small
arms control.
· Intensify efforts to support former child
soldiers in their sustainable socio-economic reintegration into their families
and communities, including the provision of catch up education and vocational
and other skills training.These
efforts should be community-based, reduce the child’s stigmatization and take
the protection needs of the entire family into consideration. The UN and NGOs
should cooperate closely to identify former child soldiers who have
spontaneously returned to their families.
· Support the Consultative Committee for
Humanitarian Assistance (CCHA) [42] to improve the coordination with the GoSL and to give priority to the
protection of civilians. The Committee should regularly review documented
violations of non-adherence to the Guiding Principles on Humanitarian
Operations and take them up with government representatives.
· Support arms embargos against the LTTE by
India
, the
US
,
the
UK
,
Canada
and other governments, as
well as the EU.
· To governments, such as
India
and those in the APEC region,
cut supply and demand of small arms by supporting programs that enhance human
security, such as amnesties for deserters and civilians, voluntary weapons
collection programs, progressive demilitarization of certain border areas and
targeted interventions for unemployed young men.
· To the governments of
Canada
,
the
UK
, the
United States
and other countries with a significant Tamil diaspora, take active steps to
prevent the LTTE from raising money in these territories to buy arms. This
includes raising awareness among members of the Tamil community that funds
raised for the LTTE may indirectly support the killing and maiming of children
in
Sri Lanka
,
the recruitment of children as soldiers and other war crimes.
· To the government of the
UK
, conduct a thorough investigation against
Colonel Karuna, currently held under immigration charges, for crimes committed
as eastern commander for the LTTE and also as leader of the TMVP/Karuna
faction, and to pursue prosecution under
UK
law.
Children continue to be direct and indirect targets of
the violence in
Sri Lanka
.
The following is a brief summary of the impact of armed conflict on children
relating to the six grave violations identified by the UN Security Council.
Sri
Lankan children are maimed and killed as a direct and indirect result of the armed conflict. More than 3,000
civilians, including children, have been killed in the conflict since the
renewal of fighting in 2006, according to the UN, Press Release, “United Nations Concerned by Civilian Deaths in
Sri Lanka
,”
January 2, 2007. At least 45 children were killed and 77 children maimed due to
armed conflict between November 1, 2006 and September 14, 2007 (S/2007/758,
para. 24). Children die fighting on the frontlines (see above: Child Soldiers).
They become the deliberate or accidental targets of aerial bombardments and
shelling. The availability and use of small arms and the indiscriminate use of
claymore mines and other explosive mines put the lives of children in Sri Lanka
at risk (see above: Small Arms, also Landmines and ERW). In addition, the armed
conflict has had a detrimental and at times lethal effect on the nutrition and
overall health situation of children in the North and East. Many children are
dying of treatable diseases due to forced displacement, the deterioration of
medical services and the denial of humanitarian access (see above: Health).
Sri
Lankan children are abducted by various armed groups and forces. These abductions are generally a precursor
to forced recruitment by the LTTE or the TMVP/Karuna faction (see above: Child
Soldiers). More than 1,100 new
abductions and “disappearances” of civilians, mainly young Tamil boys and men,
by the GoSL, the LTTE and other armed groups were reported between January 2006
and June 2007, according to HRW, Return
to War, Human Rights under Siege, August 2007. The inaction of the
government’s security forces in response to abductions by the TMVP/Karuna
faction even in government-controlled areas continues to lend credence to
accusations of complicity between the government’s security forces and the
TMVP/ Karuna faction.
Sri
Lankan children, particularly girls, in conflict areas are at risk of rape and
other grave sexual violence according
to international and national organizations in
Sri Lanka
. However, even simple
documentation of sexual violence in
Sri Lanka
does not exist. This lack
of reporting is likely due to inadequate access to legal, medical and social
services and referral systems for survivors, which discourages survivors from
reporting crimes against them. Moreover, many survivors, afraid of
stigmatization and potential socio-economic repercussions, choose to remain
silent. Long and cumbersome judicial procedures and widespread impunity also
dissuade children and their parents from making formal complaints (see above:
GBV).
Sri
Lankan children are recruited and used as child soldiers by the LTTE and the TMVP/Karuna faction (see
above: Child Soldiers). Flaunting international commitments and repeated
pledges, the LTTE has reportedly continued to recruit and re-recruit children
into its ranks. The UN Secretary-General has named the LTTE as a party that
recruits or uses children in four annual reports on children and armed conflict
to the UN Security Council (S/2002/1299, S/2003/1053, S/2005/72, S/2006/826). There were 6,248
cases of child recruitment by the LTTE, including 2,469 cases of girls, between
January 2002 and December 2007. The LTTE has released a total of 2,042
registered cases of child recruits, while others have escaped or died. There
were a reported 1,429 outstanding cases, including 205 cases concerning children under age 18 as of
December 2007.
In total, there were
453 cases of child recruitment by the TMVP/Karuna faction, including one girl,
between April 2004 and December 2007. The TMVP/Karuna faction has released a
total of 122 registered cases of child recruits while others have escaped or
died. There were 229 reported cases of recruitment or re-recruitment by the
TMVP/Karuna faction, including 160 cases concerning children under age 18 by
the end of December 2007. The
GoSL, for its part, has failed to end the recruitment of children by the
TMVP/Karuna faction even in the government-controlled areas in the East.
Further, it has not conducted appropriate investigations of the alleged
complicity of certain elements of government security forces with the
TMVP/Karuna faction.
The GoSL also put more than 200 children
surrendering or escaping from armed groups and seeking the government’s
protection into prison together with adult ex-combatants (S/2007/758). While
many of them have been released, some children have been detained for more than six
months without a clearly
identified mechanism for their release. This defies international standards relating
to the special protection required for children recruited and used in armed
conflict.
Attacks
on schools and hospitals injure and kill Sri Lankan children and deprive them
of their rights to education and to health. In 2006 and 2007, both the government’s
security forces and the LTTE attacked schools, mainly in the
Jaffna, Trincomalee, Vavuniya and Batticaloa
districts. For example, in July 2007, 291 primary and secondary schools were
forced to close due to conflict/security reasons, preventing more than 107,000
children from attending school, according to the Joint UN North East Situation Monitoring Report of September 2007 (see above: Education). Additionally,
the proximity of many military checkpoints and TMVP/Karuna faction political
party offices to civilian sites such as schools and hospitals exposes civilians
to military attacks as well as harassment and arbitrary and illegal arrests by
the government’s security forces.
The
GoSL and the LTTE do not provide people living in crisis areas with adequate
assistance and at times have obstructed and denied the delivery of vital
humanitarian assistance by other groups. The government closed the A9 highway, the only land route to
Jaffna from LTTE-controlled areas in August 2006, and the
LTTE, in turn, put up a sea blockade, cutting off 600,000 people in
Jaffna from aid supplies.Since that time, the situation has continued
to deteriorate. In December 2007, the LTTE demanded that international agencies
operating in the LTTE-controlled Mullaithivu and parts of Kilinochchi cease
their operations and move their staff out of these areas. This denial of access
to humanitarian aid exacerbates malnutrition, preventable diseases and other
problems among Sri Lankan children.
Adding to considerable bureaucratic barriers
imposed by the government and the LTTE, humanitarian and human rights workers
are increasingly harassed, threatened and even killed while carrying out their
lifesaving work. Frequent and unfounded attacks in the media against UN
agencies and international NGOs endanger the security of humanitarian and human
rights workers and obstruct their work. From January 2006 to November 2007, at
least 28 humanitarian aid workers were killed in violent attacks.
Agence France-Presse (AFP) www.afp.com
Claymore
Mines: “Awful” Weapon of
Sri
Lanka
's Rebels, 5/8/06
Amnesty International (AI) www.amnestyinternational.org
Sri Lanka
Tamil Tigers Beating up Families, 7/7/04
Sri Lanka
:
Waiting to Go Home - The Plight of the Internally Displaced, 6/29/2006
Sri
Lanka
Armed Groups Infiltrating Refugee
Camps, 3/14/07
Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW)
Letter to the UN Human Rights Council, Human Rights
Council: Urgent Action Needed to End Abuses in
Sri Lanka
, 12/7/07
Asian Development Bank (ADB), UN, World Bank
Sri Lanka
.
Assessment of Needs in the Conflict-Affected Areas. Districts of
Jaffna, Kilinochchi,
Mullaitivu, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara, 5/03
Sri Lanka
.
Assessment of Conflict-related Needs in the Districts of Puttalam Polonnaruwa,
Anuradhapura Moneragala, 5/9/03
Asian
Human Rights Commission (AHRC) www.ahrchk.net/
Sri Lanka
: Another Alleged Assault of a
14-year-old Student by the Principal, 4/30/07
Sri Lanka
: Chief Justice Warns
Judiciary is Becoming a Joke, 4/3/06
Sri Lanka
, Extrajudicial Killings of
Five Youths in Vavuniya, 11/6/07
Sri Lanka
: Supreme Court Removes
Country from Obligations under International Law, Raises Unprecedented
Questions for UN, 9/18/06
Sri Lanka
: Torture of a Boy by the
Thelikada Police, 6/8/06
Sri Lanka
: Torture of a 15-year-old Boy
from Batuwatte by Members of the Police, 11/16/06
Sri Lanka
: Vavuniya Police Allegedly
Attacked a Family Member of Torture Victim, 11/30/07
Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC) www.alrc.net/
Alternative
Report to the Second Periodic Report of
Sri Lanka
to the Committee against
Torture, 9/2005
Special Case: Supreme Court on Nallaratnam Singarasa,
6/18/07
Systematic and Widespread
Torture by State Institutions in
Sri Lanka
and Absence of Effective
Remedies for Victims and their Family Members. An Alternative Report to the
Second Periodic Report of
Sri
Lanka
to the Committee against Torture,
9/2005
Associated Press www.ap.org
Sri Lankan Human Rights
Advisers Quit, 10/15/07
BBC News www.bbc.co.uk
Country
Profile:
Sri Lanka
,
8/3/07
Monitors’
Statement on Sri Lanka Killings, 8/30/2006
Ignoring UN Treaty ‘Unprecedented,’ 9/24/06
Police Evict Tamils from
Colombo, 6/7/07
Sri Lanka Defense Budget to
Soar, 10/1/07
Sri Lanka
in False
UK
Visa Report, 11/8/07
Sri Lanka
on
Brink of All-Out War, 10/16/07
Sri Lanka Youth “Seized to
Fight,” 11/13/06
Sri Lanka
: War Weary Tamils Face
India
Hardship, 6/4/07
Who
is Winning Sri Lanka’s War? 5/25/07
Biting the Bullet www.international-alert.org
Implementation
of the PoA in
South Asia, 6/06
British Refugee Council (BRC)
www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/
Sri
Lanka Monitor, No. 138, 7/99
Sri Lanka
:
Return to Uncertainty, 7/02
Carnegie Council www.cceia.org/calendar/data/6051.html
Children
and Armed Conflict:
Sri
Lanka
, a Case in Point, 6/5/07
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) www.crs.org
Lens into Sri Lanka Crisis from
Refugee Camps in
India
,
7/2/07
Center for Policy Alternatives (CPA) www.cpalanka.org
HIV/AIDS in Sri
Lanka. A Profile on Policy and Practice, 7/07
Report of the Fact Finding
Mission to Mannar in
October 2007, 11/07
Report of the Fact Finding
Mission to Batticaloa from
May 17-18 2007, 5/07
Report of the Fact Finding
Mission to Trincomalee
District from April 23-27, 2007, 4/07
Supreme Court Grants Leave to
Proceed to Case Filed by CPA on the Eviction of Tamils from
Colombo, 7/26/07
CPA and The
Asia Pacific Leadership
Forum (APLF)
www.cpalanka.org
A Profile of the Stigma and
Discrimination Faced by People Living with HIV/AIDS, 2005
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers www.child-soldiers.org
Sri Lanka – The LTTE and
Child Recruitment, Forum on Armed Groups and the Involvement of Children in
Armed Conflict, Chateau de Bossey, Switzerland, July 4-7, 2006
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers/Chatham House www.chathamhouse.org.uk
Child Recruitment in South
Asian Conflicts. A Comparative Analysis of
Sri Lanka
,
Nepal
and
Bangladesh
, 2006.
Danish Refugee
Council Sri Lanka and UNHCR
Sri Lanka
:
Jaffna Welfare Centre Assessment – Final
Report, 7/31/07
Deutsche
Presse-Agentur (DPA) www.dpa.de
Nervous Sri Lankan Parents
Pull Kids from Schools amid Bomb Rumours, 6/28/06
Roundup:
Colombo Says it Regrets Killings of 65
Refugees, 11/6/06
European Commission http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm
European Commission, Sri Lanka
Strategy Paper 2007 -2013
Feinstein
International
Center (
Tufts
University) http://fic.tufts.edu
Humanitarian
Agenda 2015. Sri Lanka Country Study, 10/2007
Fisher, Sarah
Gender
Based Violence in
Sri Lanka
in the After/Math of the 2004 Tsunami Crisis: The Role of International
Organisations and International NGOs in Prevention and Response to Gender Based
Violence, 10/6/05
Freedom House www.freedomhouse.org
Freedom of the World Survey 2007
MCC Should Withhold Funding
from Sri Lankan Government, 4/6/07
Global Information Network www.globalinfo.org
Sri Lanka
:
Social Workers Fight for Acceptance of AIDS Orphans, 07/06/07
Human Rights Watch (HRW) www.hrw.org
Complicit
in Crime. State Collusion in Abductions and Child Recruitment by the Karuna
Group, 1/07
Funding
the “Final War,” LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora, 3/14/06
Improving
Civilian Protection in
Sri
Lanka
. Recommendations for the Government
and the LTTE, 9/06
Living in Fear. Child Soldiers
and the Tamil Tigers in
Sri
Lanka
, 11/2004
Return
to War: Human Rights under Siege, 8/2007
Sri Lanka
: End Expulsion of Tamils
from
Colombo, 6/8/07
Sri Lanka
: Government Abuses Intensify.
Killings, Abductions and Displacement Soar as Impunity Reigns, 8/6/07
Sri Lanka
.
Karuna Group and LTTE Continue Abducting, 3/29/07
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)
www.humanitarianinfo.org
Country Team in Sri Lanka:
Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa
& Ampara Situation Report # 91, September 6-13, 2007, 9/13/07
Country Team in Sri Lanka:
Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa
& Ampara Districts, Situation Report # 92, September, 13-20, 2007, 9/13/07
Joint UN North East Situation Monitoring Report, 6/07
Joint UN North East Situation Monitoring Report, 8/07
Joint UN North East Situation
Monitoring Report, 9/07
Internal
Displacement
Monitoring
Center (IDMC)
www.internal-displacement.org
Civilians in the Way of Conflict:
Displaced People in
Sri
Lanka
, 9/26/2007
Sri Lanka
:
Escalation of Conflict Leaves Tens of Thousands of IDPs without Protection and
Assistance, 11/16/06
Sri Lanka
,
Over 301,800 Currently Displaced because of Fighting since April 2006, 4/07
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) www.icbl.org
Landmine
Monitor Report 2006, 10/06
Landmine
Monitor Report 2007, 10/07
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) www.icrc.org
Annual
Report Sri Lanka 2006
Sri Lanka
:
ICRC Deeply Concerned about Increasing Mine Casualties, 6/15/06
International Crisis Group (ICG) www.crisisgroup.org
Sri Lanka
:
The Failure of the Peace Process. Crisis Group
Asia
Report No. 124, 11/28/06
Sri Lanka
’s
Human Rights Crisis, 6/14/07
Sri Lanka
’s Muslims: Caught in the
Crossfire, 5/29/07
International Herald Tribune (IHT) www.iht.com
17
Civilians Killed in Schools in
Sri
Lanka
, 8/4/06
International Labor Organization (ILO) www.ilo.org
Child
Labour and Responses. Overview Note –
Sri Lanka
, 11/2004
International Medical Corps (IMC) www.imcworldwide.org
Save
Sri Lanka
's Neglected Population IMC's
Mobile Clinics Bring Health Care to Those Who Need It
Most, 8/31/07
Institute for Peace & Conflict Studies (IPCS) www.ipcs.org
Child
Soldiers III: Baby Brigades of the LTTE, 10/21/03
IPS News http://ipsnews.net/
Sri Lanka
:
‘Deadly’ Climate for Reporters and Aid Workers, 8/28/07
IRIN News www.irinnews.org
In
Sri Lanka Children Still Go to War, 3/24/07
Sri Lanka
: A
Vital Lifeline for Families Torn Apart, 11/20/07.
Sri Lanka
:
Conflict Disrupts Ongoing Demining Effort, 8/2/07
Sri Lanka
, “Groundless” Allegations could
Threaten Aid Work, 11/28/07
Sri Lanka
:
Humanitarian Access Improving in Resettlement Areas in East, 11/21/07
Sri Lanka
: Malnutrition Rising in
Jaffna, Aid Deliveries
Struggling, 7/18/07
Sri Lanka
:
Many Schools in East Reopen, though Fear Persists, 5/21/07
Sri Lanka
:
New Security Measures Slow Deliveries to the Vanni, 6/26/07
Sri Lanka
:
Orphanages used as Last Resort by Parents of 19,000 Children, 9/3/07
Sri
Lanka
: Shortage of Construction Materials Hampers
Rebuilding in
Jaffna,
7/9/07
Sri Lanka
:
Taking the Long Route Home, 8/17/07
Sri Lanka
:
Thousands of Displaced Persons Begin Return to Batticaloa West, 5/24/07
Sri Lanka
:
Uneven Progress in Post-Tsunami Schools’ Reconstruction, 9/6/07
Sri Lanka
: UN Urges Investigations of
Deaths and More Security for Aid Workers, 11/14/07
Joint UN Team on AIDS in
Sri
Lanka
www.unaids.org/en/CountryResponses/Countries/sri_lanka.asp
Situation & Response
Analysis, Update 2006, Key Findings from the External Review of the STD &
AIDS Response in Sri Lanka, 2006
Law and Society Trust www.lawandsocietytrust.org
Memo Submitted By Sri
Lankan Human Rights Organizations to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,
9/17/07
Statement by Human Rights
Organizations on the Expulsion of Tamils from Lodges in
Colombo, 6/7/07
Minority Rights Group International www.minorityrights.org
One year On:
Counter-Terrorism sparks Human Rights Crisis for
Sri Lanka
’s Minorities, December
2007
Médicins Sans Frontičres (MSF) -
USA
www.doctorswithoutborders.org
MSF
Responds to Ongoing Violence in
Sri
Lanka
, 1/24/07
The New York Times www.nytimes.com
Sri Lanka
’s
Scars Trace Lines of War Without End, 6/15/07
Nonviolent Peaceforce (NPSL) www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org
Nonviolent Peaceforce Programme
Department - Report for October 2006
Quarterly Report, January – March
2007
Refugees Studies Centre www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/
Children
& Armed Conflict in
Sri
Lanka
. A discussion document prepared for
UNICEF Regional Office South Asia, prepared by Jason Hart (with permission of author) 2001.
Reuters www.alertnet.org
Sri
Lanka Bans Charity for Funding Rebels, 11/22/07
Sri Lanka
Rebukes UN Aid Chief over Safety Fears, 8/10/07
Sri
Lanka Renegades to Disarm Once Safe from Tigers, 8/8/07
Sri Lanka
’s War Displaced Seek New
Start - Yet Again, 6/19/07
Save the Children in Sri Lanka www.savethechildren.lk
Home
Truths, Children’s Rights in Institutional Care in
Sri Lanka
, 2/28/06
Save the Children in
Sri Lanka
:
Emergency Response Monthly Update, 5/07
Small Arms Survey www.smallarmssurvey.org
In the Shadow of a
Cease-fire: The Impacts of Small Arms Availability and Misuse in
Sri Lanka
by Chris Smith, 10/03
Small Arms and Human
Insecurity: Participatory Research in
South Asia
by Small Arms Survey/Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 4/2002
Small Arms Survey 2004
South Asia Small Arms Network Sri Lanka and Saferworld www.saferworld.org.uk
Small Arms and Light
Weapons. Challenges in
Sri
Lanka
and Options for the Future, 5/06
South Asians for
Human Rights (SAHR) www.southasianrights.org/
Report on the Fact Finding
Mission
to the North and East of
Sri Lanka
to Assess the State of
Displaced
Persons, 8/2007
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) www.slmm.lk
Implementation of the
Agreements Reached Between the Government of
Sri
Lanka
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam at the
Geneva Talks, 22-23
February 2006
The Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission Condemns Claymore Mine Attack on a Civilian Bus near Kebitigollewa,
6/16/06
The Economist www.economist.com
A
War Strange as Fiction, 6/7/07
Forecast,
6/12/07
United Nations www.un.org
Press Release: United Nations Concerned by Civilian
Deaths in
Sri Lanka
(IHA/1248), 1/2/07
Secretary-General’s
Report on Children and Armed Conflict in
Sri Lanka
(S/2006/1006), 12/20/06
Secretary-General’s
Report on Children and Armed Conflict in
Sri Lanka
(S/2007/758), 12/21/07
Secretary-General’s
Report on Children and Armed Conflict (S/2005/72), 2/9/05
Secretary-General’s
Report on Children and Armed Conflict (S/2006/826), 10/6/06
Security
Council Resolution on Children and Armed Conflict 1539, 4/22/04
Security
Council Resolution on Children and Armed Conflict 1612, 7/26/05
UNAIDS www.unaids.org
Sri Lanka
,
2007 (retrieved 9/17/06)
Sri
Lanka Country Report on Follow Up to the Declaration On Commitment on HIV/AIDS
(UNGASS), Ministry of Health, Reporting Period: January 2003- December 2005,
2006
The HIV/AIDS Portal for Asia
Pacific,
Sri
Lanka
at a Glance, 6/15/07
UNAIDS, WHO and UNICEF www.who.int/
Epidemiological
Fact Sheets on HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections:
Sri Lanka
, 12/2006
UN Committee of the Rights of the Child ww.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/index.htm
Concluding Observations of
the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) – 2003
UN Economic and Social Council www.un.org/ecosoc
Written statement submitted
by the Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC), a Non-Governmental Organization in General
Consultative Status (E/CN.4/2005/NGO/116), 2/17/05
UNESCO www.unesco.org
Adolescent
Reproductive Health in
South Asia.
Sri Lanka
,
2007
EFA Global Monitoring Report
2008. Education for All. Will We Make It? 2007
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) www.unhcr.org
IDPs by Place of Displacement
and Place of Origin as of 31 October 2007, 11/13/07
IDP Working Group Meeting.
Theme One: Sexual and Gender-based Violence, 3/31/06
Sri Lanka
:
Working Together against Gender-based Violence, 4/18/06
UNHCR
Official Calls on
Sri Lanka
to Double its Efforts to Assist IDPs, 7/13/07
UNHCR Response to New
Displacement in
Sri Lanka
:
September 2006
UNICEF www.unicef.org
Call
to Increased Action for
Sri
Lanka
’s War Affected Children, 1/22/04
Database
on Underage Recruitment in
Sri
Lanka
, 12/31/07
Humanitarian
Action.
Sri Lanka
.
Donor Update, 6/24/07
Learning
Years, 2007 (retrieved 09/13/07)
Making
a Difference with Catch-up Education, 2006
New Syllabus Helps
Conflict-Affected Children Get Back to School in
Sri Lanka
, 11/5/07
Rapid
Needs Assessment Survey: Education of Children in Conflict Affected Areas of
Sri Lanka
,
2003
Sri Lanka
,
2007 (retrieved 9/21/07)
Sri Lanka
:
Activities. Water & Sanitation, (retrieved 10/03/07)
Sri Lanka
.
Statistics (retrieved 10/3/07)
Sri Lanka
- UNICEF HIV and AIDS
Programming Country Profile 2006
The State of the World’s
Children 2007
UNICEF
HIV and AIDS Programming Country Profile 2006
UNICEF and National Institute of Education
Rapid
Needs Assessment Survey: Education of Children in Conflict Affected Areas of
Sri Lanka
,
2003
UNICEF
ROSA www.unicef.org/rosa/about.html
Social Inclusion: Gender
and Equity in Education SWAPS in
South Asia.
Sri Lanka Case Study, 2007
University Teachers for Human Rights (
Jaffna) (UTHR(J))
www.uthr.org
Can the East be Won by Human Culling? Special Economic
Zones. An Ideological Journey Back to 1983. 7/07
Slow Strangulation of
Jaffna: Trashing General
Larry Wijeratne’s Legacy and Enthroning Barbarism, Special Report No. 28,
12/4/07
The Plight of Child
Conscripts, Social Degradation and Anti-Muslim Frenzy, 7/20/02
The Choice between Anarchy
and International Law with Monitoring, Special Report No. 23, 11/7/06
UN News Service www.un.org
Ban Ki-moon urges Political Solution as
Sri Lanka
Truce Breaks Down, 1/3/08
UN
Adviser Finds
Sri Lanka
’s
Children “At Risk from All Sides,” 11/14/06
UN Human Rights Expert Reports Allegations of Torture
in
Sri Lanka
,
11/16/07
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) www.unocha.org
CHAP
for
Sri Lanka
2007, 1/12/07
CHAP, Mid-Year Review of the
Appeal 2007 for
Sri Lanka
,
7/17/07
Consolidated
Report on Civilian Population Displaced, 7/26/2006
Humanitarians Remember
Murdered ACF Workers Crime Against Humanitarians Still Unsolved One Year On,
8/6/07
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) www.ohchr.org
Press Statement by High
Commissioner for Human Rights on Conclusion of Her Visit to
Sri Lanka
,
Colombo,
10/13/07
Press Release: UN Expert
Emphasizes Sustainable and Durable Solutions for Sri Lanka’s Internally
Displaced Persons, 12/27/07
Sri Lanka
:
United Nations Condemns Indiscriminate Use of Force, 11/9/06
UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Children and Armed Conflict http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/index.html
Sri Lanka
–
LTTE Attack on School is a Grave Violation of Rights of Children, 12/12/06
USAID www.usaid.gov
Complex
Emergency Fact Sheet # 4 (FY) 2007, 6/1/07
US Department of State www.state.gov
Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices 2006.
Sri Lanka
, 3/6/07
Bureau of Population, Refugees
and Migration, FY 2007 Guidelines
for Proposal Submissions for IO and NGO Protection and Assistance Programs for
Sri Lankan Refugees in
India
,
8/27/07
Trafficking
in Persons Report, 6/2006
US Institute of Peace (USIP) www.usip.org
Washington Times www.washingtontimes.com
Tamils
flee Sri Lankan War for Jobs in
India
;
Families Sell Possessions to Make Journey, 11/18/2006
Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict www.watchlist.org
Getting
It Done and Doing It Right: Implementing the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism
on Children and Armed Conflict in
Sri Lanka
, 1/08
Women and Media Collective www.womenandmedia.net
Women’s Rights Watch, 1998, 1999
Women in Development IQC
Gender
Assessment for USAID/Sri Lanka, 2/17/04
World Bank www.worldbank.org
HIV/AIDS
in
Sri Lanka
,
6/05
World Bank, Government of the United Kingdom, Netherlands Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, The Asia Foundation, SIDA
Aid,
Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka, 2000-2005, 2005
World Health Organization (WHO) www.who.int
Health
Lines. Newsletter of Country Office for
Sri Lanka
, 12/06
World
Health Statistics 2007
World Health Organization / Regional Office for
South-East
Asia (WHO/SEARO) http://www.searo.who.int
Adolescent
Sexual and Reproductive Health and HIV/AIDS among Young People, Compendium of
Institutions in
Sri Lanka
,
2006
Reproductive Health and
Research, 9/13/06
Sri Lanka
.
Mini Profile – 2007
World Food Program (WFP) www.wfp.org
Executive Brief:
Sri Lanka
.
Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification (IPC), 5/07
Health Lines. Newsletter of
Country Office for
Sri Lanka
,
12/06
Sri Lanka Food Security
Assessment, based on the Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification
Approach 15 – 30 April 2007, 6/07
Sri Lanka
.
National Health System Profile – January 2005
World Organization Against Torture (OMCT) www.omct.org
State Violence in
Sri Lanka
.
Alternative Report to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, 1/04
Violence Against Women in
Sri Lanka
, Report prepared for the Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 2002
Ganeshpanchan, Zinthiya
Domestic
and Gender-based Violence among Refugees and Internally Displaced Women, 2005
Watchlist works within the framework of the
provisions adopted in Security Council Resolutions 1261, 1314, 1379, 1460, 1539
and 1612, the principles of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its
protocols and other internationally adopted human rights and humanitarian
standards.
Information is collected
through an extensive network of organizations that work with children around
the world. Analysis is provided by a multidisciplinary team of people with
expertise and/or experience in the particular context. Information in the
public domain may be directly cited in the report. All sources are listed in
alphabetical order at the end of this report.
General supervision of
Watchlist is provided by a Steering Committee of international nongovernmental
organizations known for their work with children and human rights. The views
presented in this report do not represent the views of any one organization in
the network or the Steering Committee.
For further information about Watchlist or
specific reports, or to share information about children in a particular
conflict situation, please contact: watchlist@watchlist.org
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